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HISTORY OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

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The sixth volume concludes the series of essays "The History of Russian Foreign Intelligence." It is dedicated to her work from 1966 to the present: a period full of drama in the history of our state - the height of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that difficult time for the country, intelligence was restructuring its ranks on a democratic basis, looking for and finding new priorities, directions, forms and methods of work, improving its structure, and renewing personnel. This was reflected in some of the essays in the final volume.

A number of essays show the work of foreign intelligence to defend the geopolitical interests of our Motherland in the first post-war years, its activities to prevent the cold war from turning into a "hot war", the fight against the enemy's intelligence agencies on the political, ideological and economic fronts. Also touched upon are new directions in intelligence activities, caused by the dictates of the times.

Intelligence is still called upon to contribute to the country's national security. And its main mission - obtaining secret information in the interests of Russia - will continue in the future.

For a wide range of readers.

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Foreword

The content of the sixth and final volume of the "History of Russian Foreign Intelligence" is devoted to its activities in the 70-90s of the last century and in the first years of the new, XX] century.

The fifth volume of essays ended with the events connected with the beginning of the period of détente in international relations. The sixth volume, telling about the work of foreign intelligence in the 70-90s, draws a line under the activities of intelligence in the Soviet period of Russian history. The essays in this volume tell about the beginning of the post-Soviet period in the life of intelligence, its restructuring on a democratic basis, about new tasks and directions of work, and the importance of the information it produces in ensuring the external security of the country.

Such a diverse historical content of the volume created considerable difficulties in its preparation. Probably, the reader may also face difficulties - after all, the volume deals with the work of intelligence on the verge of two eras, at one of the turning points in Russian and world history.

The 1970s and 1980s were a difficult and dramatic period in Russian history, culminating in the disappearance of the great power, the Soviet Union, from the political map of the world, whose policy for many decades was one of the determining factors in the balance of power in the world.

The activities of foreign intelligence in these years, the nature of the tasks it solved, operational and information-analytical work in accordance with the directive instructions of the country's leadership were determined by the peculiarities of the development of the international situation and, first of all, by the efforts of the Soviet Union to ensure the national security of the country, protect its vital interests in the international arena.

Changes in international relations following the diplomatic resolution of the Caribbean missile crisis, which

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which put the world before the reality of thermonuclear war, seemed to be securely enshrined in such fundamental international legal acts as the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in August 1975 in Helsinki, adopted by the UN in 1977 at the initiative of the Soviet Union Declaration on deepening and strengthening the relaxation of international tension, as well as in a number of bilateral agreements signed by the Soviet Union with the leading capitalist countries in the 1960s and 1970s.

Taking into account the course pursued by the country's leadership to ease tensions in international relations, foreign intelligence made certain adjustments to its work. Without refusing to acquire important new sources in order to obtain reliable information about the plans of the opponents of this course, it refrained from taking acute measures that could be used by them to return to the policy of confrontation. A significant part of active intelligence activities during this period was aimed at strengthening the line for the peaceful resolution of existing contradictions, increasing the number of its supporters among the political and public circles of various states, and exposing the activities of opponents of this policy.

Describing the end of an acute period in Soviet-American relations, J. Kennan, the former US ambassador to the USSR and one of the prominent developers of US foreign policy towards our country, wrote: "Pressure against detente never ceased in Washington, even at its highest point of development. It was only held back by the fleeting prestige and authority of the White House. As the power of President R. Nixon collapsed in 1973 and 1974, the forces opposed to detente again took up combat positions, and very effectively." US President George Ford later admitted that "the staunch supporters of American military superiority in the Pentagon would have made the conclusion of a new agreement on SALT impossible anyway."

Therefore, the discharge was short-lived. Already in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the situation in the world again began to be characterized by significant tension caused by attempts by certain US circles to break the existing strategic balance, to achieve unilateral military superiority in order to try to secure a dominant position for themselves. in the world.

The relations of the two superpowers again returned to a strategic confrontation, under which for many years, until the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign intelligence had to work.

The main task assigned to intelligence during this period of confrontation between the two superpowers was to avoid overlooking such a breakthrough of the opposite side in the military, scientific

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technical and political fields, which would give it an overwhelming advantage and would pose a real security threat to our country, would expose it to the possibility of a surprise nuclear missile attack.

In June 1975, the United States declassified and published the founding document of the Cold War: US National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC-68) signed in 1950 by US President Truman.

This conceptual document, which determined the US foreign policy doctrine for long decades, until the collapse of the USSR, was a kind of cold war charter. As the main goal of US policy, he proclaimed "the achievement of a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system."

First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR G.M. Kornienko in his memoirs "The Cold War. Testimony of Its Participant" gave the following assessment of this doctrinal setting of American foreign policy. Within the framework of the policy recommended by the NSC directive, he writes, "there was virtually no room for serious and successful negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, either on a general settlement of their relations or on questions of arms limitation and disarmament. Not expecting that through negotiations the United States would be able to reach a settlement that would lead to fundamental changes in the Soviet system, the authors of the document allowed the use of negotiations with the USSR only for purely tactical purposes.

The focus of US policy on the elimination of the Soviet Union was also confirmed in the documentary materials obtained by intelligence about the nuclear planning of the United States, and then NATO, the development of specific plans for delivering nuclear strikes on the territory of the Soviet Union and its partners under the defensive Warsaw Pact ("Totality" - 1945). year, Pincher - 1946, Broiler - 1947, Dropshot - 1948, Sizzle - end of 1948).

Thus, the "Dropshot" plan, drawn up back in 1948 by the Pentagon and the US Chiefs of Staff, provided for the use of 300 atomic and 29,000 conventional bombs to strike the Soviet Union. According to American calculations, this should have led to the destruction of 85% of the industrial potential of the USSR and the death of several million people of its population.

Since the late 1960s, American and NATO strategists began to draw up the so-called "Unified Integrated Operational Plans" (SIOP) for strikes against the Soviet bloc, which provided for the unification of all forces and means of waging a nuclear war under a single command. These plans were constantly refined taking into account the emergence of new types of weapons and changes in the balance of forces on

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international arena. The task of foreign intelligence, which she solved not without success, was to be constantly aware of these NATO plans. The last comprehensive plan SIOP-6 known to foreign intelligence of the USSR was signed by R. Reagan in 1980.

On the whole, the Soviet leadership did not have a shortage of information about the plans of the American ruling circles and their focus on "fundamentally changing the nature of the Soviet system". Another thing is how it was perceived, how soberly and according to the state was assessed. Statements like "who will bury whom" did little to mobilize the country's internal resources in response to a real threat.

From May 1956 to July 1971, A.M. Sakharovsky, a man with extensive experience in military and KGB work, a participant in military reconnaissance operations DURING THE WAR.

For intelligence, this was the time of its formation in the conditions of the aggravation of the international situation. During this period, there was an intensification of the activities of the military-political blocs created by the United States that surrounded the USSR, the events in Hungary, the war in the Middle East and Korea, the Caribbean and Berlin crises, and the events in Czechoslovakia.

In 1971 Sakharov retired from intelligence with the rank of Colonel General for health reasons. For a number of years he then worked as a consultant to the chairman of the KGB.

From July 1971 to January 1974, Lieutenant General F.K. Mortin, who was the first deputy of A.M. Sakharovsky.

In November 1974, V.A. was appointed head of foreign intelligence. Kryuchkov. A graduate of the Higher Diplomatic School, he had experience of working in the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the embassy in Hungary during the days of the well-known Hungarian events, in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU as assistant secretary of the Central Committee Yu.V. Andropov. In the KGB of the USSR, he headed the Secretariat, from 1971 to 1974 he was the first deputy head of intelligence.

By this time, foreign intelligence had rich experience in operational work, well-trained personnel and a well-functioning system of apparatus. Intelligence as a whole coped with the tasks assigned to it by the country's leadership.

At the same time, in accordance with the instructions of Yu.V. Andropov, who personally paid great attention to improving the work of intelligence, outlined the main, fundamental directions for improving the activities of foreign intelligence, a more targeted orientation of its work to the needs of the political and economic life of the country.

Much has been done to improve the efficiency of all parts of the intelligence service. Much attention was paid to

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improving the work of information and analytical services. Several scientific structures were created that were engaged in the generalization of operational practice, methods of conducting reconnaissance work in various conditions, studying the directions and methods of work of enemy intelligence services, introducing computer equipment and the latest information technologies into the work of the reconnaissance apparatus and residencies. .

In the 1970s, foreign counterintelligence, which had come a long way in its development, took shape as an independent unit. It was designed to detect and suppress the activities of foreign intelligence services against the Soviet Union and its citizens, to ensure the security of the activities of foreign intelligence and its residencies, to protect its agent network from penetration by the frauds of the intelligence services of foreign states. The main means of solving these problems was to infiltrate the enemy's special services, re-recruit agents, and conduct operational games. Truly, it was an intelligence war - the most delicate area in intelligence activities, creative, but also the most protected.

Assessing the work of foreign counterintelligence in the period described, we can say that it was very effective. In the early 1980s, at the cost of great intelligence and counterintelligence efforts, it was possible to reach the enemy's extensive agent network in the Soviet Union, obtain specific information about its existence, and identify objects into which the enemy managed to infiltrate his agents. These were the security agencies and military intelligence, the most important state institutions, research institutes, strategic industrial enterprises.

Taking into account the requirements of secrecy, together with internal counterintelligence, a large-scale work was carried out to neutralize the enemy's agent network.

The work of foreign intelligence on Afghan issues is reflected in this volume. In Afghanistan, this traditionally friendly state to Russia, our intelligence has been working since ancient times. The main task was to contribute to the strengthening of Soviet-Afghan relations, to monitor the situation in the country and around it. The persistent US attempts to destabilize the situation on the southern borders of the USSR were especially alarming; for this, the Muslim factor was used, in particular.

It performed foreign intelligence in Afghanistan and another function: it helped to strengthen local security agencies. For these purposes, our advisers were sent to many Afghan provinces, and Afghan intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers were trained on the territory of the USSR. |

The activities of foreign intelligence in Afghanistan have sharply intensified since the entry of Soviet troops into the country. On the shoulders of intelligence

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ki laid down primarily information and analytical tasks. She regularly submitted analytical notes to the country's leadership with proposals for possible options for action in a given situation.

Many foreign intelligence officers sent to Afghanistan had a chance to take a direct part in the hostilities. Some of them died doing their duty. In intelligence, their memory is deeply honored.

With R. Reagan coming to the US presidency in 1981, intelligence began to receive more and more information about the development by his administration of not probable, but very specific plans for the destruction of the USSR and the liquidation of the system of countries of the socialist community.

Even during the pre-election campaign, foreign intelligence received fairly complete data on the personality of R. Reagan. Sources described him as a politician obsessed with the idea of "destroying the existing social system in the Soviet Union."

Thus, already in the early 1980s, the Soviet leadership should have had no doubts about the ultimate goals of R. Reagan's policy. Foreign intelligence sent the country's leadership detailed information on the content of the directives developed by the US National Security Council and signed by R. Reagan regarding the directions and methods of work of the US state machine for "fundamental change in the Soviet system", as stated in the fundamental directive of the National Security Council-75, signed by R. Reagan in January 1983.

Information reported by foreign intelligence to the leadership of the country showed that the United States, using the ever-increasing objective difficulties of the Soviet economy, was implementing a targeted program to further weaken it.

In particular, this program, according to intelligence, included measures to reduce the flow of hard currency into the Soviet Union by lowering world oil prices; creation of difficulties in the implementation of large-scale projects for the extraction of natural gas and the construction of gas pipelines in order to limit the export of Soviet gas to the West; creating obstacles to the export of Soviet raw materials and equipment; maximum restriction of the USSR's access to advanced world technologies; creating difficulties, up to a complete disruption, in the implementation of major projects vital for the country; deliveries to the Soviet Union of obviously obsolete equipment and technologies; promotion, using the channels of special services, scientific and technical disinformation.

Plans to undermine the Soviet political system and economy were not drawn up from scratch. When developing them, data from the American intelligence services, the State Department,

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The Pentagon, research centers and other sources of information about the real difficulties of the Soviet Union and the negative social and political processes developing in its bowels, the inability of the top party leadership to assess the changes taking place in the world and the country in a timely manner and make adequate decisions.

In a secret CIA report on the problem of a shortage of hard currency in the USSR, prepared by American intelligence in 1986, which became known to Soviet intelligence, it was said: materials by the end of the decade. The sharp decline in imports of goods in hard currency by a third or more came at a time when Gorbachev was probably counting on an increase in foreign exchange profits, through which he intended to finance an economic recovery program.

The financial difficulties of the Soviet Union were exacerbated by the ongoing arms race. According to the CIA calculations given in the above-mentioned report, the real losses of the USSR as a result of the measures carried out by the Americans amounted to 13 billion dollars at the beginning of 1986.

The tasks of foreign intelligence at this crucial moment in the history of the Soviet state were not only to obtain information and reveal the plans of the United States and its Western allies to destroy the Soviet Union, but also, acting with their own specific means, to counteract these plans. In particular, using its connections with politicians and leaders of a number of countries, foreign intelligence worked to create conditions that would facilitate the receipt of cash loans by the Soviet Union.

The main burden of countering the enemy's plans to undermine the Soviet economy fell on scientific and technical intelligence. In the 1980s, it was strengthened organizationally, replenished with personnel, most of whom, in addition to intelligence experience, had scientific and technical training. Scientific and technical intelligence was one of the first to introduce the latest information technologies into its work, created an analytical service that had an extensive array of information in its databases.

Scientific and technical intelligence regularly supplied the government and industry with information about the latest achievements of the West in the field of fundamental and applied sciences, advanced technologies, the production of new types of materials, the development of electronics, and much more.

Under the conditions of the economic blockade of the USSR organized by the United States, which was expressed, in particular, in the tightening of prohibitive measures on the import of advanced technologies into the Soviet Union, the

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intelligence and materials, foreign intelligence, primarily its scientific and technical services, acting by their own specific means, significantly weakened the discriminatory measures of the West aimed at strangling the Soviet economy. Through secret channels organized by intelligence, it was possible to obtain not only documentation for the latest technology, but also sometimes unique devices and equipment.

In order to resist the economic sabotage of the Western powers, at the end of the 1980s, it was decided to separate work on economic issues into an independent area of foreign intelligence activity and create appropriate structures for this purpose. Over time, the economic direction of foreign intelligence strengthened, created operational positions in economic organizations both within the Union and abroad, and on a par with the lines of political intelligence (PR), counterintelligence (CR) and scientific and technical intelligence (NTR).) became one of the leading intelligence units for the extraction of secret information and carrying out operational activities in defense of the economic and trade and financial interests of the USSR. Its tasks included obtaining up-to-date secret information about the processes taking place in the world economy that affect the security of the USSR, tracking markets strategic raw materials and situations in the currency markets, detection and prevention of enemy economic sabotage against Soviet commercial organizations, insurance companies and banks abroad, detection and suppression of attempts by foreign firms and banks to cause direct economic damage to Soviet foreign economic organizations, providing

assistance to the successful implementation of the commercial and financial activities of Soviet organizations and representative offices abroad.

In the last two decades of its existence, Soviet foreign intelligence has grown in many respects: its numerical strength has increased; it became multifunctional in terms of areas of work, the nature and specifics of the tasks being solved, created a number of structures for the scientific understanding of intelligence activities, armed with the latest information technologies.

The question naturally arises: what was the return, what were the achievements of exploration during this period? As for the operational side of the matter, it is difficult to answer this question: each intelligence agency jealously guards its secrets. However, no matter how paradoxical it may seem, one can indirectly judge the success of intelligence by its failures, the failures of agents. Over the past few years, the press has been circulating the names of what the Americans claim were former Soviet foreign intelligence sources, such as the Walkers, Lipke, Ames, Hanssen, Edward Lee Howard, Souter, and many others. Where they work: CIA, FBI, NSA, Navy cryptographic services, etc. Let the reader myself and

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think about whether intelligence worked well or badly and what enemy targets it managed to penetrate. Foreign Intelligence reserves the right not to comment on these press reports.

By the end of the 1990s, Soviet intelligence increasingly began to receive information that the intelligence services of the United States and some other capitalist countries had stepped up their work against the Soviet Union. Intelligence informed the leadership of the country about this, warned of the brewing of negative processes noticed by Western intelligence in our society, drew attention to how the intelligence services of Western countries widely used such factors as separatism, regionalism, conducted purposeful work to influence intelligentsia, creative circles.

In October 1988, V.A. Kryuchkov was appointed chairman of the KGB.

In February 1989, career intelligence officer L.V. Shebarshin. It fell to his lot to manage intelligence in the last years of the existence of the Soviet state. As an experienced analyst and operative worker who had worked in intelligence for almost three decades in various, including leadership, positions, he could not help but see the imminent process of the collapse of the Soviet state and the role of Western intelligence services in this. In these difficult conditions, he did everything possible to preserve the potential of foreign intelligence, realizing that, whatever the outcome of events, foreign intelligence should remain a necessary attribute of the state apparatus, protecting Russia's national interests from external threats.

In September 1991, E.M. Primakov.

These were difficult times for exploration. Perestroika was going on in the country, which, of course, affected intelligence as well.

Initially, perestroika was perceived by intelligence as the need for a radical improvement in all areas of intelligence work both in the central apparatus and in residencies, the search for new, more efficient forms of work, and the concentration of efforts on the main directions of its activities.

Hard work was going on in the central apparatus and intelligence subdivisions to comprehend the instructions of the central organs and develop new forms and methods of intelligence activities.

Changes were not long in coming. First of all, the tasks that intelligence was supposed to solve were clarified and narrowed, and their priority was determined. From "globalism", when practically in every country, regardless of its place in world politics and significance for the interests of Russia, residencies were created, they were decisively and even with some relief.

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The concept of "main adversary" has been revised. In organizing its work, intelligence began to focus on the "national interests of the country." In each specific situation, the director of the SVR E.M. Primakov, "we can have opponents and allies. Intelligence under the new conditions continues to fight against the enemy, but not once and for all given, but revealed as a result of his real activity, which violates or may violate the interests of Russia.

In intelligence, departization was carried out. From now on, employees were prohibited from participating in the activities of political parties and associations.

Such a phenomenon as glasnost has come to intelligence. The processes taking place in the country and society urgently demanded that the general public have an idea of what foreign intelligence is, why it is needed, what it does and whether it violates the rights person.

The heads of the intelligence service and its individual subdivisions began to speak to representatives of the media, in various labor collectives, and to meet with the public. To the extent possible, they talked about the history of foreign intelligence, its role in the most critical moments in the life of the country, about the tasks of today, about the very concept of "intelligence information" and about the need to conduct intelligence in a world split into military blocs, in a world where there are still states nurturing aggressive intentions and full of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The need for intelligence and the demand for intelligence information have become clearer to the population of the country.

To work with the media and strengthen public relations in intelligence, a press bureau was created. Journalists got access to some intelligence materials, the opportunity to meet within the regulated framework with its employees, primarily with veterans.

In October 1991, foreign intelligence was withdrawn from the KGB and became an independent body. Intelligence, thus, withdrew from the law enforcement system.

Primakov was well aware of the need to preserve and continuity of state structures that ensured the security of the Russian state in the new conditions. Foreign intelligence was retained. Its personnel, traditions developed by decades of service to the Fatherland have been preserved.

For the first time in the history of intelligence, a solid legal basis was placed under its activities. In 1992, the Law "On Foreign Intelligence" was adopted. Decrees of the President of Russia approved the Regulations on the Foreign Intelligence Service. Foreign intelligence has become a legitimate form of state activity, its powers have been fixed, and its place in the system has been determined.

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ensuring the security of Russia, direct subordination to the president of the country is established.

In January 1996, V.I. Trubnikov.

As director, Trubnikov, along with his current work, made a great contribution to the conceptual development of foreign intelligence tasks in the post-Soviet period, arising from the peculiarities of the international situation after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called

unipolar world, which introduced a wide range of new threats to the national security of our country.

The collapse of one of the two blocs that existed in the world on an ideological basis did not lead to the end of the confrontation in the international arena. The unipolar world not only did not eliminate the existing contradictions in international relations, but also gave rise to new ones and revived the old ones. The desire of a number of states to realize their geopolitical aspirations at the expense of other countries, and finally, the clear desire of some powers to establish their hegemony in the world, to revise already agreed norms of international law, make the international situation tense and dangerous, including from the point of view of Russia's interests. Some states are hatching plans for their introduction into the post-Soviet space, separation of the CIS countries from Russia, and even dismemberment of the Russian Federation. Others lay claim to parts of Russia's territory and artificially inflate so-called territorial disputes.

The spectrum of threats to the security of the Russian Federation thus remained diverse. New elements also appeared in it: international terrorism, aggressive nationalism and religious fanaticism, organized crime, drug trafficking.

Under these conditions, foreign intelligence, in accordance with the Federal Law "On Foreign Intelligence" and the requirements arising from the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation approved by the country's leadership, is working by its own means to identify, track and neutralize threats to the national interests and security of Russia, creating favorable conditions for the implementation of foreign policy activities of the state.

In the new conditions, another function or form of activity of foreign intelligence appeared - contacts and interaction with the special services of various countries, including NATO members. As a result of such interaction, the Foreign Intelligence Service receives an additional amount of information on such issues as international terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and the situation in "hot spots".

The inherent continuity of the intelligence service to the cause of serving one's Fatherland and people helped it survive during the collapse of the Soviet Union and preserve itself as a necessary tool for protection.

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Russia's national interests. President of Russia V.V. Putin, who visited foreign intelligence in May 2000 in connection with the appointment of its new director, S.N. Lebedev noted: "Thanks to the high professionalism of the employees and the high degree of reliability laid down in previous years, it was possible to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of Russia's foreign intelligence."

The main purpose of intelligence is to identify, using its inherent methods and means, threats to Russia's security, primarily external ones, and actively contribute to their elimination. Based on this conceptual position, Russian foreign intelligence builds its work in the modern period of history.

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The strategic "triad" of the US administration on the collapse of the Soviet Union

Archival materials of Soviet foreign intelligence show that the Cold War was not the choice of the Soviet Union, it was imposed by its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. It is appropriate to recall that in August 1943, such secret documents as "Memorandum 121" and "Unthinkable Plan" were prepared in Washington and London, which envisaged an attempt "to turn against Russia the whole power of undefeated Germany, still ruled by Nazis or generals". And in the same year, at a meeting in Quebec, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

agreed to implement "some kind of settlement hostile to Russian interests" in the event of Germany's defeat in World War II. Already on July 1, 1945, it was planned to throw 47 American and British divisions against the USSR, reinforcing them with ten German divisions that had not yet been disarmed. The goal was "to force Russia into submission to the will of the United States and the British Empire." Fortunately, these bellicose intentions of the Anglo-American politicians were cooled by the staff generals of His Majesty King George VI: they reported to Churchill and Harry Truman that "it would be beyond our ability to achieve a quick limited success and we would find ourselves embroiled in a long war against superior forces."

Thanks to the efforts of Soviet intelligence, I.V. Stalin and the State Defense Committee got acquainted with the content of the mentioned documents and the sober conclusions of the British generals. This happened a few days after they were reported to the owner of the White House and a resident of Downing Street, 10.

And then followed Churchill's keynote speech in Fulton in March 1946 and the Dropshot scenario, which provided for the atomic bombing of major cities of the Soviet Union and the occupation by 250 divisions of its territory and the countries of Eastern Europe.

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And at the same time, Western strategists were told by their intelligence that the Soviet Union was not planning military aggression. In their opinion, it was necessary to deal with him because he is "an implacable enemy of Western civilization." Behind this primitive motivation were geopolitical considerations to expand the influence of the West and eliminate those positions in the world that the Soviet Union acquired as a result of the victory over fascism.

Convinced of the impossibility of defeating the USSR through the use of brute military force, especially after the creation of its own nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies concentrated their efforts on dismembering the Soviet Union, tearing away the countries of Eastern Europe from it and forming - ultimately vanishing "capitalist liberal-democratic Russia". This is exactly how the content of these intentions was stated in the messages of the Soviet intelligence residencies and its reports to the highest party and state leadership of our country. Such methods were called "psychological warfare" in Washington and NATO headquarters. To organize and direct it, by order of Truman, was entrusted to the Office of Psychological Strategy. General Dwight Eisenhower, who succeeded him as President of the United States, consistently adhered to the same line.

This situation in world politics forced the Soviet leadership to pay special attention to confrontation with the West in the Cold War. From the beginning of the 1950s, the term "main adversary" appeared and became fixed in the vocabulary of Soviet intelligence officers.

President John Fitzgerald Kennedy took over from Eisenhower to carry on the Cold War against the USSR. Head of intelligence - the First Main Directorate of the KGB (PGU) A.M. Sakharovsky, speaking in 1961 at the UP of the KGB party conference under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in particular, noted that the new American president equated the intelligence service with the armed forces. "Our enemies in the West," he continued, "are betting on a "war of ideas", on transferring the ideological struggle to the "territory of the enemy", which the USSR is openly declared to be. The implementation of ideological sabotage against the USSR is increasingly being entrusted to the intelligence agencies." Parting words to young scouts, in January 1962, the deputy head of the PGU F.K. Mortin noted that, according to our intelligence, since September 1961, the headquarters of the psychological and political war against the Soviet Union has been functioning in the United States, headed by Minister of Justice Robert Kennedy, J. Kennedy's brother. This body was charged with coordinating the work of American departments involved in propaganda and strategic psychological operations against the USSR. Here is how the PSU reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in October 1963 about the guidelines that R. Kennedy outlined to members of his headquarters:

"American intelligence and counterintelligence should create on the territory of the United States and allied countries such conditions for diplomatic, trade, cultural and other representations of the USSR and socialist states that would impede their activities and completely paralyze the work of Soviet intelligence."

Official Washington in those years did not really hide its intentions to carry out subversive activities against the Soviet Union using such a specific tool as intelligence. This is how Senator William Fulbright, who is well aware of the close connection between the US foreign affairs agencies and American intelligence, commented on this line in one of his unofficial statements. "A nation that recognizes morality and the law of law cannot permit its soldiers to openly overthrow the governments of other countries, but it can, in accordance with generally accepted international practice (11 - Auth.), provide secret assistance to national elements within foreign states in order to overthrow those who are objectionable to us governments".

And here is how the headquarters of the psychological and political war of the United States clarified the essence of this strategy in one of its directives:

"In the course of a tough confrontation between coexisting worlds, it is necessary to create and aggravate an unstable situation in the enemy camp, using all means of propaganda and methods of psychological warfare. Our ideology and morality should be introduced into the public consciousness of the population of the countries of the communist camp. Stirring up national contradictions and religious prejudices, as well as using human vices (envy, desire for pleasure, female vanity, etc.), it is necessary to introduce rejection of the goals of the leadership of communist states. Economic, moral and other turmoil must be mercilessly put on display and, on this basis, encourage the population to passive resistance and sabotage. If the state takes any countermeasures, resolutely classify them as unjust and thereby cause dissatisfaction with the communist system."

In its reports to the leadership, the PSU showed that a qualitatively new stage of the Cold War had begun since the early 1960s, when the United States and its NATO allies launched a strategic offensive against the Soviet Union, setting their ultimate goal of its complete destruction. As for the slogans "defending the traditional values of the West," they remained a propaganda smokescreen for many years of the Cold War, covering up the true geopolitical aspirations of the opponents of the USSR.

All American presidents after Kennedy consistently pursued the strategic course he formulated, taking into account the specifics of the emerging international situation. In this sense, it is legitimate to regard as a tactical maneuver widely

"détente" ("détente") organized in the 1970s under Richard Nixon. Nobel Peace Prize winner President Jimmy Carter also made his personal contribution to the intensification of the Cold War. On the advice of his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, on July 3, 1979, he signed a secret directive allocating \$500 million for "the creation of an international terrorist network that should spread Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and thus destabilize the Soviet Union". This document entered into "legal force" in the United States six months before the introduction of a limited military contingent of the Soviet Army into Afghanistan. On this basis, the CIA developed and began to put into practice Operation Cyclone. In subsequent years, the Americans spent an additional \$4 billion to feed the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and finance religious centers in Pakistan that trained a whole galaxy of Taliban.

These funds were used to infiltrate the Taliban movement and detachments of the terrorist al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden on the territory of Afghanistan.

This policy gave birth to a boomerang called "international terrorism", which later, on September 11, 2001, hit the twin towers of the World Trade Center in

As you can see, every US president in the post-war period was noted in the field of confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, President Ronald Reagan made a special contribution to this.

Shortly after taking office in January 1981, Reagan held a secret meeting of his closest associates and set the task of developing a plan for a secret strategic offensive against the Soviet Union with the aim of finally destroying it as a geopolitical adversary. It was attended by Vice President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard Allen, and CIA Director William Casey.

The working apparatus for developing and monitoring the implementation of this program was the National Security Council (NSC), and the main generator of ideas was CIA Director Casey, a former businessman who outwardly resembled an elderly, modest pensioner with a sweet disarming face, but possessed a powerful intellect. . Every week he personally reported intelligence information to Reagan and had a great influence on shaping the president's attitude towards the Soviet Union.

During 1981-1982, the plan to destroy the main adversary of the United States was developed, approved and consistently implemented throughout the entire period of Reagan's tenure.

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His main idea was to lead things towards the complete and final collapse of the Soviet system. And at the same time, commitment to the course of peaceful coexistence of the two world systems was officially and openly proclaimed. In this regard, all US government departments were ordered to act in the following three areas:

- reducing the sphere of influence of the USSR and undermining its positions throughout the world, exerting direct military pressure on it, if necessary;
- loosening the foundations of Soviet power from within, revealing its weaknesses and using them in the interests of the United States;
- waging a merciless trade and economic war against the USSR in order to bring it to complete financial bankruptcy and economic collapse.

In fact, this "triad" meant a deliberate confrontation with the Soviet Union along the entire front.

The first part of the "triad"

To achieve the goals fixed in the first part of the strategic "triad", it was envisaged to deliver successive strikes by political-diplomatic and secret intelligence methods and means against the most vulnerable, from the point of view of Reagan and Casey, links of the USSR foreign policy front. At the beginning of the 1980s, Poland and Afghanistan were recognized as such.

Poland

Already at the first meeting with Reagan, which was mentioned above, it was decided to find real opportunities for weakening Soviet influence in Poland.

In August 1981, PSU reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU that Reagan demanded that the CIA and the State Department begin providing the Solidarity trade union with the necessary assistance and

to promote, officially and behind the scenes, the implementation of "progressive" reforms in Poland.

Soon the CIA and Mossad reached an agreement that Israeli intelligence would help the Americans acquire channels to reach the top of Solidarity, and in exchange for this, the CIA would allocate funds for the maintenance of foreign Mossad stations. To collect information about the situation in Poland, the CIA connected the international relations department of the trade union association AFL-KCHP. For the same purposes, as well as to establish covert contacts with the Polish opposition, American intelligence agents managed to involve the Vatican.

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This turn of events forced the Soviet leadership and statesmen of the People's Republic of Poland (PPR) to take appropriate response measures. As a result, on the basis of information from the Soviet and Polish state security agencies, which closely cooperated, and on the recommendation of a special Polish commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which functioned from August 1980, martial law was introduced in Poland on December 13, 1981, and Solidarity » and other underground opposition groups are outlawed. This took the US administration by surprise. According to information received by the vocational school, Reagan demanded that the CIA and the National Security Service at all costs save Solidarity and inflict covert but sensitive strikes on the USSR. In accordance with these guidelines, the CIA, under the leadership of Casey, developed and from February 1982 began to implement a special program of work with Solidarity. In particular, it provided for:

— Funding in dollars and zlotys for Solidarity and other opposition groups through illegal channels. Already in April 1982, Lech Walesa and his entourage received 8 million dollars from the CIA. Approximately in this amount they were supplied with money then annually;

- supply of the latest radio equipment and communications equipment necessary to maintain stable and uninterrupted contacts between various groups of the underground;

- supplying the Solidarity leadership with intelligence information from CIA sources;

- involvement in subversive activities of prominent functionaries of Solidarity and other influential Polish emigrants who found themselves abroad;

- involvement in covert operations to overthrow the party and state leadership of the PPR and ensure the seizure of power by Solidarity of the secret services of NATO member countries, the Vatican and a number of statesmen and politicians of Western Europe.

According to the Soviet intelligence and state security agencies of the PPR, secret operations of an undercover nature were coordinated by the CIA station with a center in Frankfurt am Main (FRG), and the main task of the Warsaw station was to organize pressure on the official circles of Poland through agents in order to persuade them to agree to negotiate with the opposition. The transfer of money and their distribution among the Solidarity cells was carried out by the Americans through Zbigniew Bujak. CIA operatives actually managed the following departments in Solidarity:

- propaganda (work with the intelligentsia, publication of underground literature, leaflets, newspapers);

- administrative (maintenance of safe houses and shelters, communications, production of false cover documents);

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- intelligence and counterintelligence (it was actually a branch of the CIA residency, bashfully called the Bureau of Hygiene and Security).

The material and technical supply of Solidarity was carried out through transshipment bases in Brussels (Belgium) and Stockholm (Sweden). In 1984, Casey managed to convince even such a scrupulous figure as Olof Palme of the need for the Swedish authorities to provide all possible tacit assistance in this matter.

On Reagan's instructions, CIA representatives regularly informed the Vatican about the situation in Poland and about the main covert operations aimed at helping the Polish opposition and undermining the state-political regime of the PPR. This was done through one of the Pope's trusted prelates. In particular, in the spring of 1984, Casey personally informed him of the plans of the law enforcement agencies of the PPR to carry out arrests among the most dangerous Solidarity functionaries and asked the Vatican through its channels to warn the opposition about the threat looming over them. Moreover, the Vatican received assurances that the US would not allow the regime of Wojciech Jaruzelski to destroy Solidarity and expel its leaders from the country.

In 1976-1983, more than 70 CIA operatives were identified through the joint efforts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the PPR and the representative office of the KGB of the USSR. And that's not counting the employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). In 1982 alone, 98 Western spies were installed in Poland, operating under diplomatic cover.

Diplomatic and political confrontation in the international arena over the Polish problem, as well as a fierce war on the "invisible front" were held with varying success, but by the summer of 1983 the scales began to gradually tip in favor of the official authorities of the PPR. This made it possible to cancel martial law, which was perceived in Washington and other Western capitals as a defeat for Solidarity. And yet the US, NATO and the Polish underground did not give up. In this regard, it was necessary to resort, in particular, to the arrest of 340 prominent functionaries of Solidarity and thus paralyze for some time not only the anti-government attacks of the opposition, but also the subversive actions of foreign intelligence services. And by that time, the latter had suffered significant losses in their undercover apparatus. Thus, during the period 1974-1984, 22 CIA agents operating in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Polish Army, local special services, representative offices of international organizations and scientific circles were exposed and neutralized in Poland. Some of them (for example, Kuklinsky) were "donated" to the Americans by the Israeli Mossad.

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Hotheads in Reagan's entourage suggested resorting to emergency measures. For example, to bring Jaruzelski's government to bankruptcy, since Poland's foreign debt was approaching \$30 billion. However, experts from the CIA and the National Security Service convinced the president not to do this and advised him to focus on intensifying the economic war against the USSR. At the initiative of the same specialists, American intelligence was advised to avoid actions that could provoke Moscow to military intervention in Poland.

The state security organs of the PPR and the USSR acted mainly on defense and only in extreme cases delivered preventive strikes against their opponents. This was due to the tasks they faced - identifying threats to stability in Poland, protecting the state interests of the PPR. The representative office of the KGB of the USSR at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the PPR maintained contact not only with its colleagues in the profession, but also with the party and state leadership of this country. Regular reports were provided, in particular, to Stanislav Kane, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Miroslav Milevsky, Czesław Kiszczak. As the deputy minister of internal affairs of the PPR, Pozhoga, noted, "the team of the KGB representative office and its head, General V.G. Pavlov worked very actively, with complete objectivity approaching the assessment and analysis of the processes that took place in Poland. When informing Moscow, they did not allow distortion of facts and subjectivism. From an intelligence standpoint, their reports were top notch. And no one adjusted to the subjective whims of some Moscow leaders."

Having suffered setbacks in a frontal offensive in Poland by 1985, the US administration actively switched to making efforts to undermine the "communist regimes" in the countries of Eastern Europe. In fairness, it should be noted that such work through the CIA and the State Department was carried out regularly after May 1945, but turned into one of the main priorities of US foreign policy from the beginning of 1982, that is, after the introduction of martial law in Poland. In April 1982, as Soviet intelligence managed to establish, Reagan approved a document born in the depths of the NSS, which set the task of a strategic nature - to lead to the destruction of the unity of the countries of the socialist community and the return of Eastern Europe to the bosom of the "free world". To do this, all American departments, primarily the CIA, DIA and NSA, were instructed to:

— providing secret support to the anti-government underground in the states of Eastern Europe in its efforts to overthrow the "communist regimes";

— intensification of psychological warfare against communist ideology using all available means, including

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in turn radio stations "Voice of America" and "Freedom / Free Europe";

— search and application of diplomatic and trade and economic ways to weaken the dependence of the governments of the countries of the region on the Soviet Union.

By the end of 1983, the CIA had collected fairly detailed intelligence on the emerging underground anti-government groups in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and began to establish regular contacts with them through its agency in Solidarity. At the same time, it was recognized that this opposition (especially in Czechoslovakia) was still in an embryonic state. And yet, according to Soviet intelligence materials, the CIA informed the NSS that by mid-1986 in these countries, except for Bulgaria, the foundations had been created for the formation of an organized anti-government opposition, including with the participation of representatives of emigration. In October 1986, the Americans succeeded in persuading 122 dissidents from Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to jointly launch an open call to "throw the Soviet yoke over Eastern Europe." Among the signatories of this document were Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel and George Konrad.

Afghanistan

In 1979-1980, Carter was content with modest, by American standards, assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen with money and weapons, hoping in this way to contribute to inciting a guerrilla war in Afghanistan against government troops and units of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces. there were few. Casey spoke more frankly on this issue: "We need to wear down the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. We must bleed the communists there"; "We need to organize a few more Afghans"; "I want the Soviets in Afghanistan to pay us for Vietnam. They supplied the Viet Cong with weapons to kill Americans, and now we will give weapons to the Mujahideen to kill Russians.

As evidenced by the data at the disposal of the SVR, covert operations in this area have noticeably intensified since 1981 and were carried out according to the plan approved by Reagan, which provided for the following.

1. Regular deliveries to the Mujahideen of such a quantity and quality of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment, which would be sufficient not only to resist the government troops and the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces, but also to defeat them. In 1980-1981, the CIA spent \$50 million on the purchase of Soviet-made weapons in Egypt through the CIA. With the assistance of the Joint Intelligence Directorate (ORU) of Pakistan

it was sent to Afghanistan. An agreement was reached with the director of the ORU, General Akhtar, to supply the Mujahideen with surface-to-air missiles, small-caliber artillery pieces and grenade launchers.

Weapons and ammunition were also purchased on the world market. By 1982, the CIA had about a hundred Afghan agents trained in this kind of underground trade. The money came from the Americans and the government of Saudi Arabia, which added its own petrodollar to every US dollar. The purchased goods, packed in boxes labeled "TV sets", "tools", etc., were delivered by air and sea to Karachi (Pakistan), and then by rail to Islamabad and Quetta. Special echelons were guarded by ORU employees. After some time, weapons and equipment ended up with the Mujahideen in different parts of Afghanistan. In 1981-1984, almost 65 thousand tons of such goods were transported. And in 1985, the Afghan armed opposition received an additional 50,000 tons. Reagan constantly demanded an increase in military supplies, because he believed that "we must make the Soviets pay an increasing price for the occupation of Afghanistan." By his order, up to \$100 million annually has been allocated for the purchase of weapons since 1984. On the advice of Washington, the ruling elite of Saudi Arabia began to allocate at least \$120 million a year for these purposes.

From July 1985 to December 1986, the Mujahideen received 1,200 Stinger missiles and 250 launchers for them through the CIA and ORU channels. For the first time this weapon was used in September 1986 near Jalalabad against Soviet helicopters. The Stingers were followed by 10,000 grenade launchers and 200,000 rounds for them. "When we start shooting down Soviet planes worth \$20 million apiece," Casey gloated, "the Kremlin will go berserk"?

2. Training of personnel to replenish the armed formations of the Afghan opposition (according to our terminology of that time, these were bandit formations). According to information obtained by Soviet intelligence, approximately 200,000 "fighters of the Afghan armed resistance" were trained in special camps in the territory of the Pakistani North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan during 1982-1983. They were trained by CIA and ORU instructors not only in conventional military programs, but also as specialists in sabotage explosive and electronic devices. This project was personally sanctioned by the President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. By 1985, the system of military training centers for the Mujahideen, which began to be called "CIA universities," produced annually up to 20,000 "fighters for the triumph of Islam." Recruits were recruited mainly from Afghan refugees.

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3. Supplying the ORU and through it the Mujahideen with intelligence information about Soviet military and industrial facilities in Afghanistan. Under instructions from Langley, the Islamabad station of the CIA regularly transmitted images from spy satellites to the ORU and the Mujahideen about the deployment and movement of Soviet troops and the location of objects against which it was planned to carry out sabotage. These satellites were also used to evaluate the results of attacks on these targets. During one of his many visits to Pakistan in 1983, Casey personally gave Zia-ul-Haq a pack of such photographs, and, as a kind gift to the Pakistani leader, added to them secret information about the deployment of Indian troops in the border zone. He also assured the general that the United States would certainly come to the defense of Pakistan if the Soviet Union decided to strike at Pakistani territory in the course of pursuing the retreating Mujahideen.

4. Carrying out terrorist acts against employees of Soviet missions abroad and the command of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces in Afghanistan. By agreement with the CIA, Pakistani intelligence trained special Afghan sniper fighters for the physical elimination of Soviet diplomats, generals and officers, as well as members of high-ranking delegations visiting Afghanistan. Of these, special-purpose groups were formed, which were sent to the areas where Soviet institutions and headquarters of military units were located. It was the duty of the Pakistanis. And the CIA supplied the addresses

place of residence and work (service) of the intended victims. In 1985, American intelligence supplied the Mujahideen through the ORA with a hundred of the latest sniper rifles, although, according to CIA lawyers, their use in Afghanistan was contrary to US law. After obtaining Reagan's consent to the transfer of these murder weapons, Casey cynically declared: "And we will call them hunting rifles. Who the hunters will hunt is their business, not ours." He also convinced General Akhtar that terrorist acts against Soviet dignitaries and diplomats were simply necessary. "As long as the Soviet elite feels safe," he reasoned, "the war in Afghanistan will continue. But when elite sons are sent home in zinc boxes, the situation may change."

The Soviet leadership was informed about the threat to the lives of our people, which, in particular, came from mujahideen snipers in Afghanistan. Appropriate precautions were taken. But they still couldn't save everyone. The victims numbered in the dozens. Ghibli and our scouts.

5. The use of Afghanistan as a springboard for transferring military operations to the territory of the Soviet Union. This idea was born in the offices of the CIA and the NSS. Reagan approved it. In the nearest

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a circle of advisers and assistants, it was decided to implement it in two directions:

— fomenting religious and ethnic conflicts in the Soviet republics of Central Asia and preparing an anti-government underground there;

- the subsequent invasion of specially trained detachments of the Mujahideen from the northern provinces of Afghanistan into the territory of the USSR

As for undermining the foundations of Soviet power in Central Asia, the CIA has been doing this for quite a long time. For example, in early 1981, during a visit to Saudi Arabia, Casey approved the intention of the Saudis to organize a large-scale campaign to illegally import Wahhabi religious literature into Central Asia through Afghanistan. He also provided the Saudis with information on "the atrocities of the Soviets in Central Asia after the revolution of 1917 and the Second World War" in order to prepare materials based on it for distribution to the Muslim population of these regions.

As a result, by the end of the 1980s, the CIA involved the secret services of a number of Muslim states in carrying out subversive anti-Soviet actions in Central Asia. However, the "useful return" from this was rather low, because the information of the PGU on this topic allowed the territorial bodies of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to take appropriate preventive measures.

To solve the second part of the mentioned task, American intelligence and Casey personally needed to conduct top-secret and very delicate negotiations with the highest state leadership of a number of Asian countries. Therefore, Soviet intelligence had to extract information about them bit by bit and with great effort.

Since February 1983, Casey has been convincing Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq that Central Asia is the Achilles' heel of the USSR, its "soft underbelly", which can and should be struck. In his opinion, the ideological and sabotage campaigns waged by the combined efforts of the United States and its friendly states are capable of creating a favorable political atmosphere in themselves, but the final result must be achieved only by military actions. Zia-ul-Haq, in principle, shared such opinions, however, consent to the involvement of the ORU and the armed forces of Pakistan in the preparation of the invasion operation in the USSR gave only in 1984, although he was afraid of a Soviet retaliatory strike on Pakistani territory. In his view, the success of this operation could be ensured by inspiring, for example, a local uprising in Uzbekistan, and then, as it were, coming to the aid of "the fighters for the liberation of the oppressed Muslims from the yoke of communism."

The idea of an invasion operation was also discussed in strict confidence with the President of Egypt and the King of Saudi Arabia. Both did not reject the plan of the Americans, but they themselves did not take serious practical steps, considering this project risky. They were satisfied with a secret campaign in Central Asia to propagate Islam in order to "stir up the locals and revive nationalism in the USSR."

In this regard, the Americans were forced to exert serious pressure on the Pakistanis, and nevertheless they achieved their goal. In 1984, CIA and ORU instructors in special camps trained about a thousand militants and saboteurs to be thrown into the territory of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. An ORU agent from Afghan Uzbeks was involved in the recruitment of auxiliary agents in the areas of the planned landing. In April 1984, this agent made trips to Soviet territory and picked up several places convenient for crossing the Pyanj and Amu Darya rivers. The CIA approved the results of his work and handed over to the ORU officers several hundred rubber inflatable boats, machine guns and grenade launchers made in China, night vision devices, modern means of communication, and special explosive devices.

The CIA and the ORU believed that the issue of jumping from Afghanistan to Central Asia was already being translated into a practical plane. According to Casey, the Mujahideen are knocking at the gates of the "evil empire". "Is it better to punish Moscow for the bloody war in Afghanistan," he asked in a conversation with one of the leaders of Pakistani intelligence, "than to transfer the war to its own territory?!" However, he rejoiced prematurely: through the joint efforts of Soviet intelligence officers, counterintelligence officers, border guards and security agencies of Afghanistan, this major operation was thwarted. In 1985 and 1986, the "invasion forces" and its creators had to be content with only episodic artillery and rocket attacks on the Soviet border across the Amu Darya and isolated sabotage, which, to tell the truth, had little effect on the political and operational situation on the Soviet side.

In November 1982, Yu.V. Andropov. He soon followed with an instruction to all departments involved in the work in the Afghan sector to analyze the situation and determine the measures that are necessary to turn the tide of events in our favor. As a result, a coordinated program of action was drawn up and put into practice. From the middle of 1983, this was felt not only by the Mujahideen, but also by their patrons. In particular, the leaders of the ORU assessed the end of 1983 and the whole of 1984 as a difficult period for the Mujahideen and seriously feared that the Afghan armed opposition might suffer a military defeat. The Americans were seriously alarmed by the plan

of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces for 1985-1986, which provided for the defeat of large gangs: Reagan in January 1985 demanded that the NSS and the CIA do everything possible to help the Mujahideen not only survive, but also win.

With the accession to power of President Najibullah, a program of national reconciliation was launched in Afghanistan. Even its first results gradually created the prerequisites for the transition of the stalemate, when none of the opposing sides could prevail, into the process of consolidating the constructive layers of Afghan society and rejecting the irreconcilable opposition. Feeling this, the Americans, Pakistanis and Mujahideen leaders were forced to agree to the Geneva talks in order to find a reasonable compromise and a peaceful intra-Afghan settlement. By the way, the information and operational support of this process was carried out mainly by Soviet intelligence. So the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the observers of the USSR were fairly well equipped with the necessary materials to defend their interests. And if the United States and Pakistan had adhered to their obligations to stop military supplies to the Mujahideen, as the USSR did in relation to the Kabul regime, then it would hardly have ended in a fall

government of Najibullah, and the collapse of the Afghan statehood would not have become so fatal.

But times and customs were changing in the Soviet Union, leaders were changing, as well as their attitude to the Afghan problem. In November 1986 M.S. Gorbachev told Najibullah that the USSR would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in two years, but promised not to stop reasonable military supplies, economic aid and political support. Alas!

It should be emphasized that the Soviet and then the Russian leadership never experienced a lack of sound and reliable intelligence information and accurate forecasts on a wide range of the Afghan problem. Our scouts have fulfilled their duty to the country and people to the end.

Cold War in the third world

In accordance with the first part of the strategic "triad" of the US administration, since March 1981, the work of the CIA was intensified to undermine the positions of the USSR in the third world. Reagan and his entourage proceeded from the fact that in the countries of this group "after the devastation of the period of anti-colonial movements of the 1950s-1960s and the rule of pro-communist regimes, the real conditions for anti-Soviet speeches were ripe." Priority objects

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covert operations were elected Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria and Iraq. The Americans recruited allies in the struggle against the USSR among the elites of those countries whose ruling regimes, by their standards, could not even be called democratic. And by UN standards, some of them were officially considered outcasts of the civilized world. For example, an agreement was reached with the intelligence services of the South African country of classical apartheid to provide assistance to the UNITA group, which waged a guerrilla war against the Angolan government forces and the Cuban military contingent. South African businessmen were provoked into anti-Soviet scams on the world market for gold, diamonds and platinum group metals.

With monarchist Saudi Arabia, the Americans formed a strong anti-Soviet alliance and intimidated the royal family with the fact that the USSR inherited from tsarist Russia the desire to gain dominance over the entire territory up to the coast of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The suspicions of the Saudis were inflamed in every possible way that the Soviet military advisers and KGB officers in both Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Ethiopia were only doing what they were developing operations to overthrow the Saudi dynasty. Allied ties were also reinforced by a material contribution to ensuring the security of the kingdom: local air defense was equipped with an aircraft with the AWACS system, the armed forces received hundreds of Stinger missiles (by the way, bypassing Congress). The Central Command of the US armed forces in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf zone extended its area of responsibility to the entire Persian Gulf region, and the installation of the Peace Shield air defense system began.

In Ethiopia, the Americans encouraged the armed struggle of the Eritrean separatists and Tigray nationalists against the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, supported by the Soviet Union, which ultimately ended in the collapse of this state.

The above examples show that the United States waged a systematic struggle against the USSR not only for ideological reasons, but primarily pursuing its own geopolitical goals, regardless of the negative consequences for many regions of the planet.

military pressure

According to Soviet intelligence data, Reagan and his closest associates considered it necessary to prepare the US military organization for the destruction of the Soviet Union with

the very first attempt. The plan to achieve this goal, which came to light in May 1982, included:

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— drawing the Soviet Union into an unbearable arms race and frustrating its attempts to achieve parity with the military potential of the United States;

- to block supplies to the Soviet Union of everything necessary to strengthen its military power and defense capability.

It was assumed that the Soviet defense system should be upset and destroyed in its main elements within one decade.

Hence the need arose to replace the doctrine of mutually assured nuclear destruction, which Reagan considered immoral, by the way, with a project to create a strategic defense system. It was this project that was promulgated by the American President on March 23, 1983 in the form of a "strategic defense initiative" (SDI). 26 billion dollars were allocated for it.

Not everyone in the US and the West met the plans to create SDI with enthusiasm and approval. There were also those who doubted the expediency of spending such money on this undertaking. For example, this was announced to Reagan in her insistent manner by the "iron lady" - Margaret Thatcher. In response, the president noted that even if such a system could never be built, it still makes sense to create conditions for the Soviet Union to overstrain in an attempt to find an adequate response. And he added: "There must be some reasonable limit of self-sacrifice that Soviet leaders can demand from their people!" These arguments were enough for Thatcher to help draw not only England, but also the FRG, Italy, Japan and Israel into the SDI project.

The Americans did not stop building stocks of conventional weapons, giving preference to their latest models. Thus, in 1980-1985 the US military budget doubled. During this period, the Pentagon received 3,000 combat aircraft, 3,700 strategic missiles and 10,000 ships, submarines and boats.

In 1982-1984, through NATO, the Americans obtained from their ALLIES:

- ratification of the so-called offensive doctrine, the meaning of which was to allegedly deliver retaliatory strikes by US ground forces on the territory of member countries of the Warsaw Pact;

— Mandatory adoption by the national armies of 30 latest high-tech American-made weapons systems.

Since February 1981, strategic bomber aircraft of the US Air Force have periodically violated the airspace of the Soviet Union, keeping our air defense system in suspense and forcing the Soviet political and military leadership to make far from simple decisions about the need to respond

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niya. Reagan and his entourage made no secret of the fact that such a line was designed to demoralize the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and create an atmosphere of confusion and hopelessness among them. On one occasion, Reagan made the following remark about this: "For the time being, no one is going to use the atomic bomb. But the enemy must fall asleep every night with the fear that we might still throw it off"?

Our intelligence regularly reported to the top party and state leadership about the hidden essence of the SDI venture and provocative violations of the airspace of the USSR.

countries. Specialized departments dealt with this issue at PSU. Their duties included the analysis of intelligence information coming from all continents and the development of forecasts of the probability of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the Soviet Union by the United States and NATO.

The second part of the "triad"

Shaking the foundations of Soviet power, revealing its weaknesses and using them in the interests of the United States was a constant goal of the American intelligence services, primarily the CIA and RUMO. But special activity in this matter was noted in the 1980s. How this was done, in particular, in Central Asia, was discussed above. The conduct of an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign by the Voice of America and Svoboda radio stations, the mass sending of subversive literature and its distribution among the population, the material and moral and political support of dissidents and the stimulation of political emigration are widely known. Many "fighters against totalitarianism", "human rights activists" and their former patrons flaunt this quite openly. But few people know that a large group of political scientists, psychologists and psychiatrists of the CIA worked tirelessly to process vast arrays of open information and intelligence data and prepare, on this basis, the most detailed political and psychological portraits of representatives of the ruling Soviet elite. First of all, the Americans were interested in members and candidate members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the most influential top officials of key ministries. Their intellectual and physical potential, political weight, character traits, strengths and weaknesses were studied. In a word, everything that was suitable for finding approaches to these figures, channels and methods of influencing them in the interests of the United States. For example, let us give the main content of one of the questionnaires (questionnaires) that were used by the CIA residencies to collect the data necessary for analysts.

1. How does the object of study relate to the United States, evaluates their domestic and foreign policy.

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2. What the object is afraid of in political and everyday personal LIFE.

3. To what extent and in what terms the object is able to restore working capacity and, in general, vital activity.

4. How sharply the object reacts to defeats and shocks, how quickly it recovers from the political blows inflicted on it, psychological trauma and property losses.

5. How, if necessary, you can shake the object's self-confidence and subdue it outside influence.

The main object of interest of the US administration, and therefore the CIA, were the General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU. With L.I. Brezhnev, K.U. Chernenko, Yu.V. Andropov was clear enough. Then this post was taken by a young compared to his predecessors M.S. Gorbachev. After winning the 1984 elections, Reagan was one of the first to receive Thatcher at Camp David, who told him in detail about her meetings with Gorbachev and convinced him of the expediency of working with this promising figure, who was able to take a fresh look at the relations of the USSR with the West. The results of the study were summed up at a special meeting of the National Security Council, which took place on June 25, 1985. The essence of the presented materials came down to the conclusion that the new party leader, apparently, is a Soviet leader not only of the younger generation, but also of a new type in his thinking, and purposeful work with him can help solve a number of problems in the interests of USA. The summary of the American president was unexpected. In his opinion, evidence of Gorbachev's usefulness to the US may not be forthcoming; Apparently, it will take even ten years. In the meantime, it is necessary to continue pressure on the Soviet Union along the entire front, and there is no reason to refuse any of the covert operations to destroy the "evil empire". Let Secretary of State George Shultz Continue

to perform "ritual dances" in front of Gorbachev, convincing him of the good intentions of America. Psychological warfare against the USSR must be intensified.

This was taken as a command to continue the strategic offensive against the main enemy. The Cold War continued despite perestroika and the new political thinking.

The third part of the "triad"

The last, but by no means least, component of the "triad" was the economic war of the US administration, which was steadily waged for many years in order to undermine the national economy of the USSR and bring it to complete bankruptcy. Reagan took over the baton for its continuation in December 1981. His first step to

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in this direction was the refusal to participate in the construction of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod-Europe gas pipeline (according to the American terminology Urengoy-6) and forcing the allies to follow the example of Washington. Then, in November 1982, a comprehensive program for the economic strangulation of the Soviet Union was developed and approved. The main task was to identify the weak points of the Soviet economy and deliver targeted strikes against them with the combined power of the United States and Western countries. This was to be achieved by:

- a sharp reduction in the receipt of hard currency in the Soviet Union due to a decrease in world prices for oil and gas (in this case, the main stake was placed on cooperation with Saudi Arabia);
- limiting the supply of Soviet natural gas to Europe and disrupting the construction of the gas pipeline mentioned above;
- blocking the access of the Soviet Union to advanced Western technologies;
- a broad campaign of technical misinformation by the Soviet Union in order to drive promising Soviet technical and technological developments into an irrevocable dead end.

In accordance with these directives, CIA experts, under the personal supervision of Casey, conducted a thorough study of the USSR economy and identified its most sensitive points. For example, in the field of oil production and export, the key importance was given not to obtaining factual information about the amount of income of the Soviet Union from the sale of hydrocarbons, but to accurately determine the degree of its dependence on this source of funds necessary for development. Having analyzed the next five-year plan of the USSR (1986-1990) to the details, the Americans compiled a detailed list of technologies in which the Soviet economy experienced the most urgent need. In short, Reagan and Casey were less about feeling the economic pulse of the Soviet Union than about keeping it by the throat.

From the reports of the PGU, the Soviet leadership was sufficiently aware of the intentions of the United States in the economic war. He was also aware that this tough confrontation initiated by Reagan did not always meet with the approval of the European allies. They were going through hard times and hoped to solve a number of their problems by participating in the construction of the Urengoy-6 gas pipeline (providing energy resources at affordable prices, reducing unemployment in their countries, etc.). But the American president believed that the economic destruction of Moscow was an excellent strategy, which begins precisely with the disruption of the construction of this gas pipeline. He could not fully achieve this, but the completion of this grandiose project was delayed by two years. This was affected by powerful US pressure on its European allies, including through COCOM and NATO.

After Yu.V. Andropov in November 1982, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU raised the issue of the urgent need to intensify intelligence activities to uncover and parry the subversive actions of the CIA, the DIA, the NSA, as well as the NATO special services, was particularly acute. In this regard, in 1983 and 1984, a series of important meetings on this issue were held through the KGB. Specific tasks have been set before the central intelligence apparatus and its foreign apparatuses. Collaboration with the intelligence agencies of the socialist countries and interaction with the security agencies of a number of developing states were filled with topical content. As a result, the top leadership of the USSR and the relevant departments received sufficient intelligence information necessary to make the necessary political decisions and take measures to repel the attacks of the geopolitical enemy.

Soon the Americans felt it too. For example, Casey repeatedly complained to Reagan that sensitive data was being leaked from federal agencies due to violations of state secrets. "Every time," he lamented, "when we want to do something, the information about it flows away like through a sieve. And I want to carry out operations that would be really secret." John Poindexter, a member of the US National Security Council, echoed him: "It would be foolish to believe that Moscow is unaware of much of what we are doing. She had her informants,

About what kind of undercover capabilities the Soviet intelligence had in those days, now something has become known. But the sources of the CIA and RUMO in the USSR, according to the leaders of these special services themselves, then began to "dry up" a lot. By no means always their loss could be compensated by modern technical means used by the NSA. This situation, which had been painfully felt at Langley and the Pentagon since April 1984, was the result of the joint efforts of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence officers who struck back at the enemy. That is why Casey persistently demanded from foreign residencies more and more new recruitment of agents who would be able to work productively on the problems of the Soviet Union.

The confrontation between the intelligence services of the United States and NATO, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, on the other, was one of the constituent elements of the confrontation between the two world systems and, of course, was carried out in strictly conspiratorial forms and specific means. The facts, which, apparently, are destined to remain hidden in the archives, testify that on this "invisible front" Soviet intelligence fulfilled its duty to the Fatherland and the people at a fairly high level.

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Moreover, it armed the country's leadership with the necessary data, on the basis of which events of national importance were carried out. Here is just one example.

By 1984, it became completely clear to Moscow that Reagan would be re-elected for a second term, and his strategic program, which, in our opinion, went beyond the limits of reality, would remain the desire to crush the "evil empire" and send it to the "dustbin of history". In this regard, it was decided to let him know that his plans are known for certain and that the Soviet Union will not put up with this and will defend itself by all available means. Such a mission was entrusted to A.A. Gromyko. On July 27, 1984, in Yalta, he expressed these considerations in a conversation with former Senator McGovern.

On September 23, 1984, Gromyko, speaking at the UN, openly criticized the US administration for interfering in the internal affairs of the USSR, for waging an economic war against it, for unleashing an arms race and putting unprecedented pressure on many countries to curtail relations with the Soviet Union.

On the sidelines of Langley, this speech was snickered: they say that the Soviet leader spoke as if he had studied the most secret directives of the US President on national issues.

security. Of course, Gromyko did not read the texts mentioned in the original, but he knew their contents from the reports of the PSU.

On September 28, 1984, Gromyko, in a personal conversation with Reagan, bluntly stated that, according to Moscow, the policy of the US administration was clearly designed to ensure that the Soviet Union exhausted its material resources during the aggravation of the Cold War and was ultimately forced to surrender. at the mercy of America. Reagan preferred to get away with clumsy jokes and turn the conversation to other topics.

Casey died in early 1987. The "war machine" without this "powerful engine" "sneezed" for a short time, but soon its "flywheel" was spun up again: the work of undermining the Soviet Union from within and strangling it economically and politico-diplomatically from the outside continued until the end of Reagan's stay in White House, and then by relay was bequeathed by the new administration, by the way, also from the Republican Party.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. There is a widespread opinion among Western political scientists that the covert operations of the CIA and other American intelligence agencies radically changed the nature of the Cold War and accelerated the inevitable collapse of one of the world's superpowers. Others felt that without the offensive American policy, the Soviet system would hardly have collapsed. Still others are convinced that only the Reagan administration's strategy was the main tool for destroying the Soviet Union.

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for and what exactly it made possible the "mortification of Soviet communism" and the end of the Cold War with a final victory.

All these conclusions, in our opinion, do not fully express the essence of the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s. If we judge them according to the data of Soviet foreign intelligence, then we can and should say that the Reagan administration did not create a crisis in the Soviet system, but only exacerbated it. The reputable American Sovietologists themselves believed that the Kremlin would have been quite able to survive if it had not been forced to resist the cumulative effect of the threat of SDI, the accelerated growth of the US military potential, geopolitical difficulties in Poland and Afghanistan, and the devastating impact of economic war. In short, "the Soviet system was not an organism prone to self-devouring under any international situation."

In conclusion, it must be stated with all confidence that the overwhelming majority of Soviet intelligence officers defended our Great Motherland on their sector of the external front selflessly and to the end.

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Foreign intelligence about secret Western assessments of the Soviet economy and plans to weaken it

After a period of detente in the first half of the 1970s, a new round of aggravation of Russian-American relations began, which had a negative impact, among other things, on the development of bilateral economic contacts. In accordance with the instructions of President Reagan, set out in the directives of the US National Security Council prepared on his instructions, the task of changing the political structure of the Soviet Union and its allies-socialist countries was transferred from a staged to a practical plane, became the main direction of US foreign policy. In the second half of the 1970s, the United States launched perhaps the most powerful offensive in terms of scale and organization against the foundations of Soviet statehood. At the same time, Washington attached important, if not primary, importance to the economic direction.

The data obtained by our intelligence indicates that the topic of covert offensive operations against the Soviet Union was discussed from a specific angle for the first time at a meeting of the Working Group on National Security Affairs on January 30, 1981. In early 1982, Reagan and his advisers began to formulate a strategy based on an onslaught on the most vulnerable places in the political and economic system of the USSR. One of the components of this operation was the "economic war".

The goals and means of this offensive were outlined in the Secret National Security Directives (M5pp) signed by Reagan in 1982 and 1983. M5pp-32 of March 1982 recommended the neutralization of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and the support, through covert operations, of anti-Soviet organizations in that region. MSP0-66 (November 1982) declared that the goal of US policy was to undermine the Soviet economy by attacking its main components. MS00-75 of January 1983 recommended specific measures aimed at fundamental changes in the Soviet system.

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The essence of the directive was reduced to the task of depriving Moscow of "Western means necessary for life." It covered three main issues: 1) the United States must achieve the consent of its European allies to provide loans to Moscow only at market rates; 2) The US will not allow the Soviet economy and army access to modern Western technology. The activities of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Control, established in 1949 to coordinate the actions of the leading capitalist countries to restrict the access of the USSR and other socialist states to the latest Western technology and modern equipment) will be expanded; 3) The US and allies will seek alternative sources of energy to reduce Europe's dependence on Soviet natural gas supplies. Its deliveries to Europe should not cover more than 30% of needs.

The MPpp-75 document became, according to information received from Washington, the most important presidential directive of the Reagan administration on the issue of US strategy towards the USSR.

The strategy developed in the presidential directive also provided covert financial, intelligence and political assistance to the Solidarity movement in Poland, as well as significant military and financial assistance to the Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan.

The implementation of this plan included actions to sharply reduce hard currency receipts in the Soviet Union as a result of lower oil prices. This goal was to be achieved in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as well as by limiting the export of Soviet natural gas to the West.

The US planned to significantly expand the psychological warfare, aimed at sowing fear and uncertainty among the Soviet leadership.

As a consequence of these measures, it was planned to increase the arms race and maintain them at a high technical level, which was supposed to undermine the economy of the USSR.

In this regard, Peter Schweitzer's book "Victory" published in Russian in 1995 is very interesting! subtitled "The Role of the U.S. Administration's Secret Strategy in the Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Camp."

P. Schweitzer assigned the decisive role in unleashing a large-scale confrontation with the Soviet Union to R. Reagan and his entourage, in which such figures as CIA Director William Casey and Defense Minister Caspar Weinberger played a key role.

Since a large part of the strategy was based on the conduct of covert operations, CIA Director Casey, an energetic and purposeful organizer, became one of its main leaders. Casey instructed his apparatus to identify the weak points of the Soviet economy.

Vulnerabilities were identified financial, energy and technological areas.

This did not remain unknown to the Soviet secret services. Estimates of foreign special services and research centers of the state and prospects of the economy of our country were monitored, analyzed and brought to the attention of the country's leadership.

The information sent by the intelligence to the addressees solved basically three tasks: 1) to look at the weaknesses in the Soviet national economic policy with "other eyes" and, accordingly, to find reserves for its improvement; 2) reveal the specific plans of the United States and its NATO allies to weaken the economic power of our state and the countries of the socialist community; 3) to identify contradictions in the camp of the enemy and the possibility of neutralizing his subversive plans.

Materials in the foreign intelligence archive show how great efforts the United States directed to limit the ability of the USSR to receive loans necessary for development economy.

In the early 1980s, Washington managed to impose on its allies a number of measures to tighten its credit policy towards the East. In particular, in 1981-1983. the "cost" of export credits increased sharply (almost doubled), the permitted volume of credit transactions decreased, and the intergovernmental agreements concluded in the 1970s between the USSR and some major Western countries on the provision of export credits were not extended.

At the same time, Soviet intelligence received timely information about the main stages and nuances of this work. Thanks to reliable intelligence information, the Soviet side was able to timely assess the nature and reality of these threats.

Thus, after the announcement on January 4, 1980 by J. Carter of the imposition of economic sanctions against the USSR in response to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, such as an embargo on the supply of American equipment for the Yamal gas pipeline - Western Europe, the suspension of negotiations on concluding a long-term agreement on grain, etc., information appeared about plans to freeze foreign exchange funds placed by the Soviet Union in Western banks. The intelligence analysis of the information received showed that such an option is unlikely. Reliable sources reported that similar attempts were made earlier by certain Western countries and in relation to Iran, but turned out to be ineffective. However, the Soviet Union had stronger positions than Iran. Western capitals also understood, and our sources pointed to this, that measures to freeze Soviet deposits would be fraught with the announcement by the Soviet Union of a moratorium on its foreign debt. This would deal a significant blow to the economic system.

system of the West, including the United States. Unilateral US "sanctions" against the USSR in the credit sector could only lead to a decrease in the competitiveness of American banking institutions in relation to banks in other countries. In addition, the financial position of the Soviet Union was viewed as prosperous (decrease in external debt, significant reserves in foreign currency, practically key positions in the gold market). Under these conditions, the United States would hardly have been able to create a monolithic front of the Western states in taking joint measures against the USSR in the monetary and financial field.

Intelligence also informed the government that, despite tendencies toward increased coordination of Western credit policy, at the same time, rather sharp disagreements persisted between the capitalist countries. This and similar information enabled the Soviet representatives to better prepare for the negotiations, which were ultimately successfully completed for us.

The government was informed about Washington's dissatisfaction with the then practiced by some countries of subsidizing interest rates on export credits provided by the USSR to Czechoslovakia and the GDR, about pressure on their allies in order to force them to abandon such actions and about the complications in relations that arose in this regard. members of NATO.

This kind of information was especially important at the stages of tightening the Western credit policy, as was the case in 1982, when the United States directly raised the issue of imposing an embargo on loans to the East and sent a special representative to Western Europe to coordinate actions in this area. However, the US plans failed.

At the end of 1984, intelligence received an analysis of the consequences of a possible embargo on loans to socialist countries prepared for the government of one of the Western European countries. It noted that the Reagan administration, under pressure from influential financiers in the United States and Western Europe, temporarily abandoned the idea of an embargo and even stopped discussions on this problem. Nevertheless, the potential threat of Washington's use of "credit weapons" against the CMEA countries remained. As US government experts noted, credit sanctions against the USSR cause only minor damage to it, forcing it to resort to measures to save hard currency. It was believed that the embargo would not cause political upheaval and would not induce Moscow to make concessions. On the contrary, this action by the West would give the Soviet Union a propaganda trump card and would allow it to take political countermeasures in response, in particular, to declare itself free from repayment of obligations or impose a moratorium on them, prompting ITS ALLIES to similar actions.

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Attempts by the United States and the Western world to have a negative impact on the Soviet economy through credit policy were not the only means of pressure on the Soviet Union.

At the end of 1983, the closed assessments of one of the authoritative Western organizations regarding the needs of the Soviet Union for advanced Western technology were reported to the government. Their main content was as follows.

In the current decade, a further reduction in the superiority of the NATO countries over the USSR in terms of the main types of weapons is likely, primarily in view of the consistent build-up of the capacities of the Soviet defense industry. However, due to a possible slowdown in economic growth, the USSR will be forced to somewhat reduce its own military developments in order to save forces and resources and at the same time step up efforts to officially and especially illegally acquire modern technologies in the West.

The document stated that the USSR would focus on obtaining secret information about developments, the use of which can significantly increase the effectiveness of Soviet strategic and tactical weapons: data on new generations of components for inertial control systems for American missiles, on the production of homing heads. The USSR will devote considerable efforts to acquiring technologies for the production of ultra-light and super-strong composite materials, bypass jet engines, information about the machine design of aircraft, and technology related to the design and construction of aircraft carriers. In the field of computers, the USSR will be interested in information about the latest machines for modeling and designing complex weapons, as well as about ultra-large integrated circuits and large integrated circuits. It is possible that in this connection Moscow could turn to the West for help in the construction of two or three plants for the production of polycrystalline silicon.

The main channel, according to the Americans, was the repurchase of technologies and samples through intermediaries (dummy individuals, trading companies of "third countries"). To control this channel, through which the bulk of the technology leaves, was still considered difficult in the United States.

case, since there was no effective special mechanism for cooperation on this issue between the concerned US departments and their counterparts in the allied countries.

The US administration carried out some reorganization of the national mechanism for monitoring possible leakage of advanced technologies into the USSR and other socialist countries. Corresponding divisions were created within the State Department, ministries

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trade and defense. At the end of February 1984, the issue of a nationwide export control mechanism to the socialist countries again acquired particular relevance due to the expiration of the special export law, which was extended by the US President under special powers.

The American point of view on the effectiveness of international control carried out within the framework of COCOM was twofold. On the one hand, the Americans supported his activities in every possible way and imposed a tougher line on their partners. However, along with this, they were clearly dissatisfied with the non-binding nature of the decisions taken in COCOM, and, as a consequence, their incomplete observance by the allies.

By the autumn of 1983, the relevant NATO bodies had basically completed a comprehensive study of West-East trade and economic ties and their impact on the security of the states of the North Atlantic bloc.

The initiator of the analysis, the Reagan administration, pursued the goal of reorganizing the activities of COCOM and further strengthening control over the supply of the latest Western technology and modern equipment to the countries of Eastern Europe. Washington demanded that the participants in COCOM conclude a formal treaty and thus create a new legal basis for COCOM, the decisions of which would be binding. The White House tried to strengthen the organizational structure of COCOM, in particular, to form a special military subcommittee with a staff of military personnel, proposed the establishment of a special information bank to more closely monitor the use of Western technology supplied to "third countries" (mainly socialist and neutral).

At the same time, intelligence reported that the countries of Western Europe were still delaying the adoption of any new commitments on fundamental issues, in particular, they opposed the expansion of the functions and powers of COCOM according to the Washington scenario, fearing the transformation of this organization to a supranational body. They tried to convince the United States that expanding COCOM's "prohibition" lists to include civilian goods, including power equipment, would by no means increase the effectiveness of economic control. Of all the goods defined as "critical", only 15% were fully controlled in practice. Given these disagreements, the compilation of the next "prohibition" list progressed slowly and, according to some COCOM members, could hardly have been completed before the spring of 1984.

The United States intended to use the COCOM mechanism in the interests of American business,
in particular to veto the ex

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port by the Allies is more competitive, in comparison with similar American, advanced civil technology. Firms from Germany and France were subjected to the greatest pressure.

Unlike the United States, the countries of Western Europe and Japan sought not to curtail trade and economic relations with the East, but to transform their character. They, in fact, wanted to assign the role of suppliers of raw materials and buyers of finished industrial products to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In their opinion, such a policy allowed the West to extract much

large economic dividends. Some US allies believed that the extensive import of Western technology, equipment and technology would lead to an increase in the financial dependence of individual socialist states on the West. Technological dependence will also be created, which will be especially noticeable in a number of key sectors of the national economy: the chemical industry, petrochemistry, electronics and electrical engineering, the automotive industry, and a number of engineering industries.

Passion for Western technology, as noted by European experts, will also lead to the emergence in individual socialist countries of a dependent approach to the use of foreign scientific and technical experience, the refusal to introduce domestic achievements in the field of science and technology, which will doom their own research and development. - boots on a deliberate lag behind the world level.

The West, primarily the United States, actively tried to create difficulties for the Soviet economy in the energy sector as well. Considering that oil and gas revenues were one of the main sources of funds for the modernization of the backward sectors of the Soviet economy, the United States and its NATO allies sought, on the one hand, to hinder the increase in oil and gas supplies from the USSR and, on the other hand, to maximize - lower their prices a little.

According to foreign intelligence data, the majority of foreign experts believed that, despite the favorable situation for Western fuel-importing countries in the first half of the 1980s, it would be premature to talk about the elimination of the threat of a new energy crisis. The increase in demand for fuel as the economies of the Western countries emerged from the crisis, in their opinion, could again lead to a deterioration in the structure of their energy balance and an increase in dependence on external supplies.

Therefore, confirming their desire to adhere to a safe level of energy imports from the USSR, the Western European countries, nevertheless, considered the possibility of a shortage of fuel in the world market in the future. In this regard, they refused to recognize the mandatory nature of the International Energy Agency's guidelines on quotas for the volume of purchases of energy raw materials in the USSR.

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Foreign intelligence, relying on the opinion of its competent sources, warned that since gas will remain the most realistic alternative to oil in many respects in the next decade, the United States, through its capabilities among Western gas importers from the Soviet Union, will be strenuously seeking price reductions. on this product compared to oil. According to intelligence, this policy of undermining Soviet gas prices reflected the West's shift to more sophisticated and flexible methods of waging an economic war against the USSR.

Somewhat later, foreign intelligence analysts came to the following conclusions regarding the approach of the EEC countries to the issue of purchasing Soviet gas, which were reported to the government:

~ EEC member countries, in the context of a temporary reduction in fuel consumption, through measures of direct and indirect regulation of demand for certain energy carriers and diversification of their imports, deliberately hamper the purchase of Soviet gas, despite its high competitiveness on the world market. The expectation is that the Soviet Union, under the threat of curtailing its gas exports, will abandon the system of guaranteed minimum prices for new contracts and fulfill the demands of importers to equalize trade balances;

At the same time, the EEC countries plan, on the one hand, to ensure, as demand for fuel rises, the supply of cheap Soviet gas within politically safe limits, and on the other hand, to create conditions that would limit the Soviet Union's foreign exchange earnings to the maximum at maintaining a high degree of its dependence on imports of Western goods.

The United States used in its plans for the collapse of the USSR and the policy of exporting agricultural products.

First of all, it was aimed at making the Soviet Union dependent on grain imports in order to use food weapons in the future to achieve its political, economic and ideological goals. In particular, according to US Secretary of Agriculture D. Blok, the expansion by the United States of grain exports to the USSR to the level of 30-35 million tons per year in the future would turn it into a potential lever of influence on Moscow's policy. In addition, according to the calculations of American experts. The Soviet Union will be forced to divert hard currency resources from solving strategic tasks in the sphere of economic development and increasing defense capabilities. The interest of American farmers in stable and long-term supplies of their products to the Soviet market was also taken into account.

According to intelligence, in order to achieve its goals, the US administration planned to create a kind of grain cartel in

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consisting of the USA, Australia, Canada and the EEC countries, which would give the Americans the opportunity not only to control the main sources of grain supplies to the Soviet Union, but also to sharply raise prices for it (according to American estimates, the cost of importing a ton of grain already at that time 7-8 times higher than the cost of its production in the USSR).

It was proposed to impose on the Soviet Union an irrational procurement structure in which wheat would play the main role. At the same time, American experts proceeded from the fact that the purchase of soybeans instead of wheat would allow the USSR to save a large amount of grain used for livestock feed (one ton of soybeans made it possible to balance 8 tons of wheat in terms of protein content).

It was envisaged to consolidate and expand the "binding" of V/O "Eksportkhleb" to a limited circle of the largest grain trading companies, which would make it possible to achieve significant overpayments by the Soviet side when purchasing grain. Thus, according to the president of the Dreyfus company, it is easy to work with Russians, they do not bargain, they overpay at \$8 per ton (in total, in some years this amounted to about \$80 million per year only in transactions with this company). to her).

The purchase by the Soviet Union of grain not from the largest firms, but from small and medium-sized companies, grain producers' associations and farmers' cooperatives, as well as the use of the Chicago Grain Trading Exchange and the system of so-called futures transactions, would enable it to save large sums in hard currency. The American business community estimates that the Chinese save between \$600 million and \$900 million a year through these forms of trade.

It was planned to tighten the conditions for exporting modern technology for storing and transporting grain to the USSR. According to American experts, if the Soviet Union had implemented it, it would have prevented the loss of about 30 million tons of grain, that is, an amount equal to the entire volume of imports.

The American administration was concerned that the Western European states did not agree to ban the export of such technology to the Soviet Union, since it did not fall under the COCOM lists.

The United States was interested in maintaining the existing discrepancy between the timing of grain shipment and the throughput capacity of Soviet ports, the elimination of which would lead to savings of about \$ 1 billion annually paid as fines for demurrage of foreign ships with grain.

An important goal of American policy was to undermine agricultural production in the USSR. Taking into account the formal nature of the inspection by the Soviet side of the quality of grain

in ports

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shipments, the US intelligence agencies studied the possibility of sending specially treated consignments of grain to the USSR, causing epizootic diseases in livestock.

Intelligence analysts conveyed to the Soviet leadership the opinion of foreign experts that the USSR, in principle, was capable of disrupting the implementation of these American plans in a relatively short time. The Soviet Union, following the example of China, given the dependence of the United States on grain exports, could tighten the requirements for its quality (95% of grain coming from the United States was constantly infested with quarantine pests and infested with weeds, while the level of contamination of Canadian and Argentinean grain supplied to the USSR were 53 and 27%, respectively).

Part of the general strategy of the West regarding the USSR was to inflict material damage on the channel of cooperation with other socialist states, undermine economic cooperation within the CMEA and, as a result, the collapse of the social community. To do this, vulnerabilities in the cooperation mechanism were identified and measures were developed to use them in a subversive activities.

Information on these issues was regularly reported by intelligence to the leadership of the country for taking appropriate countermeasures.

The West assigned an important place in the political and ideological struggle against communism to undermining the economic cooperation of the USSR with the developing countries. Soviet foreign intelligence tracked this line as a whole, collecting information about specific intentions in individual geographical areas. For example, at the beginning of 1984, generalized data on the intensification of Western measures to weaken the economic position of the USSR in the third world were reported to the leadership of the Soviet Union with approximately the following content.

In 1983, the United States completed the development of a comprehensive program to undermine the economic ties between the USSR and third world countries. Government departments (Department of State, ministries of trade, finance, agriculture, intelligence agencies), as well as private banks, corporations and the media are involved in its implementation.

As part of the program, it was supposed to prove that the USSR was falsifying data on the amount of assistance to young states, to substantiate the thesis about the political, rather than commercial, approach of the Soviet Union to the development of economic ties, to show that long-term trade agreements were unprofitable for third world countries, and presumably the forms of industrial cooperation promoted by the Soviet side (joint ventures, compensatory projects).

It was planned to build this campaign, relying primarily on data received through various channels on miscalculations and mistakes in the activities of Soviet foreign trade organizations. Before government

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The military and business circles of the third world countries were informed about the facts of the delay by the Soviet side of negotiations on contracts and deadlines for fulfilling orders, about requests to extend letters of credit, poor maintenance of equipment, interruptions in the supply of spare parts, etc. At the same time, it was envisaged to carry out direct sabotage actions against Soviet projects in young states, to organize sabotage. Pro-Western elements in state institutions of third world countries were instructed to slow down decision-making on contracts with Soviet organizations, use various pretexts to suspend work at facilities being built with the help of the USSR, disrupt the delivery of equipment for these facilities, create difficulties in recruiting local personnel, and impose restrictions for entry

Soviet experts.

The United States actively used financial leverage, as well as food supplies, to force developing countries to refuse to conclude agreements with the USSR and other socialist states.

In general, while supporting the United States, most Western European states and Japan considered it insufficient to use propaganda and pressure methods to limit the economic ties of developing countries with the USSR. the concept of restructuring world economic relations. Characteristically, Japan's planned increase in state aid in the 1980s was directly linked to the need to fill a vacuum in the Third World economy that could be used by the Soviet Union to penetrate developing countries.

In some countries of Western Europe, it was noted that, in contrast to the initial phase of decolonization, when developing countries needed Soviet military and political support, over time, economic problems are increasingly coming to the fore, in the solution of which the Soviet Union, with the current structure of its foreign economic links can only be of limited help. It was concluded that the time had come for the West to take active steps to weaken the political and economic positions of the USSR in the third world.

The above information, based largely on genuine intelligence documents, shows a fairly high awareness of Soviet foreign intelligence about Western assessments of the state of various sectors of the economy of the Soviet Union, the plans of the United States and its allies to use the economic factor in confrontation with the USSR and its supporters.

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All this information was brought to the attention of the political leadership of the country in a timely manner. The question of the effectiveness of their use by the country's leadership and the national economic bodies of the state apparatus is beyond the scope of foreign intelligence activities, since intelligence information cannot change the economic and political processes in the country.

' Schweitzer Peter. Victory. The role of the secret strategy of the US administration in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp. – Minsk, 1995.

2 English A / itez - futures transactions on the exchanges, which are the purchase and sale of goods at a price fixed at the time of the conclusion of the transaction with the execution of the operation after a certain period of time.

5

"Rasa zip geguapda"*

Throughout human history, the desire to ensure the security of some states and peoples at the expense of the interests and security of others has given rise to an uninterrupted chain of devastating wars and armed conflicts. Already in the biblical books it was written about those times when peoples "will beat swords into plowshares and spears into sickles". However, against the backdrop of wars and bloodshed, the search for ways of peaceful coexistence on the basis of agreements and treaties also developed. It is noteworthy that it was Russia that was the initiator of the adoption of actually the first international legal document in history - the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 - which limited the use of specific types of weapons'.

The emergence of nuclear weapons, and with it the threat of destruction of life itself on Earth, made it imperative to critically rethink the entire complex of issues of war and peace, and to search for ways to ensure comprehensive international security. But before the ideas of a world without weapons could become a reality, it was necessary to decide what to do with the accumulated and growing stocks of various types of weapons, where, how much and how

destroyed, how much and where is left for storage or placed so as to guarantee the security of states and the necessary level of combat power of their armies, to create a predictable balance of power in the world as a whole. At the same time, it was necessary to fulfill dozens of political, economic, environmental and social conditions that most naturally arose along with the realization that humanity has grown to such a degree of armament that threatens it with complete self-destruction.

* "Treaties must be respected" (lat.) is one of the basic principles of international law.

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The world's leading countries once again had to sit down at the negotiating table, taking a fresh look at the problems of disarmament, arms limitation and control. Naturally, the first item on the agenda was the issue of nuclear weapons. As a result, after almost twenty years of discussion, in 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was concluded and in 1970 came into force. The contract was accepted for 25 years and was extended indefinitely in 1995.

Having fundamentally resolved the issue of the most dangerous type of weapons, the world community came to the conclusion that even without it, there are enough means on Earth that can, if not completely stop, then significantly delay the development of life.

Issues of security and arms control have become permanently present in the spectrum of problems of international diplomacy, and, therefore, in the list of priority tasks of political intelligence of all countries of the world.

Russian foreign intelligence was no exception. In the last decade of the last century, a new line of activity took shape and established itself in its composition — tracking various aspects of arms control.

It cannot be said that foreign intelligence has not previously been engaged in such work. The problems of military potentials and new types of weapons, especially in their political dimension, constantly remained in its field of vision. However, at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, the situation changed qualitatively. Disarmament problems came to the fore in the diplomacy of the great powers.

The entry of the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR into the world community was accompanied by the emergence of a host of new problems, including, almost primarily, in the field of disarmament. The West did not need Russia, which inherited all the military, technical and scientific power of its giant predecessor. There was strong pressure towards conversion, and in fact the curtailment of military production and the defense industry in general, active buying of scientific personnel, flooding the country with various humanitarian and missionary organizations, the purpose of which was to analyze the Russian scientific and technical potential, establish direct, allegedly scientific contacts with national scientific centers in the field of nuclear and other defense research. At the same time, there were far-fetched accusations of an ever-present threat to the world, allegedly emanating from the territory of the former USSR, by which, for obvious reasons, only Russia was understood, even if events and facts that took place on the territory that had already become independent and independent by that time were cited as confirmation. by all in this capacity recognized by the states of Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Fissile materials, including weapons-grade materials, were allegedly illegally exported from Russia in tons and

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military and dual purpose mining. If we are to believe the publications and diplomatic notes pouring in from a cornucopia, Russia supplied weapons to almost all extremist organizations and states classified by the West as the so-called risk countries, all international arms dealers were necessarily declared to be immigrants from the former USSR or had communications on its territory?. And all this against the backdrop of an endless performance with the now famous

even on feature films with "red mercury". Foreign intelligence also had to reasonably refute the accusations, checking the information against its sources.

As a result, by the end of 1991, the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction began to crystallize as a new challenge in world politics, which soon became one of the new priorities in intelligence work. "The Foreign Intelligence Service is now directly involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Ye.M. Primakov, "considering this one of the main problems, the main challenge after the end of the Cold War."

Experts understood that WMD in itself is only a generic name for super-powerful types of weapons in terms of the degree and consequences of destruction, and as long as it is concentrated in the countries of the "nuclear five", its use is almost unlikely. Practical military experience has shown that the use of chemical weapons in solving strategic problems is inexpedient, if only because of the prohibitive dependence of the effect on weather conditions. Biological weapons, due to the indiscriminate nature and uncertainty of the timing of residual contamination and the area of spread of pathogens, have not been fully adopted by anyone, remaining only at the level of research developments and untested samples? In any case, none of the countries admitted to violating the 1972 bioconvention.

The main danger of WMD proliferation in the 1990s was that this process was superimposed on the development of conflict situations at the regional level. And, paradoxically, the move away from tough confrontation, from bloc confrontation, and the end of the Cold War significantly weakened control over the development of regional conflict situations. Moreover, their range has expanded. Against the backdrop of the unresolved so-called traditional conflicts, in particular in the Middle East, the spread of weapons of mass destruction could have the most negative impact on the regional situation and bring an element of instability to the global level, creating a significant and long-term obstacle to arms reduction and a serious threat the world as a whole. In addition, already then there was a threat of the emergence of a new type of terrorism, about which

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rum was publicly spoken ten years later and which proved to be held a year later in Matsumoto and Tokyo with the use of chemical poisonous substances produced by supporters of the Aum Shinrikyo sect. Experts expressed serious concern about the revealed interest of international criminal structures in the organization of illegal trade in fissile and other especially dangerous materials. At the end of the Cold War, in the heat of establishing strategic parity, the combatants somehow missed the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I had to make up for lost time.

As it turned out soon, the WMD itself was only a head problem, followed by many problems that simply did not arise before in this form. It was seen as necessary to establish a system of international control over the movement of goods and technologies used to create weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and, consequently, to organize intelligence monitoring of the corresponding situation in countries that pose a threat due to their desire to possess "superweapons".

Within the framework of export control, questions arose of Russia's relations with international organizations and regimes" operating in this area. At that time, Russia occupied not the most influential positions in them. And all these structures, as a rule, were connected in one way or another with the problem of WMD proliferation. And everywhere they tried to put Russia in the position of a defendant.

It was important that this problem became the content of new relations between the Russian Federation and other members of the world community, and without reaching compromises it is difficult

It was necessary to count on interaction with the countries of the West, which was an important element of the foreign policy of our country. At the same time, the task was to protect the interests of the country as a whole and its defense complex in particular as much as possible. It was necessary to organize an adequate system for analyzing the necessary information and developing proposals.

It must be admitted that, although quite certain people were the driving force behind the advancement of non-proliferation issues, objective circumstances were realized in their actions: the "new challenge" really existed and required an adequate response. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Council of the Russian Federation literally bombarded intelligence with requests, where until that time no one had dealt with the problem in its entirety, and especially in its foreign policy dimension.

Intelligence by this time had already left the KGB and became an independent state structure.

As a result, in the early 1990s, the direction of activity related to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction was clearly formed in the SVR.

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The incoming information was analyzed, databases were accumulated, and the team of experts grew. It was here that the idea of an open report by the Foreign Intelligence Service on topical issues of WMD was born. It should be noted that the SVR had no experience in preparing such reports. However, from the very first steps, difficulties arose related to the novelty of such an approach in Russian conditions and sometimes looked insurmountable. Among them are the selection of materials and facts that could be summarized and used in the report with the obligatory observance of the main requirement - to prevent the leakage of secret information and even a hint of its source, the search for a form of presentation, definition of criteria, classification system etc. and so on. In addition, a public intelligence report is a political and diplomatic step, which should have been reflected both in the text and in the form of presentation.

The problem of WMD proliferation as a topic of the first open report of the SVR did not arise immediately, but when they reached it, and it was born in the process of many discussions, including with intelligence leaders, and now it is difficult to say with certainty who exactly proposed this topic. There was no longer any doubt. The idea was fully supported, the report became the full report of the Service, its preparation and release were carried out under the guidance of its director E.M. Primakov.

In this work, not only the information and analysis results obtained by that time were implemented, but also serious methodological ideas, new approaches to the problem at that time.

It contained two fundamentally new ideas. The first and main one is the definition of criteria for classifying countries into categories that require intelligence attention. In fact, this became the methodological basis of an alternative to the division of countries into "friendly" and "unfriendly", which is still practiced by the West. The introduction of the concepts of "threshold" and "near-threshold" countries, which excluded the political angle of view, clearly defined the direction and degree of attention to them from intelligence. Threshold countries were seen as interesting in their own right. It seemed that in order to assess the level of their progress towards the possession of WMD, it was enough to determine the state of the relevant programs in the country itself. On the contrary, in relation to the "near-threshold" states, it was necessary, first of all, to control their external relations and, using existing international mechanisms, which by that time were already sufficient, to prevent them from obtaining the missing knowledge, technologies, equipment or materials from abroad. It is important that this approach turned out to be completely indifferent to the political situation both within the country and in the international arena. Countries and, accordingly, the threats emanating from them were considered on their own, outside bloc and regional strategies. The consequence of this scheme became widely used in the future, up to the present day, the concepts of vertical and horizontal distribution - created

new types or types of WMD at the expense of their own capabilities, development or enhancement of their own potential, or through the acquisition of weapons, their elements, knowledge, technologies, equipment or materials from another country.

The second important achievement of the report, but already from the point of view of the method of work, was the development in it of systems of signs of the existence in the country of programs for the creation of specific types of WMD and missile delivery vehicles and the presence of the country at one stage or another of the implementation of such programs. Moreover, these signs were grouped into hierarchical structures, which made them understandable and natural even for a non-specialist. In addition to facilitating the understanding of the approach to assessing information on the degree of progress of a country on the path to the possession of WMD, the developed systems are also of purely practical importance: they can actually be used as the basis for the knowledge base of monitoring systems for WMD development programs of specific countries. In fact, these are models of expert systems in the nuclear, chemical, biological and rocket fields.

In addition to the indicated scientific and practical results, the report contained a serious analysis of the catalysts for the proliferation process, as well as existing international mechanisms that formally declare their goal to counteract this process. To some PostCOCOMA ideologues! and other similar international innovations, it was probably not without interest to see that all the ideological fog they cast around such organizations was in fact absolutely and initially transparent to the SVR.

With special interest, judging by the assessments received from abroad, the section given in the appendix, which occupied a little less than half of the volume of the report, was perceived with particular interest. It presented the results of an analysis of the WMD potential and missile delivery systems of 16 countries, which were classified by the SVR as "threshold" and "near-threshold" categories, objective at that time. Naturally, they did not include states officially possessing all types of WMD.

The report aroused genuine interest among various departments of Russia, special agencies of other countries, in the diplomatic and journalistic corps.

According to reports, foreign intelligence services noted the high professional level and content of the SVR report. In addition, it was emphasized that the SVR report allowed them to make adjustments to their databases on WMD problems and further build their work taking into account the criteria of our report. They also pointed to the courage shown by the Service, with which it "intruded" into such a sensitive area and clearly expressed its attitude to the topic raised.

But life did not stop, and after this report, three more were prepared, perhaps not so fundamental, but very

important issues: the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the prospects for the prohibition of chemical weapons and the problem of the destruction of anti-personnel mines. They became the first documents on the SVR site on the Internet and still remain on it, without losing demand from site visitors.

! In accordance with the Declaration, the participating countries (most of the states of Europe) committed themselves not to use explosive and incendiary bullets in military operations.

2 Viktor Bout, an illegal arms dealer operating in Africa, was listed by Interpol as a Russian citizen, although until 1990, when he left the USSR, he lived in Latvia, while his brother lived and had a transport company in Kazakhstan. At the same time, his lack of Russian citizenship was not even mentioned.

3 With regard to WMD, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between weapons as a system (actually

means of influence - a nuclear explosive device, military chemical

poisonous substance or biological agent - the causative agent of a disease, or otherwise a toxin, - in conjunction with specialized

PTO delivery, providing a guaranteed detonation of ammunition in

the required place and at the required time) from substances which for these purposes

are used. The latter, of course, are not considered as weapons.

Therefore, the possession of fissile substances, and, moreover, phosgene,

cyanides, etc. substances, as well as cultures of plague pathogens, Siberian

ulcers, various kinds of fevers, etc., is not and cannot be considered as the possession of WMD.

In addition to the already mentioned KOCOM and those who replaced it, but from the teaching

with the support of Russia and the more loyal Wassenaar Arrangements (according to

place of establishment - Wassenaar, the Netherlands) existed and still operate about a dozen international organizations and regimes providing international control of exports to various fields: chemistry

(Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), Biology (Australia

Lia Group), nuclear industry (Nuclear Suppliers Organization, Co.

mitet Zangger), etc.

Those who made a political decision to create WMD, who have advanced

research programs in this area and having

sufficient scientific and technical potential for its development and production by our own forces.

Those who have made a political decision to create WMD, who have begun its

implementation, but whose scientific and technical potential does not allow

sew development and start production without the use of foreign aid.

The interim organization that replaced COCOM existed in 1994-1996.

and had in fact the same focus - to limit the transfer to Russia

high technologies and products made with their use.

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NATO nuclear scenarios on the intelligence table

Since the appearance of atomic weapons in the United States, the danger of using qualitatively new means of mass destruction. The fact that President Truman decided order the use of their very first models against Japanese cities when the outcome of the war

with Japan turned out to be a foregone conclusion, was understood in Moscow as a formidable warning, primarily to the USSR, a former ally in the anti-Hitler coalition. From now on, the owner of a new type of weapon was tempted to end his potential rival with one blow. This radically changed the balance of forces, the strategy and tactics of a possible war, putting the most important vital centers of the country and its physical survival on the brink of destruction.

The appearance in 1949 of an analogue of such a weapon in the USSR initially, at a time when its production was insignificant, even increased the temptation to strike the first decisive blow. Only as the Soviet Union acquired ballistic means of its delivery and developed the minimum necessary stock of deterrents, the risk of a sudden outbreak of a nuclear war was reduced. But, as the materials obtained by foreign intelligence in the United States showed, fears of receiving a strike in response with "unacceptable damage" or the threat of "atomic winter" and other considerations did not stop the strategists of a nuclear strike from developing forms of its use. It was only a question of changing the forms and methods of its application at each given stage, making this extreme means of destruction practically applicable.

This was convincingly evidenced by the content of the American nuclear war plans consistently obtained by Soviet intelligence, which became the subject of careful study in Moscow.

The first such plan, codenamed "Totality", called for surprise atomic strikes using

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20 bombs in 17 cities, including Moscow, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov. The plan was developed just four months after the Potsdam Conference, at which the heads of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain agreed to establish "lasting peace on Earth." In July 1946, the development of the second American plan "Pincher" ("Pincers") was completed, which planned the atomic bombing of 50 Soviet cities and the invasion of Soviet territory through Poland, the Balkans and the Middle East. The next plan "Sizzle" ("Sizzling Strike") expanded the zone of atomic attacks to 70 cities, including Moscow (8 bombs) and Leningrad (7 bombs).

But the most large-scale in political and operational terms was the Dropshot (Instant Strike) plan for an atomic war against the USSR, prepared by the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff (CNS) of the US Armed Forces by the beginning of 1956. This plan provided for nothing less than the liquidation of the Soviet Union as a state and the occupation of its territory by the forces of 160 divisions of the United States and its allies. It should be noted that the Dropshot plan was constantly refined, in particular, it was even planned to reduce the number of atomic strikes, "only" 220 bombs instead of 300 in the original version of the plan. In addition, according to Pentagon estimates, by the mid-1950s. The USSR could have had enough atomic bombs to deliver a "tangible retaliatory strike against the United States." Proceeding from this, the CNS of the US Armed Forces determined the so-called "Day A", which denoted the last favorable opportunity for the United States to carry out atomic strikes against the Soviet Union with impunity.

After the testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the USSR, the idea of the preventive use of atomic weapons changed markedly. In the United States, the development of new types of combat nuclear weapons has begun: from thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), the power of which is calculated in megatons, to tactical nuclear weapons ("nuclear land mines") with a power of one kiloton or less, designed to destroy strategic objects behind enemy lines.

In December 1960, the first general plan for a nuclear war against the USSR came into force - the "Unified Integrated Operational Plan" ("Oshoe Ptsergme4 Oregayop R]ap, ZOR" - SIOP), developed by the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces. The SIOP was the main nuclear planning document in the United States, providing for the conduct of a nuclear war against the USSR and

PRC This plan was periodically changed and refined, and the number of targets and objects to be destroyed by atomic bombs ("nuclear targets") was constantly increasing. Thus, in SIOP-1, it was planned to launch nuclear strikes on the territory of the USSR and China using 3.5 thousand nuclear weapons with a total capacity of 780 megatons (!). As a result of these strikes, about 280 million people could have been killed in the Soviet Union and China. In terms of SIOP-2 (1961) readings

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elk already 6 thousand "nuclear targets". In SIOP-4 (1971) - 16 thousand, in SIOP-5 - up to 25 thousand.

The development of SIOP plans and verification of nuclear planning in general was carried out through strategic command and staff exercises (CSE). The main goals and objectives of these exercises included: testing and improving the effectiveness of the command and control bodies of the Armed Forces, mastering the theory and practical organization and conduct of various types of combat operations by command personnel, especially in difficult operational conditions, teaching the principles of using atomic weapons. If necessary, units, formations and associations of certain types and types of troops could be involved in participation in the KShU. In terms of scale, KShU were strategic, operational and tactical, and in terms of organization they were unilateral and bilateral, one-stage, two-stage (for example, division - corps) and three-stage (division - corps - army). The preparation and conduct of KShU are carried out under the leadership of commanders of formations or commanders of operational formations (army, army group).

Strategic command and staff exercises, as a rule, are not only the most important elements of operational training on a national and coalition scale, but also a test of the entire system, principles and directions in the field of state military building. When covering strategic KShU, it should be noted that in the postwar period, especially after the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949, many military and command post exercises were held in the United States of America and NATO. The number of these teachings is in the hundreds, if not more. That is why this essay focuses only on US and NATO strategic command post exercises.

The US strategic command and staff exercises were conducted on a nationwide (national) scale with the involvement of units and formations of various types of the Armed Forces and combat arms, including strategic nuclear forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic aviation and nuclear missile submarines). Operational management of the exercises was carried out by the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces. In addition, the course of the exercises was usually observed by the head of state and high-ranking members of his administration, who thus tried to somehow get acquainted with the basics of military art in the preparation and conduct of conventional and especially nuclear war.

NATO command and staff exercises were usually conducted both on the scale of the theaters of operations (TOD) (North European, Central European and South European), and on the scale of the entire European theater of war. However, theater exercises were of regional importance, since they practiced private

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tasks. Thus, within the limits of the North European Theater of Operations (during exercises of the "Strong Express" type), interaction between formations and commands of the Joint Armed Forces (JAF) of NATO was practiced in the initial period of hostilities (without the use of nuclear weapons). At the Central European Theater of Operations, Sand Martin-type KShU were conducted to practice interrogations on the transfer of troops from peaceful to martial law and to check the actions of headquarters after a decision was made to use nuclear weapons. During the exercises of the Deep Farrow class, conducted at the South European Theater of Operations, the possibilities of conducting limited operations in the Balkans and in the zone of the Black Sea straits under conditions of conventional hostilities were studied.

But the main strategic command and staff exercise of NATO was considered to be an exercise of the Vintex type, the general goal of which was "to deter the combined armed forces of a potential enemy" (the Warsaw Pact Organization) in the European theater of war, where, according to the military-political leadership of NATO, the enemy had a significant superiority not only in manpower and means, but also in the effectiveness of command and control of combat operations. The most important feature of the Vintex KShU was, as can be seen from the scenario of the exercise, that the defensive ("deterrent") actions of the NATO Joint Armed Forces can only be successful when using tactical, and if necessary, strategic nuclear weapons.

Let us now turn to a specific presentation of the most indicative in terms of objectives and scale of the strategic command and staff exercises conducted in 1970-1980. in the USA (Ivy League, Globle Shield) and in NATO (Vintex). The description of these exercises was made on the basis of reconnaissance documentary materials that arrived at the Center in a timely manner from a number of residencies. Thus, foreign intelligence clearly performed its functions in this most important matter - ensuring the national security of the Fatherland.

Tracking these exercises made it possible to determine the nature of changes and the content of political and strategic concepts, and this, in turn, made it possible to correct ideas about what position the United States could take on the problems of disarmament negotiations, what exactly was behind that or another innovation that they offered to the negotiating partner.

Strategic command and staff exercise "Ivy League"

"Ivy League" (<[uu Gearie" - "Ivy League") is the largest US command and staff exercise, which was held in March 1982 with the main goal: to test the reality of plans for preparing and waging a nuclear war, to survive in conditions of nuclear impact a potential adversary and "even win" (!).

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The exercise was attended by high-ranking members of the presidential administration, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, the headquarters of the types of the Armed Forces, the main and special commands of the US Armed Forces, the command and control agencies of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF), the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the Federal Forces - the communications system, as well as a number of other ministries in charge of the material and technical support of military and civilian infrastructure facilities. The total number of participants in the exercise was more than a thousand people. Operational management of the exercise was carried out by the Chairman of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces. Given that the Ivy League was held on a national scale, the participation scenario provided for the political leadership of the exercise by the head of state, who, as you know, is the Supreme Commander of the US Armed Forces. However, during the exercise, former Secretary of State Rogers served as President, and former CIA Director Helms served as Vice President, both of whom, in their former positions, were somewhat competent in matters of US nuclear strategy. As for President R. Reagan, he personally followed the course of the exercise.

A characteristic feature of the Ivy League exercise (which was noted in the planning documents) was that for the first time in the United States, at the level of the top military-political leadership, specific issues related to the use of nuclear weapons were worked out: who, when, in what situation decision and orders the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons against targets and facilities located on the territory of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, and even on the territory of states that are neutral and loyal to the United States, unless, of course, these targets and facilities featured in the SIOP Integrated Integrated Operating Plan.

The scenario for the Ivy League-82 command and staff exercise was drawn up on the basis of one of the variants of the SIOP plan. The content of the script was as follows. An armed conflict between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (KR) breaks out in the Far Eastern theater of war. The US government immediately decides to support the Kyrgyz Republic with the forces of the group of American troops stationed in South Korea and Japan. At the same time, the United States put on full combat readiness a number of commands and formations in other theaters of war, primarily in Europe, resulting in a military conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO), and, according to the authors of the exercise scenario, - the stepping party is the United Armed Forces of the Department of Internal Affairs. In this situation, the President of the United States decides on the limited use of nuclear weapons against the advancing ATS troops and on delivering nuclear strikes against strategic targets.

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projects on the territory of the Soviet Union and other countries - allies of the USSR. The further development of military operations in the European theater of war, according to the consistent announcement of the introductory ones that appear in the scenario of the exercise, develops into a nuclear war using the entire arsenal of American nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that by that time this arsenal, created on the basis of the "atomic abundance" achieved in the United States by the end of the 1950s, made it possible to "use" (according to the exercise scenario) over 10 thousand units of nuclear weapons with a capacity of 50 kilotons to 1-2 megatons.

When analyzing the Ivy League-82 exercise, it should be emphasized that its dynamics worked out in great detail the entire range of actions of the president, the government, the apparatus of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, the headquarters of the involved commands, formations and formations of the US Armed Forces. At the same time, special attention was paid to the organization of the evacuation from Washington (prior to the start of the use of nuclear weapons) of members of the government to anti-nuclear control points. They also worked out the procedure for the transfer of supreme power (in the event of the death or failure of the head of state), which (according to the scenario of the exercise) passed to the vice president, who was at the air command post (ACP) of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, from where he was supposed to govern the state in a period of general and prolonged nuclear war. In this regard, it should be noted that the concept of a "protracted nuclear war" (progressive nuclear war) was seriously considered in the Reagan administration, which at that time, according to American military experts, could be fought for two to six months. . The possibility of waging a prolonged nuclear war, as American experts believed, depends on such factors as the recovery capabilities of the Armed Forces, the high survivability of nuclear forces, the availability of anti-nuclear control posts and shelters, the Armed Forces logistics and life support.

In general, judging by the statements of senior US military officials, a prolonged nuclear war was considered quite possible. For example, Secretary of Defense Weinberger in 1982, in his report on US military problems, stressed the need to create strategic nuclear forces "possessing sustainable survivability even in the most difficult conditions of a prolonged nuclear war." The concept of "protracted nuclear war" had a serious impact on the development in the United States of new principles of nuclear planning in general and the specific use of strategic nuclear weapons in particular. Thus, it can be assumed that the concept of a "long-term nuclear war" was officially "tested" for the first time during the Ivy League-82 strategic command and staff exercise, and, apparently, this is the main feature of this exercise.

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To complete the characterization of the Ivy League 82 KShU, one can cite a political assessment of this exercise made in Germany by independent experts. "The game with nuclear death," this assessment states, "is a historical turning point. The fact is that after the March exercise of 1982, it became extremely clear that for Reagan and his administration, the beginning of a nuclear war does not automatically become the beginning of the end. In their opinion, even such a war

you can lead limitedly and possibly even win. By acknowledging this premise, the Reagan administration completely disassociated itself from the basic principles that its predecessors adhered to. One could add to this assessment that such an assessment was made precisely in Germany, which was considered a reliable ally of the United States of America.

Strategic command and staff exercise "Gloablshield"

"Global Shield" ("Sj0Ba| Zme@" - "Global Shield") - the teachings of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) occupies a special place in the combat and operational training of the US armed forces. The SAC was created in March 1946 as a separate branch of the Armed Forces, which was assigned the following main tasks: deep air reconnaissance of continental and ocean theaters; preparation and conduct of offensive operations independently or in cooperation with ground forces and navies; infliction of nuclear strikes on strategically important objects on the territory of a potential adversary. The fulfillment of these tasks was entrusted to units and formations of strategic aviation, which were initially armed with heavy bombers (TB) B-29, and later B-52D and B-52H. The exercise areas covered North America, the Arctic, Western Europe, the regions of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The first Globe Shield exercise was held in July 1979, and then this type of exercise was held annually.

The Globe Shield doctrine is complex, and this is its main feature. In fact, on the one hand, this is a command and staff exercise, since its planning documents are dominated by the development of questions of a verification, evaluation, and, in general, hypothetical nature, that is, questions whose implementation seems possible only as a result of a comprehensive and detailed analysis, which was considered the most important task of the SAC headquarters. On the other hand, the Globe Shield can be considered (albeit to a lesser extent) as a military exercise, as evidenced by the tasks appearing in the scenario of the exercise, in reality

performed by parts

and SAK formations, as well as Air Force and Navy formations involved in the exercise.

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By the end of the 1980s. Significant changes have taken place in the structure of the Strategic Aviation Command. By this time, the SAC already combined two components of the strategic nuclear forces: 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); 2) strategic bomber and reconnaissance aviation. In addition, aircraft of the reserve command and control system of the US armed forces - air command posts (ACP) - were transferred to the SAC. At that time, the SAC already had about 1000 MX and Minuteman ICBMs, over 400 heavy (B-52D, B-52H, B-1B) and medium (B-57D) bombers, about 70 reconnaissance aircraft (F-117, F-15E) and more than 40 VPK aircraft. In general, out of the entire triad of the US Strategic Nuclear Forces, the share of SAC was about 70% of carriers and 55% of nuclear warheads. As for the changes in the tasks of the SAC, in this regard, the most indicative exercise was the "Global Shield" held in 1989, in which, as can be seen from its scenario, the following issues were worked out: checking the readiness of the controls in units and formations of the SAC; organizing interaction within the SAC, as well as coordinating the actions of the SAC with the commands and formations of the Air Force and Navy; verification of combat readiness at the level of subdivisions and units of the SAC; actions of the headquarters of the SAC formations (after receiving an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces to use nuclear weapons) to organize nuclear strikes (conditional) by intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers against the armed forces and strategic facilities on the territory of a potential enemy.

When analyzing the planning documents prepared for the Globe Shield type exercises, the features of their scenarios attract attention. First of all, it should be noted that these scenarios, as a rule, were not linked to the real geostrategic situation that had developed by the beginning of the exercises. Usually, these scenarios provided for: a sharp increase in international tension; the emergence of a crisis situation in one or two regions of the world;

armed conflict, gradually developing into conventional large-scale hostilities.

In the dynamics of the Globe Shield exercises, one should especially note such episodes as real launches of ICBMs (without nuclear warheads), mock launches of ballistic missiles from nuclear submarines, as well as practical bombing at ranges with a preliminary overcoming of the air defense zone of the "enemy". In addition, heavy bombers from the SAC mimicked enemy air raids on the territory of North America. To "repel" these raids, the air defense systems of the Joint Command of the Aerospace Defense of the North American Continent (NORAD) were "involved". And further. During the Globe Shield exercises, heavy bombers from the 43rd air wing, based on the island of

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ve Guam, demonstrated the fulfillment of the treaty American obligations for "joint defense" with Japan and South Korea.

During the final phase of the Globe Shield exercise, drills were usually conducted to test the understanding of the following issues by the SAC command staff: specifics of the handling of nuclear weapons; implementation of special measures to ensure "nuclear safety"; restoration of aircraft combat capability; elimination of the consequences of nuclear strikes of the "enemy"; ensuring the reliability of communication systems.

Judging by the parameters of this exercise (goal, concept, forces and means used, global scope, interaction of the main executor - SAC - with other branches of the US Armed Forces, and most importantly, the determination to use nuclear weapons, taking into account the "Hiroshima experience"), this doctrine had a pronounced offensive character.

It is important to pay attention to the fact that in 1985 a joint Soviet-American statement said that a "nuclear war" must never be unleashed, there can be "no winners" in it, and the USA and the USSR pledged not to strive for military superiority and stressed the importance of preventing any war between the US and the Soviet Union.

NATO strategic command and staff exercise "Vintex"

The strategic command and staff exercise "Vintex" ("Mipekh" - "Winter Exercise") was and, apparently, remains the main strategic command and staff exercise of the North Atlantic Alliance, the highest form of operational training of the Joint Armed Forces (JAF) of NATO. For the first time KSHU "Vintex" took place in 1971. Then, exercises of this type began to be held once every two years (on odd years) within the NATO "responsibility zone", which, as is known, covers the territory of the member countries of this bloc and the waters of the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean north of the sea. - the peak of Cancer and the Mediterranean Sea.

As noted in NATO planning documents, the main goals and objectives of the Vintex exercises included: testing the effectiveness of the NATO Joint Forces command and control system; development of a scheme for transferring the Armed Forces from peaceful to martial law; deployment of units and formations of the unit's joint military forces in the areas assigned to them; redeployment of reserve troops from the USA to the European theater of war; preparation and conduct of conventional combat operations and their development into operations using first tactical and then (if necessary) strategic nuclear weapons.

The exercises "Vintex" usually involved the commands and headquarters of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe, the Atlantic and the English Channel

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(headquarters of the joint tactical commands, armies, corps and divisions). In addition, representatives of the ministries of defense, general staffs and individual civilian departments of the NATO member states, which provide the material and technical supply of the armed forces, participated in the process of preparation and dynamics of the exercises.

The start of the Vintex exercises was preceded by thorough preparation, the duration of which ranged from one and a half to two years. In the process of this preparation, a set of planning documents was developed: a general scenario, operational orders, combat orders, a list of introductory instructions, instructions on the logistic support of the NATO Allied Forces. At the same time, it should be noted that the military-political leadership of the bloc paid primary attention to the general scenario of the exercise, especially its main element - the initial strategic situation that had developed in the world at the beginning of the exercise. This situation was usually based on the real balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as American and NATO concepts about the possible nature of a future war. Based on these concepts and the correlation of forces in the European theater of war, the NATO Allied Forces Headquarters modeled the conditions for the emergence of a military conflict, its dynamics and probable outcome.

It is especially important to emphasize that the operational aspects of the Vintex exercise were played out on the basis of a coalition strategy in place at the start of the exercise. Thus, for the Vintex-75 exercise, orders, combat orders and a list of inputs were developed on the basis of the "flexible response" strategy, which provided for the "metered" use of aircraft (including nuclear weapons) in proportion to the scale of the danger arising on the ground. individual theater of operations or throughout the European theater of war. In practice, during the exercises, options were worked out for the emergence of a conventional limited-scale military conflict with its subsequent escalation into a nuclear war. In this regard, the exercise "Vintex", held in March 1975, was characteristic. Prior to the start of this exercise, specific preparatory activities were carried out for 8-10 days, which consisted mainly of testing communication and alarm systems in the NATO Allied Forces. The actual exercise (dynamics) included two stages: 1) the completion of the transfer of the unit's joint military forces from a peaceful to a military situation and the development of issues on the preparation and conduct of conventional operations ("sopuepopa| sopÿÿÿÿ"); 2) the escalation of conventional combat operations into operations with the "use" first of tactical and then of strategic nuclear weapons. The reason for such an escalation, judging by the content of the scenario of the exercise, was the exhaustion of the defensive capabilities of the NATO Allied Forces under conditions of conventional combat operations. In other words, according to the general plan of the Vintex-75 exercise. The united armed forces of the bloc could hold back the offensive of the armed forces of the Internal Affairs Directorate for no more than two weeks.

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When considering the planning documents for the Vintex-type exercises, it should be emphasized that they reflect such important concepts in the field of nuclear planning as the "nuclear threshold", the "double key" system, and the "48-hour readiness of nuclear weapons" system. The essence of these concepts is as follows.

"Nuclear Threshold" refers to the moment of transition to the initial use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war. The "nuclear threshold" is determined (in time and space) by a sharp change in the balance of forces of the opposing sides in the general situation that has developed in the theater of war. In terms of time, the nuclear threshold (NPT) is calculated from the start of conventional hostilities to the time of the initial use of nuclear weapons. The more time elapses from the beginning of conventional hostilities to the first nuclear explosion in a theater of war, the HIGHER the "nuclear threshold" will be, and conversely, the shorter this period of time, the LOWER the "nuclear threshold". Thus, the "height" of nuclear power depends on the length of time between the start of a conventional war and the first nuclear strike. In space, the nuclear power plant is determined by those critical lines reached by the advancing enemy troops (according to the scenarios of the Vintex-type command and control command, we mean the ATS Armed Forces), and the development of the offensive would mean defeat, a catastrophic situation for the NATO Allied Armed Forces defending these frontiers.

The "double key" system, which has been in force in NATO since the deployment of nuclear weapons in the European theater of war, is the principle of decision-making by members of the alliance, according to which nuclear weapons can only be used with the consent of: 1) the country that owns the nuclear weapon ; 2) the country on whose territory nuclear weapons and their carriers.

The system of "48-hour readiness of nuclear weapons" means the readiness of nuclear forces in the theater of war for use no later than 48 hours after the start of conventional hostilities.

In the overall assessment of the Vintex-type command and staff exercises, one should especially note the difference in achieving their operational and political goals. Judging by the content of the main planning documents, the operational goals and objectives of the exercises, as a rule, were practiced almost in full. As for the political aspects of these exercises, especially the solution of such problems as the participation of all (without exception!) members of the bloc in the CSA, here the military-political leadership of NATO faced serious, sometimes insurmountable difficulties. For example, NATO member Greece categorically refused to participate in the Vintex-75 command and control operation, despite persistent invitations from the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. The reason for this refusal was that at that time a campaign was intensifying in Greece with the aim of withdrawing the country from the military organization of the bloc (possibly following the example of France, which, as from

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It is known that in 1966 she withdrew from the military structure of NATO and achieved the withdrawal of the governing bodies of the North Atlantic Alliance from Paris). Turkey, also a member of NATO, refused to take part in this KShU, despite the visit to Ankara of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, American General Haig. The reason for the Turkish evasion was of a mercenary nature - Turkey's dissatisfaction with the termination of American economic assistance and complications in connection with this in the internal political situation in the country. So, due to the evasion of Greece and Turkey from participating in the Vintex-75 KShU, the military leadership of the bloc would have to urgently make changes to the exercise scenario regarding the operational situation in the South European theater of operations, in the area of responsibility of which the Greek and Turkish armed forces.

Thus, the main significance of the command-staff exercises of the Vintex type was that the military-political leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance (in which the main, decisive role belongs to the United States of America) paid and, apparently, continues to pay main attention to the preparation of war with the use of nuclear weapons, which since the time of Hiroshima, according to the strategy of the United States and NATO, continues to be not so much a deterrent as the most effective combat weapon.

Tracking the US and NATO nuclear scenarios and their development during exercises in the immediate vicinity of the borders of our country made it possible to make sure that, contrary to the usually declared defensive version of the exercises and maneuvers, they proceed from the practical use of nuclear weapons after overcoming the "nuclear threshold", i.e. the period from the beginning of the conflict to the use in one form or another of this type of weapon of mass destruction.

Moreover, the level of the "nuclear threshold" is reduced to allow the most quickly and effectively to suppress the resistance of the "enemy" or destroy it. Having somewhat camouflaged these goals, attributing aggressive intentions to the other side during the exercises, the leaders of NATO and the United States, despite the proclaimed "partnership" with present-day Russia, strengthen the goals they had previously outlined for the elimination of the Soviet Union as a state, transferring these goals already on our modern state - the Russian Federation. This preserves, in a somewhat veiled form, the anti-Russian orientation of military preparations using the military potential of the former member countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization that have now joined NATO.

It should also be noted that the next SIOP plan, approved in 1999, includes 3,000 targets and facilities to be

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aiming for destruction by nuclear weapons ("nuclear targets"), 2260 of them, as shown by the data obtained by foreign intelligence, are located on the territory of Russia. They are divided into four categories: nuclear facilities - 1100, political and military authorities - 160, groups of conventional aircraft - 500, enterprises of the military-industrial complex - 500. The rest of the nuclear targets in terms of SIOP are distributed among China and a number of other countries. - Iran, Iraq (the plan was drawn up before the attack on this country), North Korea and others.

As shown by the practical actions for the attack on Yugoslavia and Iraq, the United States and its closest allies mostly follow the worked out scenarios, in particular the factors of surprise, massive destruction of military and civilian targets. All these operations are carried out under the direct supervision of American commanders according to the "monopolar world" schemes, where the main command positions are retained for the United States.

Another conclusion that follows from the analysis of information obtained by foreign intelligence is the strengthening of US intentions to apply something similar to the well-known concept of "Eurostrategic war", using for this purpose the expansion of NATO's "zone of responsibility" to the East. In other words, we are talking about the creation of military bases on the territory of the new members of the alliance, as a result of which the mobile reach of the bloc's air force will sharply increase, which will turn out to be a very serious threat to Russia in the West. In addition, the already existing US Air Force bases in Afghanistan and in the Central Asian (former Soviet republics) countries are a direct danger to Russia from the South.

A number of developments similar to the strategic KShU scenarios discussed above also appeared on the foreign intelligence table. These developments include options for strikes using 30,000 mobile-based cruise missiles, which are located in Afghanistan, in the Central Asian countries, and then will appear in the Baltic states and Poland.

It should also be noted the state of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, especially the approaching of a number of main missiles (from the Strategic Missile Forces) to their maximum technical resource, as well as the fact that a significant part of them were destroyed under the START-2 Treaty. Attention is drawn to such predictive developments as the American program document "Unified Perspective 2010", as well as the "Report on Global Trends in World Development to 2015", prepared at the end of 2000 by a group of American experts from the US intelligence services (CIA, Bureau analysis and research of the State Department). This report examines Russia's pessimistic prospects and gives an alarming assessment of China's growing military power.

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The practical actions of the United States, as a consequence of these predictive developments, were: the withdrawal of the United States of America from the ABM Treaty-72 (June 13, 2002), which was the cornerstone of ensuring geostrategic stability, the promotion of NATO military infrastructure to the east and, of course, the creation in the United States of an expensive National Missile Defense. All this testifies to the intention of the United States to break the agreements reached, to achieve unilateral advantages and the right to use new types of weapons.

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Anxieties and hopes of the Tashkent Forum

(from Memoirs of a Veteran of Intelligence)

In the dead of night on January 11, 1966, an alarming phone call rang out in the room of representatives of the Soviet intelligence in the Tashkent hotel. They called from Prime Minister Kosygin's office.

— It has just become known about the sudden death of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. Help urgently organize the transportation of the Indian delegation to the airport for a flight to India, in compliance with all diplomatic procedures and formalities...

The reconnaissance group duty officer was literally speechless. How so? Just a few hours ago, this energetic leader of the Indian delegation at the Indo-Pakistani peace talks received congratulations on the successful completion of the meeting of the leaders of the two conflicting states, and all of a sudden, such a tragic ending... Could all of Moscow's efforts and hopes have been in vain?

The meeting in Tashkent was preceded by a sharp aggravation of relations between the two large states of Asia. The conflict was based on disagreements about the territorial affiliation of Kashmir, the status of which remained not fully regulated after the British left Hindustan and the formation of two states: India and Pakistan.

This problem periodically aggravated the situation between the two countries in the Kashmir region. In August 1965, the Pakistanis sent several thousand Mujahideen to Kashmir to raise the people of that state against the Indian government. They failed, but the Pakistani invasion escalated into a serious armed conflict.

The clash between the two large states of Asia was regarded in the Soviet Union as the emergence of a dangerous hotbed of war, which must be immediately extinguished. The military operations that unfolded in Kashmir aroused the concern of the Soviet government also because this area adjoined directly

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close to the borders of the USSR Moscow understood that the contradictions between India and Pakistan were intertwined into such a complex tangle that it could only be untangled if there was good will on the part of the parties, in a calm atmosphere and with extreme patience. That is why in the messages to the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan and the Prime Minister of India L.B. Shastri, sent on September 4, 1965, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin emphasized: "In the current serious situation, it is hardly necessary to bring to the fore the question of the causes of the conflict and look for who is right and who is to blame. The main effort must be concentrated on stopping hostilities immediately..." This appeal to India and Pakistan was accompanied in Kosygin's message by an offer of good offices from the Soviet government.

However, the armed conflict continued, and on September 17, Kosygin sent a new message to the heads of India and Pakistan, in which, on behalf of the Soviet government, he submitted for their consideration a proposal to establish direct contact with each other in order to reach an agreement on restoring peace between both countries. "If both sides so wish," the message said, "the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR could also take part in the meeting. Such a meeting could be held, for example, in Tashkent or in some other city of the Soviet Union."

September 20, President Ayub Khan September 22, Prime Minister L.B. Shastri, in response to Kosygin's message, gave their consent to holding talks in Tashkent. This was facilitated by the UN Security Council resolution adopted thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, which proposed India and Pakistan to cease fire and use political methods to resolve contentious problems. This provision of the resolution was fulfilled, and on the night of September 22-23, a truce came to the Indo-Pakistani fronts. The way to the meeting in Tashkent was open.

Preparatory work began in Moscow for the talks in Tashkent, which were scheduled for January 4, 1966. Foreign intelligence (the First Main Directorate of the KGB) also took an active part in this work, which already had solid information on the Kashmir problem and other issues of Indian-Pakistani relations. However, when the decision to negotiate was made, the Delhi and Karachi residencies were tasked with making the most of all available opportunities to obtain additional up-to-date information. The information received was sent to the Center in a timely manner and taken into account in preparation for the upcoming negotiations.

Intelligence officers carefully prepared for their tasks in Tashkent, using all possibilities.

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By the end of December 1965, an operational group of intelligence officers was formed, which was tasked with providing on the spot, in Tashkent, A.N. Kosygin with the necessary information. The group included experts on Asian issues. They were entrusted with the task of extracting, analyzing and processing incoming information and preparing a daily operational report for A.N. Kosygin. The head of intelligence A.M. paid great attention to the preparation for the upcoming work of the group in Tashkent. Sakharovsky. On January 1, this group arrived in Tashkent.

On this and subsequent days, numerous Soviet and foreign journalists began to gather in the capital of Uzbekistan, they were accommodated in the Tashkent hotel, which was turned into a press center for the duration of the negotiations. And on January 3, the people of Tashkent warmly welcomed distinguished guests from Pakistan and India. A.N. Kosygin met them at the airport and escorted them to the residences allotted in the village of Darman. Practical work began immediately.

The intensity of further negotiations is eloquently indicated by the frequency and number of meetings of their participants. In six days, Kosygin held 15 meetings with the leaders of India and Pakistan. Since January 5, the Foreign Ministers of India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union have met almost daily to agree on issues for the upcoming meetings of the heads of delegations.

From the very first day of the summit, the task force of intelligence stood up practically on a permanent watch in order to obtain information important for the successful conduct of negotiations. Considerable attention was also paid to information about the mood among the foreign journalists who covered the meeting. At the same time, it was taken into account that the negotiations took place in an environment when the world was in a state of cold war. The ill-wishers of the Soviet Union tried by all means to cast doubt on the possibility of a positive outcome of the Tashkent meeting. Many political observers in the West were quick to dismiss Soviet proposals to organize talks in Tashkent as a hopeless political move by Moscow. Moreover, the sad experience of numerous mediators acting on behalf of the UN, as well as repeated unsuccessful attempts by Britain and the United States to act as "conciliators" in Hindustan served as an argument for them. An Associated Press columnist wrote from Washington: "The United States would be surprised if any agreement was quickly reached at the Soviet-initiated peace talks." Attempts to cast doubt on the success of the talks were also made by some Western journalists at their press conference in Tashkent.

Press conferences of representatives of the Indian and Pakistani delegations and the Soviet representative were held every day of

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black in the hotel "Tashkent". Journalists received very little information at these press conferences. Representatives of the parties expressed, as a rule, cautious optimism, noting some, albeit slow, progress in the negotiations. Favorite

"inch by inch" became the expression for characterizing the progress in the negotiations between Ayub Khan and Shastri.

In the evenings, after press conferences, the Tashkent Hotel turned into a kind of journalistic discussion club. In the restaurant, in the lobbies, in the bar and in the hotel rooms, hypotheses were put forward, forecasts were made and all sorts of guesses were made about what really happened behind the closed doors of negotiations. The course of negotiations and the positions of the parties were subjected to nightly analysis by a group of intelligence officers.

Everyone understood that the negotiations were difficult and that the main difficulties could arise from the different approaches of the parties to the Kashmir problem. According to India's earlier expressed official point of view, the Kashmir issue could not be negotiated. Pakistan, on the contrary, believed that without discussing the Kashmir problem, the negotiations were generally pointless. The first wake-up call came at a press conference on the third day of negotiations on 6 January. Speaking at this press conference, the representative of Pakistan stated that, from the Pakistani point of view, "it is vital to discuss in depth the issue of Jammu and Kashmir." At the same time, he added that on other issues between the representatives of India and Pakistan "there are sufficient understanding.

Serious disagreements on the Kashmir issue between the leaders of India and Pakistan became known to the employees of the operational group of Soviet intelligence officers in the very first days of the negotiations. Already in the first conversations A.N. Kosygin with Ayub Khan and Shastri, even before the official opening of the conference, which took place on the evening of January 3 and aimed at agreeing on the agenda, the Pakistanis took an uncompromising position. They declared the need to first of all resolve the Kashmir problem at the talks, moreover, on Pakistani terms. Information was also received that Ayub Khan and Shastri did not want to meet again at all. A.N. Kosygin, because in the event of the failure of the Tashkent meeting, it was about the prestige not only of him personally, but also of the Soviet Union.

In this situation, an employee of the task force, who accumulated all the intelligence information on this issue, proposed to draw up a memorandum for A.N. Kosygin, which would have identified ways out of the impasse. Having received the approval of the leadership, on January 4 he wrote a note, which was reported to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. A.N. It took Kosygin a day. For the task force, they were days of mu

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considerate expectation. After all, the intelligence officers intruded into the previously drawn up official plan of action in the negotiations. A day later, A.N. Kosygin invited the first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR N.S. Zakharov, who headed the task force, and stated that he fully agreed with the content of the note and that in the future he would act in accordance with the proposals set out in it.

In the note, in particular, it was proposed to obtain from the negotiators an agreement not to discuss the Kashmir issue, but to postpone its decision for a period after the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. In the course of the talks in Tashkent, first of all, the issues of withdrawing troops, accepting the principle of resolving contentious issues peacefully, stopping mutual acute propaganda, restoring and expanding official relations between India and Pakistan with an emphasis on the development of economic ties.

Despite the fact that the last day of negotiations - January 9 - was Sunday, it turned out to be a day of extremely hard work. The head of the Soviet government repeatedly met either with Shastri or with Ayub Khan. The meetings continued late in the evening, after the traditional press conference. Efforts to find solutions acceptable to both sides continued unabated. The Pakistani representative said at the evening press conference that he remained optimistic, while the Indian representative said, "We remain hopeful". However, the press

The conference announced the intention of both delegations to leave Tashkent on Tuesday, 11 January. This meant that only one day remained at the disposal of the negotiators.

Everyone who followed the progress of the talks in Tashkent naturally worried about how they would end. Those who were sincerely worried about the outcome of the Tashkent meeting began to say on the sidelines that the completion of the negotiations, even without any final document, could not be regarded as a complete failure, because it would be difficult to count on the elimination of the main differences between the parties. However, the persistence and diplomatic flexibility of A.N. Kosygin bore fruit, and the last day of negotiations - January 10 - overturned all pessimistic predictions.

As on the opening day of the talks, at 4 p.m. Kosygin, with the consent of Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Shastri, opened the final session of the Tashkent meeting. In the meeting hall, the words of the head of the Soviet government were heard that the Tashkent Declaration would now be read out. The text of the declaration was read out in Russian and English, after which the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India signed it and exchanged morocco folders with this important document. A.N. Kosygin approached the negotiators and congratulated them on their successful

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completion of the meeting. Ayub Khan and Shastri, to the applause of the audience, sealed their signatures with a long friendly handshake.

In the final part of the Tashkent Declaration, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan expressed their feelings of deep gratitude and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the constructive, friendly and noble role in organizing the meeting, which led to mutually satisfactory results.

The day of signing the declaration ended with a big reception in honor of the leaders of India and Pakistan. The mood was festive. The Press House in the Tashkent Hotel buzzed with multilingualism for a long time after the reception.

Intelligence officers were also in high spirits. When they read the text of the declaration, they experienced special feelings, recognizing in many paragraphs the thoughts they set forth in their memorandum to Kosygin. It became known that A.N. Kosygin highly appreciated their work.

The local newspaper Pravda Vostoka stated: "The negotiations lasted for exactly a week, and the world press assessed them differently. But this moment reduced all assessments to one: on the table lies the most weighty proof of the fruitfulness of the Tashkent meeting - the text of the Declaration agreed upon by both parties.

As expected, the complex Kashmir problem could not be solved in Tashkent. However, the leaders of India and Pakistan stated in the Tashkent Declaration of firm determination to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and reaffirmed their commitment, in accordance with the UN Charter, not to resort to force and to resolve their disputes peacefully. "It was with this in mind," the declaration said, "that the question of Jammui Kashmir was discussed, and each of the parties stated its respective position."

Immediately after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration, India and Pakistan began to implement the measures envisaged by the declaration to establish peace in Hindustan. While still in Tashkent, on the evening of January 10, the secretary of the Pakistani Ministry of Information and Broadcasting issued an order in which the state radio of Pakistan was recommended to refrain from any anti-Indian statements. Both sides immediately began to implement the withdrawal of troops from the territories they seized during the hostilities, as stipulated by the declaration, and their withdrawal ended exactly on the date set by the declaration - February 25th. Sudden death of Prime Minister Shastri

darkened the mood of the Indians, but could not prevent the implementation of the agreements. By mid-January, normal diplomatic relations had been restored.

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relations between India and Pakistan, and the ambassadors (high commissioners) of both countries returned to their usual duties. In January, air communication, postal-telegraph and telephone communications were restored between the countries. All this indicated a significant shift towards the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.

At one of the press conferences in Tashkent, the Pakistani representative Gohar stressed that the Soviet Union provided Pakistan and India with an excellent opportunity to normalize their relations. "How we use this opportunity," he said, "is up to us."

The dangerous hotbed of war was extinguished. The agreements reached in Tashkent ensured a peaceful five-year period in relations between India and Pakistan.

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Afghanistan, December 1979

(through the eyes of an eyewitness)

As a result of which the victorious armies in the past decay and die, how and why do world empires and superpowers collapse? Probably not a single historian or politician can answer these questions accurately and objectively.

It is impossible to take into account and link together all the elements of historical processes; there is no mechanism that would accurately take into account the mood of social strata and groups, as well as the possible forms of manifestation of these moods. All explanations of major historical phenomena are, in my opinion, only approximate.

I think that within the framework of such an approximation, I can state my opinion about our involvement in Afghan affairs.

The thesis that the introduction of our troops into Afghanistan was a mistake of the Soviet leadership has become widespread in the world, and no one seems to doubt it. It seems to me that it was not the entry of troops into Afghanistan that was a tragic mistake, but their presence there for ten years.

Having made sure during the first year that the presence and military operations of our army in Afghanistan do not contribute either to stabilizing the situation in the country or to consolidating the regime that is friendly to us, we had to leave Afghanistan.

The Soviet leadership showed neither sobriety, nor courage, nor foresight in this matter, although some of our military leaders and politicians understood the situation well.

At regular meetings where the development of the situation in Afghanistan was discussed and at which I was present, Marshal S.F. Akhromeev and General of the Army V.I. Varennikov spoke in an undertone: "Understand, because the Soviet army is at war with the people, and there can be no victory in Afghanistan!"

It seems to me that the political, economic and national phenomena of a crisis order that have begun to mature in our city

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state since the 70s, the Afghan epic has aggravated. Afghanistan did not allow us to start looking for ways out of the crisis, which further complicated the position of our army and state.

I was personally involved in the Afghan tragedy, since I spent the whole of December 1979 in Kabul, where, together with my colleagues, I carried out the instructions of the leadership of the USSR and the KGB.

After the change of power in Kabul on December 27, 1979, all participants in this operation were advised to forget everything and destroy operational documents. I also liquidated my official records, where not only by days and hours, but also by minutes, it was written how the events in Afghanistan unfolded in December 1979.

Years passed, the government changed, and those bosses who called for silence began to write memoirs on the Afghan theme, appear on television, give interviews, and so on. Moreover, for some reason, it was former KGB officers, and not army generals, who were at the forefront of storytellers about the events in Afghanistan. Either the representatives of the KGB were tired of their former total secrecy and they wanted to get out of the "zone of silence", or was the oath stronger in the army? Don't know.

In any case, in my opinion, one should not talk about some of the "covert operations" of intelligence in Afghanistan, since this disarms and disorients the younger generations of intelligence officers.

I do not set myself the task of writing everything I know about our involvement in Afghan affairs, especially since most of the interesting pages of this epic have already been read and turned over.

There is probably no point in telling again who and how made the decision to send troops to Afghanistan; how, by order of Amin, his "only and beloved" teacher Taraki was strangled; how, in four specially designed "coffins", four of Amin's closest associates, who became his opponents, were taken by roundabout to Moscow; how Soviet military advisers were seconded from Kabul, who had great sympathy for Amin; how the assault on the palace of Amin Dar-ul-Aman took place; how they replaced Babrak Karmal with Najibullah - all this has been mentioned more than once in the media, studies and memoirs.

In this chapter, I want to talk only about my personal participation in Afghan affairs and about the conclusions that I came to at different stages of the development of the situation in Afghanistan.

After these preliminary remarks, it makes sense to fast forward to November 1979 and remember, how it all started.

One day I was called by the head of intelligence V.A. Kryuchkov said that important events were brewing in Afghanistan. The ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan finally split into two wings - Khalq and Parcham. The Afghan dictator Amin proved himself to be a notorious fascist and executioner of the Afghan

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kind, and, in addition, facts were revealed that indicate his readiness to reorient his policy towards the United States. Under these conditions, the "parchamists" began preparations for overthrowing Amin and taking power into their own hands. The task of intelligence is to help the "parchamists" put an end to Amin. Someone from the leadership of the First Headquarters needs to go to Afghanistan, further study the situation, clarify our capabilities and carry out preparatory work to change the situation in the direction we need.

I had no doubts that Kryuchkov meant me by the term "someone", and I readily agreed to fly to Kabul at any time.

Having resolved this issue, the intelligence chief instructed me to form three or four groups of experienced employees, led by officers who knew the Persian language and the situation in

Afghanistan and neighboring countries, to be sent to Afghanistan in order to provide assistance to the "Parchamists" at a decisive moment.

From that moment on, Afghan affairs became a priority in my official activity for a long time. The battle groups were formed, equipped, armed and, together with army specialists, were transferred to the Afghan military base Bagram a few days before the events.

I flew to Kabul earlier, in early December 1979.

Winter... Cold... Night... The Chkalovskoye airfield is immersed in darkness, gloomy and uncomfortable. I have been looking for a plane for a long time, in which I need to fly to Bagram. No one knows anything or simply does not want to talk to an unknown civilian.

Finally the plane was found. I have a diplomatic passport for the very prosaic name of Petr Ivanovich Nikolaev. By the way, I never presented this passport to anyone anywhere.

I was listed on the passenger lists and was allowed on the plane along with a group of generals and paratrooper officers.

Among the military group, the senior was the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Nikolai Nikitovich Guskov. Later, with him, already in Kabul, I made plans for the withdrawal of our troops to the main objects of the capital of Afghanistan, which were to be occupied by our army units, and seconded KGB intelligence officers to them, who had previously studied the situation at these objects.

In short, the guides for the army units in Kabul were intelligence officers from the Cascade Detachment, who spoke the local languages.

They flew for a long time, sitting on some boxes, bags and overturned buckets, and thus got used to the harsh Afghan everyday life. It was cold and anxious from the full

uncertainty.

We arrived in Fergana before dawn, and here we were already waiting for a table, and shelter, and the arms of paratroopers, who, as it turned out later, were also purposefully preparing for being thrown into Afghanistan.

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We flew to the Bagram military airfield on the same day at dusk and settled down for the night in army bunkers, and in the morning we went to Kabul in several cars.

Unfamiliar country, unfamiliar people, but whom do they remind me of anyway? And the scenery is very familiar. Yep, I remembered. This is Yemen, where I once worked. And the mountains are like that, and the people are bearded, thin, gloomy, dusty. Who is dressed in a soldier's overcoat, who is in a coat, who is in a tattered robe. There is also a great variety on the feet: soldier's boots, and sneakers, and even

galoshes.

Everything shows that the achievements of civilization penetrate the Hindu Kush extremely slowly. Cars stall from rarefied mountain air. After standing for a while, we again move towards Kabul. Nobody pays attention to us. They have long been accustomed to Russian convoys here.

In Kabul, first of all, I met with Lieutenant General Boris Semyonovich Ivanov, a senior KGB representative who had known me well for a long time, and all my further work went on with him in complete unity of opinion and agreement. We just divided the areas of work among ourselves so as not to interfere with each other.

Boris Semenovich and I lived right there, on the territory of the embassy, and were separated only for a short time in order to sleep for several hours at night, but there were, of course, completely sleepless nights.

The closer to December 27 - the more often.

In order to better understand the situation and assess our real possibilities, in the very first days I became acquainted with the leaders of some Soviet collectives. Among them were the USSR Ambassador Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev, who had just taken up his post; Chief Military Adviser Colonel General Sultan Kekezovich Magomedov and First Deputy Minister of the Interior Lieutenant General Viktor Semyonovich Paputin, who was on a temporary assignment in Afghanistan.

I soon discovered that none of them knew about the impending events, and the GRU resident knew nothing about this either.

There will be success in the change of power in favor of the "parchamists", I thought, - all the laurels will go to the KGB, if the case ends in failure - the KGB will also be responsible. A few days later, I formed a very definite opinion that the KGB representation and residency in Kabul was not in a position to provide decisive assistance to the "Parchamists" on its own. About this we with B.S. Ivanov and reported to the Center. But for many days the leadership of the USSR did not dare to inform the chief military adviser and other high-ranking officials about the impending coup and the predetermined entry of our troops into Afghanistan.

Closer to the "X" day, Viktor Semenovich Paputin felt some movement and, addressing Boris Semenovich and me, said

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once: "Guys, I see that you are up to something here ... Leave me in Kabul, I will be useful to you with our Cobalt detachment. I do not want to return to Moscow. There, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the very top, bad things are happening."

He already knew, of course, that the Minister of the Interior, Shchelokov, had prepared Brezhnev's son-in-law, Churbanov, to replace him, and therefore wanted to delay his humiliating dismissal. And it soon really took place. Paputin could not bear this injustice and put a bullet in his forehead on the very next day after the coup.

Approximately a week before the coup, the KGB representative office, the chief military adviser and the senior representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were invited to carry out a change of power by joint efforts, according to a single plan and together with the "parchamists". The Soviet ambassador and the GRU resident never received any information about the upcoming events.

Together with several army generals, B.S. and I Ivanov began a final revision of their forces and capabilities of the "Parchamists" and, after two days of exhausting debate, wrote a collective telegram to Brezhnev and their ministers stating that without military support we cannot vouch for the success of the coup and that if it fails, Afghanistan will be us lost forever, and the USSR embassy will be destroyed.

It was only after this telegram that Moscow informed us that the army would be supported. One military unit will be sent from Bagram to "protect" Amin's palace in the vicinity of Kabul in fulfillment of his request (in fact, to storm the palace), and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division will land at the Kabul airfield 25 December, for which we had to ensure control over the airfield.

The "defenders" of the palace included special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff and a KGB detachment led by my colleague and comrade, Deputy Head of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov.

Deputy Chief of the Airborne Troops N.N. Guskov and I, together with a small group from the Ministry of Defense, began to draw up a plan of action.

8 objects were allocated, which were to be occupied by the combat groups of the 103rd Guards Air Division in the first place, and the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with the "parchamists", were ordered to carry out preliminary work on these objects in order to persuade the people working there to take it easy to a change of power.

I bring these objects from memory:

1. Amin's Palace.
2. The General Staff of the Afghan army.
- Z. Prison for political prisoners in Puli-Charkhi.

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4. Intelligence and counterintelligence service.
5. Ministry of the Interior.
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
7. Radio and television.
8. Telephone exchange.

Amin's palace was instructed to take the army airborne assault unit and the detachment of Yu.I. Drozdov.

Since losses were expected during the capture of the palace, we set up a medical center on the territory of the embassy.

After the landing of the airborne division at the Kabul airfield, I went there together with the senior reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the "Cascade" to attach them to the division. It was December 26, 1979.

When meeting the division commander, the latter introduced himself to us in all his uniform: "Commander of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, Major General Ryabchenko." Having met the divisional commander, I asked him why he did not name his division by its full title: "Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree."

Ryabchenko was surprised by this question and asked: "How do you know this?" "I fought in this division, and in it I finished my military service,"

I explained.

After that, we went into the headquarters tent, pitched here, on the airfield, and distributed the Cascade groups among the units and subunits of the 103rd division.

Ryabchenko called his commanders, I introduced them to the senior groups, together we clarified and set the task, and our comrades immediately joined the battle formations of my native division. This was such an unexpected meeting with her after 33 years.

During the movement to the objects and at the time of their occupation, the senior groups of the "Cascade" were obliged to report by radio to the KGB representative office (in the embassy building) about how the operation was developing.

We are B.S. Ivanov were supposed to coordinate their actions and inform Moscow about the development of events by a special telephone.

On the evening of December 27, at nightfall, the columns of the 103rd Airborne Division led by our groups (some of them included "Parchamists") moved along the developed routes. By the morning of the 28th, all operations were to be completed.

Boris Semyonovich Ivanov decided that it would be more useful for him not to be at the KGB headquarters, but at the headquarters of the military command. He went there in advance and stayed there until the next morning.
day.

Thus, I reported all the information about the movement of troops, the capture of objects to Moscow, and in the course of the reports I had to simultaneously deal with issues of coordination so that our columns would not mistakenly start shooting at each other. Such danger all the time arose.

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Employees of the KGB representative office, residencies and fighters of the Cascade detachment perfectly prepared for the operation and ensured a bloodless transfer of power to the Parchamists at most facilities. The most difficult objects to capture were Amin's palace and the premises of the General Staff. Unfortunately, our assessments that it will not be possible to seize these objects without a fight have been confirmed.

The wounded and the dead were taken to the embassy.

It was probably the hardest night of my life. During the Great Patriotic War, there were both days and nights worse than this at the front, but then I was a junior commander responsible for solving some particular task, and here a large share of responsibility for the success of a multifaceted military field fell on my head. - tic operation.

Despite the fact that the conversations on the military radios were conducted practically in the open, no one heard them. Both the residents of the capital and the employees of the embassies of foreign states slept peacefully, and woke up in the morning under the new government. Our scouts from the Cascade detachment also contributed to a peaceful sleep - about an hour before the assault on Amin's palace, they disabled the telephone network in some nodes.

True, shots were heard from time to time in various parts of the city, but here this did not bother anyone for a long time. They probably thought that the Aminovites were shooting their next opponents.

Ambassador F.A. Tabeev, when the first shots rang out and the wounded began to be brought to the territory of the embassy, got alarmed, asked me on the phone in an angry voice what was happening in Kabul, and demanded an explanation.

I said that battles were going on, power was passing to the "parchamists", and now I have no opportunity to talk. We will report the situation in detail in the morning.

Much has already been forgotten, but the main episodes are firmly preserved in memory.

In the middle of the night there was a call on the internal telephone and someone's voice said: "Vadim Alekseevich, I am such and such, you worked at one time with my father ... I received several wounds and may die soon. I want to say goodbye to you. I don't have anyone else here!"

This surname did not tell me anything, I wanted to rush to the first-aid post, but remembered that I could not leave the command post and said into the phone: "My dear, I'm sorry ... There is a battle going on, and I can't leave even for a minute! Be patient and don't lose courage!"

So I don't know what happened to this man. And I forgot his last name, and I don't know if he survived or not, but my conscience is still restless.

Moscow wanted to know the details, and first of all, what happened to Amin. He reported that, according to preliminary data, he was killed during the assault on the palace.

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In the morning, after summing up the first results, I went to inspect the palace. The killed Afghans, including Amin, have already been buried, and the ground has been leveled with armored personnel carriers. In one of the rooms of the palace, I picked up a large photograph of the dictator. Saved it for history.

When we did not yet have confirmation of Amin's death, Kabul radio began broadcasting reports that, by decision of the revolutionary tribunal, the traitor Hafizullah Amin had been sentenced to death and that the sentence had been carried out.

Following this, the radio broadcast Babrak Karmal's appeal to the people of Afghanistan, pre-recorded on tape, and he himself began to move from Bagram to Kabul, accompanied by one of the detachments formed by us back in November.

On December 28, 1979, the results of the operation were summed up all day.

I have already mentioned that the employees of the KGB representative office, the residency and the Cascade detachment acted professionally, competently and perfectly oriented themselves in the situation.

On the evening of December 27, before the troops set out for their intended targets, many of our scouts dispersed to ministries, departments and services to persuade the employees to remain calm and accept the new government. A lot of work in this direction was carried out by the "Parchamists" themselves. One of the complex objects to be neutralized was the KhAD (State Security Service). Vladimir Alexandrovich Chuchukin, deputy head of the KGB Representative Office, went there. Some time later, the senior of the Cascade group, which was walking ahead of the army column, told me about what happened there:

"I'm approaching the KHAD building... It's quiet, only the light is on in one of the rooms. I think the bastards are hiding. Prepared a grenade and quietly sneak up to the door. Now I'll shy away... I opened the door ajar, and Vladimir Alexandrovich was sitting there, drinking tea with the leaders of KhAD. There is a lively conversation and occasional laughter. The grenade was not needed."

Political prisoners released from the Puli-Charkhi prison began to be appointed to responsible positions in the state.

Babrak Karmal and his comrades-in-arms settled in the Ark Palace in Kabul and, a day after the coup, received the heads of the KGB representative office and distinguished officers from the Cascade detachment. B.S. Ivanov, Yu.I. Drozdov and I also took part in this meeting. Babrak Karmal warmly thanked us as the saviors of Afghanistan and declared that without the help of the Soviet Union, the "Parchamists" would not have been able to establish themselves in power.

I had a sense of relief that most of our operational plans were well designed and prepared and successfully implemented. But with all this, death

Not

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how many of our comrades during the storming of Amin's palace seemed unjustified.

By the way, their death served as an impetus for the construction of a monument to employees who gave their lives for the Motherland on the territory of the Intelligence Service in Yasenevo. After many years, it is clear that all our sacrifices in Afghanistan, alas, were in vain.

On December 30, 1979, Yu.I. Drozdov to fly to Moscow to report on the operation.

On December 31, 1979, already after the end of the working day, we appeared before Yu.V. Andropov and reported for their work.

There was great joy in the family - everyone managed to celebrate the New Year together, at home, and a heavy burden of responsibility fell from the soul.

In the first days of the new year, 1980, joyful feelings did not leave me. Everything will now go well in Afghanistan - reasonable people are asserting themselves in power there without any extremist twists. Afghanistan remains our great friend, and who is the only one along the entire southern borders of the USSR. The chairman of the KGB promised to generously reward all the participants in the events.

But soon alarming voices began to be heard.

My great friend and senior comrade Ivan Alekseevich Markelov (at that time he was, like me, the first deputy chief of intelligence) at the very first meeting after returning from Afghanistan asked me with anxiety in his voice: "Why are we going there at all? got in? This expedition will not end well for us!"

Then came the responses from the US. They happily rubbed their hands: "The Soviets got caught - they did not take into account our deplorable experience. Afghanistan will be to the USSR what Vietnam was to the United States."

Then the orientalist began to stir - specialists in Afghanistan and in general in this region. They began to express critical remarks about the futility of the presence of our troops in Afghanistan, and from them came the phrase, which later became established in the media: "We climbed into Afghanistan without knowing its geography."

This is a time of doubt and reflection. And the leadership of the KGB demanded decisive action to assist the regime of Babrak Karmal and eliminate the "bandit movement". A massive flood of advisers of all stripes began in Afghanistan. There were many of them even before the coup, and now the "occupation" of the country by advisers from the USSR has begun even more so. It was as if the party had issued a cry: "Don't feel sorry for advisers for Afghanistan!"

Their activities in our mass media during the perestroika period were not only criticized, but simply ridiculed. They supposedly did everything according to our model: they created not only machine and tractor stations, but also Komsomol, women's and even pioneer organizations. No, of course, there was no blind copying.

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On the contrary, all the time there were calls for the need to act in accordance with local conditions and customs, taking into account the medieval age of Afghanistan and its tribal way of life.

But attempts to directly transfer our experience, of course, took place. This also applies to some extent to the field of intelligence and counterintelligence work. After all, understanding the national characteristics of a country is one thing, but the specific personal experience of each adviser is quite another. Inventing something completely new based on your experience is extremely difficult.

A whole era of conferences and meetings on Afghanistan began in Moscow, starting from the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU to departmental and interdepartmental...

Quite often, diplomats, military and intelligence officers gathered to resolve foreign policy issues related to Afghanistan and our military presence there. Most often, these meetings took place at the USSR Foreign Ministry with First Deputy Minister Georgy Markovich Kornienko. Usually there were S.F. Akhromeev, V.I. Varennikov, and from the State Security Committee, either I, or Ya.P. MEDYANIK.

It is clear that Afghan affairs were systematically discussed by Yu.V. Andropov.

There were meetings with other ministers, including the Minister of War D.F. Ustinov. The latter held meetings leisurely, with tea parties and all sorts of distractions from the main topic. Sometimes the conversation took on a character far from the agenda.

For intelligence, Afghanistan became the main task: we strengthened the security agencies of Afghanistan, sent our advisers to many Afghan provinces, and began to train hundreds of Afghan intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers on the territory of the Soviet Union and in Kabul. They did everything, up to the opening of orphanages in our country for Afghan orphans.

The orders of the KGB leadership were unequivocal: to spare nothing for Afghanistan, to satisfy all their requests immediately. The next year (and in the future every next one) was supposed to be the year of "a decisive turning point in the fight against dushmans".

In the leadership of the PSU, four people were engaged in Afghan affairs from morning to evening - the head himself, V.A. Kryuchkov, myself, Deputy Head of Intelligence for this area Yakov Prokofievich Medyanik and Deputy Head of Intelligence - Head of Directorate "C" Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov.

I oversaw, in particular, the work of the KGB representation, participated in numerous meetings on Afghanistan both in the KGB and outside it, and devoted a lot of time to conversations with our employees who visited Afghanistan - in Kabul, and in various provinces. In these conversations, various current affairs were decided,

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but I also wanted to understand the perspective of developments. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of these reports were disappointing. As before, the regime held its positions only in Kabul, and on the periphery, power passed from hand to hand, and nowhere was there even a hint of the stabilization of the regime and the support of its population.

About a year after the coup, I realized that the presence of our troops in Afghanistan did not give tangible results, and two later I came to the conclusion that our political, economic, military and all other types of assistance to the regime of Babrak Karmal would not save this regime and would not lead to stability in Afghanistan.

Disillusioned with Babrak Karmal (he was indeed a weak organizer with great ambitions), the Soviet leadership (at the suggestion and with the help of intelligence) went to replace the Afghan leader with Najibullah.

The assertion of Najibullah as the Afghan leader for some time gave rise to hopes for an improvement in the situation in Afghanistan, but soon everything went back to normal. Afghanistan continued to devour us, the army did not understand what it was fighting for, foreign interference in the affairs of Afghanistan was growing, the bulk of the Afghans considered us occupiers, and Najibullah was Moscow's protege.

The leadership of the KGB, however, did not allow the thought of our defeat in Afghanistan and constantly came up with new initiatives to provide assistance to Afghanistan in an ever-increasing volume.

Even remote hints that we should leave Afghanistan were considered anti-state, anti-party and seditious.

Seeing the doom of our participation in Afghan affairs, it was difficult to maintain at least some kind of enthusiasm. The losses of our army and the huge military and economic aid that was burning in Afghanistan aroused a feeling of protest and acted oppressively.

The paradox of this phenomenon was that the KGB, and primarily the intelligence service, managed to create truly efficient state security agencies that were successfully working not

only throughout the territory of Afghanistan, but also penetrated into the territory of Pakistan, and Najibullah, who came to power with our help, was undoubtedly the most worthy leader ever in Afghanistan. I knew him personally and met him both when he headed the security agencies and when he became president.

He was a good organizer, a highly educated person, an opponent of repressions in the country, and his very specialty - a doctor - already assumed a humane beginning in his character. Najibullah sincerely wanted happiness and prosperity for his people and spared no effort to somehow improve the situation in Afghanistan.

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Once I accompanied him in the evening on the way from the center of Moscow to Yasenevo. We were driving along Leninsky Prospekt and, looking at the illuminated windows of the houses, Najibullah said: "When will there be such modern houses in Afghanistan, when will we have such a happy and calm life as you have? Will I live until then?" There was also pain for Afghanistan, and the understanding that the path to a more or less civilized society in his country would be long and painful.

telny.

Faith in Najibullah and in the reliability of his security agencies gave rise to the illusion in the leadership of the KGB that since success can be achieved in this sector, it means that it can and should be achieved on a countrywide scale.

These dangerous illusions, the unwillingness to face the truth, delayed the withdrawal of our troops for several years. And a large share of the blame for this falls on the KGB. It should be said that the leaders of the KGB representative office in Kabul were nominated by leading intelligence officials who showed themselves positively in operational work and were very well versed in the affairs of the Near and Middle East. In addition to B.S. Ivanov, the representative office was successively headed by L.P. Bogdanov, V.N. Spolnikov, N.E. Kalyagin, B.N. Voskoboynikov, V.P. Zaitsev. Three of them, Bogdanov, Spolnikov and Zaitsev, were orientalists and previously worked in the countries of this region.

Our last representative in Kabul was V.A. Revin. He developed a particularly close relationship with Najibullah, he had the most diverse positive influence on him and encouraged him as best he could.

It should also be said that all our heads of the mission had direct access to Babrak Karmal and Najibullah, who received them at the first request.

Obviously, it is appropriate to note that Afghanistan turned out to be a defeat not only for us. In many respects, the United States also miscalculated. It was they who were the initiators of the creation on the territory of Pakistan of the armed formations of the Mujahideen, who waged an armed struggle against the Soviet army. It was the United States that armed them and sent them to fight against the "infidels". The United States essentially opened the way for terrorists, who, hiding behind the banner of Islam, inspire fear and horror in many countries at the present time. What is happening now in Algeria is also the result of previous US activities in support of the Mujahideen. The organizers of the massacre of civilians in Algeria were trained in Pakistani camps set up with the help of the Americans. Both the civil war in Tajikistan and the fratricidal war in Afghanistan itself are also, to a certain extent, a consequence of the US policy, which was ready to cooperate with the darkest and most reactionary forces in order to weaken the influence of the Soviet Union.

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The ten-year war in Afghanistan has corrupted our army. Military operations in a foreign country with obscure goals caused unnecessary cruelty in the treatment of the population, which, not without reason, was considered as accomplices of the Mujahideen - dushmans. Looting and violence have become a common, everyday occurrence.

So why did we get into Afghanistan? Some of our politicians and high officials in the past refer to the important strategic interests of the Soviet Union, but what they consisted of, as a rule, is not explained.

In general, the phrase "important strategic interests" is always shrouded in mystery. Since they are strategic, it means that not everyone is able to understand and not everyone is supposed to know, and there is nothing to bother with questions.

The most understandable and acceptable explanation was that we were interested in preserving friendly Afghanistan and a calm Soviet-Afghan border. In addition, there was a desire to demonstrate to the whole world, and above all to the United States, our determination to defend state interests not only through diplomatic actions, but, in extreme cases, through the use of military force. Moreover, the Americans really gave a reason all the time. They not only demonstrated their military strength, but actually and everywhere increased it.

There were more than enough concrete confirmations of this: delays in the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty, new long-term weapons programs for the US Army, and the creation of American "rapid deployment forces." The assumption that if we let the development of events in Afghanistan take its course, then there may appear missiles aimed at the Soviet Union, was also not without foundation. Plus, a protracted conflict with China and much more (border Turkey is a member of NATO, possible US interference in the affairs of neighboring Iran, etc.).

The arguments that the Soviet Union, through its military action in Afghanistan, wants to go to the "warm seas", expanding its zone of influence up to the Indian Ocean, do not stand up to serious criticism. Our political leadership was not so naive and confident in its own military, economic and political capabilities as to undertake such adventurous actions.

I think that when deciding on the deployment of troops, Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov calculated only one side of the entire complex of our military and political interests, namely, the situation in Afghanistan and on our southern borders. Other aspects of international politics were not taken into account, not to mention domestic politics.

By sending troops into Afghanistan and staying there for many years, we gave a good reason for the United States to intervene more actively in the affairs

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this region and provided him with reliable allies in pursuing an anti-Soviet course.

The top Soviet leadership did not foresee the reaction of the Muslim world to the introduction of troops. Overnight, we have lost friends in this world and gained many enemies, and the non-aligned movement turned its back on us.

But the main thing is that when making this decision, the issues of the internal situation in the USSR were completely ignored.

It seems that the top leaders continued to believe in the solidity of our society, national unity, the reliability of the army and inexhaustible economic opportunities.

The fact that our armed intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was extremely negatively received by part of the Soviet intelligentsia, they preferred to forget, but this should not have been done.

The most regrettable thing was that the reaction of the population to the death of our soldiers in Afghanistan was not taken into account. The death and injury of thousands of young people in the name of incomprehensible "strategic interests" every day undermined the confidence of the population of the Soviet Union in

to their leaders. Only the complete paralysis of the supreme power can explain the fact that our decaying army remained in Afghanistan for ten whole years.

We are reaping the bitter fruits of the Afghan tragedy to this day.

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humane intelligence mission

The international life of mankind is complex and diverse. Millions of people are involved in the process of realizing the natural need of various countries and peoples to maintain mutual multifaceted relations. However, it does not always proceed calmly, smoothly and constructively. Even in relatively peaceful times, "hot spots" appear on the planet every now and then, so-called local wars blaze, crises flare up, conflicts of varying intensity smolder and flare up. And, unfortunately, it never happens without victims, without the lives of ordinary people being endangered, and they themselves are not forcibly deprived of their freedom. Rescuing compatriots who are in trouble in a foreign land, who have become captives or hostages, who are subjected to deprivation, torture and humiliation, is the sacred duty of both official state structures and public organizations of each country. But when their capabilities, as well as the powers of various international organizations, turn out to be insufficient, then in order to fulfill the above tasks, one has to resort to extraordinary methods and means. As international experience shows, in such cases they always remember special services, primarily intelligence services. And in most situations, it is they and, perhaps, only them who can solve these humane problems.

There are many cases in the history of our country when scouts rescued Soviet (Russian) citizens from trouble, who were sent to foreign countries with various professional missions and found themselves in life-threatening emergencies. The list of countries, mainly Afro-Asian, where our compatriots were victims of conflicts, crimes, provocations, is long enough. For example, we can mention such countries as Angola, Bangladesh, Burma (now Myanmar), Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, Ethiopia and, of course, Afghanistan.

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Problems related to the disappearance and search of citizens in Afghanistan have arisen in the past more than once. Either unlucky fishermen or hunters were carried away by their prey fishing and lost their bearings in an almost unfamiliar area, then a party of geologists, land reclamators or builders, due to bad weather or other unforeseen circumstances, did not get in touch at a given place and at the appointed time. But before the beginning of the 1980s, not a single episode is recalled with the capture of Soviet citizens as hostages or with an aggressive hostile attack with the aim of inflicting physical, material or moral damage. On the contrary, the locals usually pronounced the word "showrawi" (Soviet) respectfully and kindly, and almost never refused help. Quite eloquent in this sense is the case told by one of our veterans, Major General Lev Petrovich Kostromin. According to him, once in a remote Afghan hinterland, a group of employees of the USSR embassy, not wishing to stop for the night in a village, settled down in an open field near the road and settled down to sleep in a car. Waking up in the morning, they saw at some distance sedately sitting upright

on the stones of the elders in turbans and robes.

"Assalamo alaikum, dear ones," the Russian diplomats greeted politely. – And how did you get here?

"Peace be with you too, dear showrawi," came the reply. - And we protect you from unkind people, saibs (gentlemen).

And so, after the introduction of a limited contingent of the Soviet Army (40th Army) into Afghanistan in December 1979, the situation began to rapidly change for the worse. Began a long and cruel

a war in which each side stood up for its own truth. And in a war, not only the dead and wounded are not spared, but also prisoners and missing people. On the Soviet side, almost all of our foreign institutions were engaged in searching for and rescuing them: the USSR embassy, the trade mission, the apparatus of the economic adviser, and so on. But the main burden in these complex and delicate cases fell on the shoulders of the military counterintelligence agencies, the KGB and USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs offices and the foreign intelligence residency. During the years of hostilities (1980-1989) in Afghanistan, 417 Soviet soldiers and officers were captured by the Mujahideen of various religious and political colors or went missing. Of these, 119 people were found and released. It should be noted that the Afghan security agencies and a number of official state institutions and departments of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) also made a significant contribution to the successful completion of these cases.

As of February 15, 1989, that is, the start date of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the DRA, the fate of 298 servicemen remained unclear. Their subsequent search became the duty not only of the Soviet state structures, but also a moral voluntary

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debt of various public organizations of the Soviet Union. Some assistance was also provided by international humanitarian missions, such as the Red Cross. As for the Afghan side, its assistance has steadily declined, and with the fall of the Najibullah regime and the seizure of power by the Taliban, it completely dried up.

But our foreign intelligence did not stop for a minute its systematic work to rescue the prisoners and establish the fate of the missing. For these purposes, a special working group headed by retired lieutenant general Alexander Titovich Golubev was created and is functioning in the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR and then in the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. Among its employees, Colonel Biryukov Leonid Ignatievich deserves special mention, who, for his selfless work in this difficult field, was awarded an informal but respectful nickname among compatriots and Afghans - Leonid the Liberator. In their work, our intelligence officers maintain constant close contacts not only with the relevant Russian departments, but also with the state-political and public structures of the CIS member countries. The contacts of A.T. Golubev and the SVR as a whole with the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Warriors, established in accordance with the decision of the summit of the CIS heads of state. Truly fraternal interaction is carried out with Belarusian, Tajik, Turkmen, Uzbek and Ukrainian

colleagues.

Intelligence measures in this area of its activity are under the control of the President of Russia and his administration.

In recent years, thanks to the efforts of our scouts, it was possible to return to their homeland or establish the burial places of 22 people. The painstaking work of searching for the remaining 276 former servicemen of the 40th Army continues. Among them are Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Belarusians, Turkmen, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Moldavians, Tajiks, Armenians. Surely one of them is still alive and would like to send news about himself to his family and friends. So the humane mission of our foreign intelligence service is far from exhausted. She continues.

A fairly unique experience in rescuing Soviet citizens from hostages has also been accumulated by other KGB residencies ~ SVR. Readers can familiarize themselves with it in the following two essays.

Abduction in Beirut

On September 30, 1985, news agencies in the Middle East reported sensational news: an unknown organization calling itself the Forces of Khaled bin al-Walid had taken hostage four employees of Soviet institutions in the Lebanese capital.

On that day, armed raids were carried out on the streets of Beirut on two cars of the USSR embassy and the employee of the trade mission Valery Myrikov, embassy attache Oleg Spirin, consular worker Arkady Katkov and doctor Nikolai Svirsky were kidnapped.

The capture of foreigners in this country, then covered by many years of civil war, was not something extraordinary. Such cases constantly occurred against the backdrop of fierce intra-Lebanese strife. The state and its capital were divided into numerous zones of influence between various political and religious groups. The central Lebanese authorities, including the army and security services, were weakened. Much of the country was under Syrian control, while the south was occupied by Israel. In addition, Iran actively intervened in the internal affairs of the state at that time, using for this purpose the Shiite organization Hezbollah, which included Lebanese and Palestinians - Shiites by religion.

All these factors contributed to the fact that the abduction by the warring parties of their opponents and foreigners (mainly citizens of the USA, France, Great Britain and some other Western countries) has become a common occurrence. Many of these hostages were imprisoned for long months and even years, while others did not return alive at all. At the same time, robberies were an unusual phenomenon in the country, numerous sabotage and terrorist attacks were organized. Soviet citizens were also exposed to this danger. However, the capture of employees of the embassy and the trade mission of the USSR was carried out for the first time and against the backdrop of friendly Arab-Soviet ties, even under these conditions, it turned out to be unexpected.

To collect information about the organizers and perpetrators of the terrorist action, as well as about its goals and the location of the hostages, the capabilities of almost all embassies and special services of the USSR in the countries of the Near and Middle East were immediately involved. And the main burden fell on the foreign intelligence officers of the KGB in Lebanon. This was due to the virtual inability to use official channels in that country to release the hostages due to the weakness and fragmentation of the Lebanese state structures. Using the accumulated operational and information potential, as well as creating additional reconnaissance positions in a short time, the KGB residency in Beirut was able, by mid-October 1985, to identify the organizers and direct executors of the action of kidnapping USSR citizens and also to collect data on the tasks that they sought to realize as a result of this terrorist operation. Subsequently, information was received about the places where the hostages were kept.

An analysis of the information obtained gave reason to conclude that the terrorist attack, the objects of which were Soviet people, was not on

ruled directly against the USSR; The extremists demanded that Moscow put pressure on Syria in order to stop Damascus's military actions against the Palestinian camps and formations of Muslim radical organizations in northern Lebanon. A letter was planted at the Beirut bureau of the Reuters agency, warning that if the requirements of the Khaled bin al-Walid Forces were not met, it would start liquidating the hostages one by one. The terrorists attached to it photocopies with their photographs, in which a gun was put to the head of each. Demonstrating the inflexibility of their intentions, the extremists shot Arkady Katkov, who was wounded during the capture, and left his body near the capital's stadium bombed by the Israelis. In other anonymous letters, they also threatened to blow up the Soviet embassy in Beirut if their conditions were not met and to liquidate all its personnel.

From Moscow came cipher telegrams from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Security Committee, insisting on an urgent temporary evacuation from the country of most of the embassy workers and

specialists, which was immediately done. Only employees remained who could make a real contribution to the conduct of operations to rescue the hostages and ensure the security of the joint foreign agencies. By that time, it became clear that the fate of the hostages largely depended on the position of the leadership of Syria and the PLO on this issue. It was decided to send responsible representatives of the KGB to Damascus and Tunisia for direct business meetings with SAR President Hafez al-Assad and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

The first meetings with leading figures of the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular with Vice-President Rifaat Assad, the brother of the Syrian President, showed that the decision on the direct participation of the Syrians in the release of the hostages depended personally on Hafez Assad. As it was established, although he was interested in their rescue, at the same time he preferred not to rush. This was explained by the fact that in October 1985, H. Assad was conducting very difficult negotiations with the Americans and the Lebanese right-wing Christian forces on the issue of recognizing the Syrian troops in Lebanon as an international peacekeeping group, and not "occupiers", as some wrote. MASS MEDIA.

In this situation, Syria's too active participation in the release of Soviet hostages with the participation of the SAR, in the opinion of the Syrian leadership, could cause a jealous reaction from Washington, which repeatedly turned to the Syrians with a request to help free American citizens captured earlier by Lebanese terrorists, but not always received positive feedback. In particular, during the period of carrying out measures to rescue hostages from among fellow citizens, extremists in Lebanon killed a previously captured

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there is CIA resident William Buckley. A special representative of the Soviet foreign intelligence, who arrived in Damascus from Moscow, handed over to Hafez Assad the available intelligence information regarding the abduction of Soviet citizens in Beirut and the request of the Soviet leadership to stop shelling the Palestinian camps in Tripoli.

The head of the Syrian state was impressed by the fact that the foreign intelligence of the USSR had much more detailed and accurate information about the kidnappers and the places where the hostages were being held than the Syrian and Lebanese special services. On the same day, Moscow's envoy was received by Chief of the General Staff Shehabi and head of military counterintelligence of the SAR Ali Duba. From them it became known that H. Assad had instructed to obtain the release of Soviet citizens, even starting military operations against any forces involved in the abduction if necessary.

The Syrians, according to their statements, were preparing to carry out a "cleansing" of the Palestinian camps in Beirut and its southern suburbs, where at one time, according to the KTB residency, there were prisoners. But this option turned out to be unacceptable, because fighting in densely populated areas could lead to the death of many people, without guaranteeing the release of the hostages. The Center received a convincing proposal to prevent the planned military-police action of the Syrian troops. After that, a special message was sent from Moscow to H. Assad, and the President of the SAR agreed with him. The operation was cancelled.

Another path to the release of the captured citizens of the USSR lay through intensive contacts with the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization. One of the employees of the Center was sent to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, to conduct regular negotiations and consultations with him on this problem. By order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the top leadership of the Soviet Union, Karakhanov, temporary charge d'affaires of the USSR in Tunisia, also met with the Palestinian leaders, after which Ya. Arafat instructed to involve the special services of the PLO in the operation to save the Soviet people.

Foreign intelligence officers of the KGB in Beirut established contacts with representatives of the military command of the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon. After protracted and difficult negotiations with them, as well as the receipt of fresh intelligence materials, it became obvious that the hostage-taking was carried out by an extremist group of Palestinians without any

collusion with the top leadership of the PDS. Having learned about the background of this action, Y. Arafat tried to resolve the issue of the quick release of the captives, but by that time they had been handed over directly to the Hezbollah armed group. Thus, Arafat himself became, to some extent, a hostage of a radical Muslim organization that served

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conductor of Tehran's political interests in Lebanon. The solution to the problem of captured Soviet people had to be sought in other directions.

It is noteworthy that in those troubled days, many Lebanese showed solidarity with the Soviet Union, so great was the authority of the USSR among the Arabs. Both right-wing Christians and local communists, Shiites and Sunnis, and Druze have tried to establish the whereabouts of the kidnapped hostages. A number of organizations expressed their readiness to use their armed units to storm the place where the hostages are being held, if it is established, and at a certain stage such options were discussed. The Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and its leader Walid Jumblatt played a special role in the successful outcome of the operation. It was they who stood up without any conditions to defend the Soviet embassy in Beirut. By decision of the leadership of the PSP, its supporters in just one night erected a line of concrete fortifications around the complex of buildings of the Soviet embassy and placed several tanks in the most dangerous directions, deployed round-the-clock detachments of armed police, which practically ruled out passage and even uncontrolled passage past the embassy buildings.

Under the supervision of officers of combat units V. Jumblatt, dump trucks with sand approached. Powerful parapets were erected, hiding and protecting the vulnerable points of stationary tanks from possible shelling. Armored towers with cannons rose above the embankments, which reliably kept all approaches to the tanks at gunpoint.

Such security measures were by no means superfluous, since in previous years extremists managed to blow up the buildings of the American, Iraqi, French and other foreign embassies in Beirut, the barracks of the multinational forces, etc., while the victims were counted tens and hundreds.

The sudden appearance of this rampart instantly became the property of the press and thus of the whole of Lebanon. "The Russians are ready for defense. They are protected by Walid Jumblatt, who has taken custody of the embassy," newspapers and television reported in various ways. The fact that the Soviets were guarded by the combat detachments of the PSP, which had military superiority in West Beirut, worked effectively. The assault on the USSR embassy turned out to be an unattractive affair. Checkpoints of the PSP and Lebanese communists quickly arose, guarding other Soviet institutions in Lebanon.

In the meantime, intelligence of the German Democratic Republic, Algeria, Iraq, PDRI, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, etc., provided information important for the search through the channels of cooperation. However, far from everything went smoothly even where, it would seem, it should not special problems arise.

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The work of the intelligence search group was complicated to a large extent by the fact that some warring political groups in Lebanon deliberately confused the "cards", trying to present the role of their opponents in black, and the kidnappers - to shift the responsibility for the kidnapping, as they say, from a sore head to a healthy one. . As it became known later, in the first days even one of the main organizers and inspirers of the terrorist attack visited the Embassy with an expression of sympathy and an offer of help. Therefore, intelligence worked out and constantly corrected versions of the crime committed. It was clarified to what extent specific organizations of Muslim extremists are involved in it, whether they are still related to

what happened to the Palestinians and which one, who has the most influence on the kidnappers, etc.

The search party could not afford to discard, without checking, any of the cases that appeared. There was a scrupulous analysis of the activities of extremist Muslim organizations. In parallel with various versions about the possible involvement of one organization or another in the abduction, arguments were also worked out about their non-involvement in this. Everything was entered into an extensive scheme of search activities. The matter was complicated by the fact that every departure of employees to the city and beyond its borders under the conditions of the ultimatum announced by the thieves was associated with a risk to life and therefore was carried out with weapons and body armor. In the most dangerous cases, the residents were covered by Soviet border guards from the embassy guards. Repeatedly after another threat, I had to go to the morgues of hospitals to identify the discovered corpses, but they turned out to be the bodies of strangers. As for the search itself, it reached a new qualitative basis: on the instructions of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, a special coordinating committee for rescuing hostages was created, which simultaneously included officers of the Lebanese army and various Lebanese political organizations and employees of the USSR embassy.

Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Union in Lebanon, Yuri Suslikov, handed a message from the Muslim authorities of the USSR to the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council of the country, Shamseddin. The Syrian leadership agreed with its political allies in Lebanon to establish a joint commission to rescue captured Soviet citizens. Representatives of the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon were instructed to get in touch with representatives of the Soviet embassy. Our scouts in Beirut continued their search between permanent artillery duels and street skirmishes of opposing Lebanese factions. One of the intense armed clashes found the resident and two other employees of the residency a kilometer from the Soviet embassy. It took more than an hour before they managed to penetrate

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enter the embassy along an extremely dangerous "corridor" formed for several minutes by the opposing sides by mutual agreement specifically for the passage

Soviet diplomats.

Sometimes it seemed that success was near, a little more effort - and the hostages would be free. But at the last moment, something prevented us from finishing the job, and the search had to be continued. There was information about the readiness of the terrorists to release the hostages, but suddenly there was information about their tightening of their position. Some intelligence sources involved in obtaining operational data and carrying out operational "games" with the kidnappers were themselves under threat, but selflessly continued their work. One of them was so closely surrounded by the kidnappers that they even consulted with him on how to proceed.

By the way, in those same days - although not as intensively as the USSR - the United States, Great Britain, France and other Western powers continued to hold consultations in Beirut for the release of their hostages. At the same time, this is not the first time they have offered millions of dollars for the release of their compatriots. Such offers only provoke potential kidnappers. The Soviet Union did not conduct such bargaining. Moreover, through specially created channels, information was brought to the extremists about the complete futility of doing business with the USSR in this way.

In Lebanon, the painstaking work of intelligence officers continued. Having found out through intelligence that the abducted citizens of the USSR were being held by the Hezbollah organization, the residency in Beirut asked the Center for permission to meet with its spiritual leader Mohammed Fadlallah. Moscow gave the go-ahead. Thus, the resident took an extraordinary and, in that situation, a very risky step, because the sheikh never received representatives of foreign states. He lived under the protection of his militants in the outskirts of Beirut, where the Europeans did not dare to appear. The meeting with him took place through the mediation of the head of the security service of the PSP, Abu Saeed.

The Soviet resident knew that Sheikh Fadlallah was highly respected in the Shiite community of Lebanon. The title of ayatollah was given to him by the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Khomeini, making him his equal. It was hard to believe that this outwardly handsome man, an authoritative theorist and interpreter of Islam, could stand behind the kidnappers. And yet it was so! And the fact that the hostages were being held by this very organization had by that time become a burden.

unintelligible.

Without disclosing the already known reliable facts, the resident, in a conversation with Fadlallah, emphasized that the hostages being held suffer, although they represent a country friendly to the Arabs. And most importantly, this tragedy will not change the policy of a great power. The Soviet Union understands that the kidnappers and their inspirers made a mistake

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ka, and therefore patiently waiting for its correction. The resident expressed hope that the sheikh also understands this and his authority, which he can use by addressing the raiders during the next Friday sermon, may decide the issue of releasing the hostages. Sheikh Fadlallah looked at the resident carefully and promised that he would pray for the release of the hostages.

With a request to exert influence on Hezbollah, Moscow turned to King Hussein of Jordan. The monarch made it clear that he would try to use his influence with the fundamentalists in order to alleviate the fate of the hostages. In the mouth of the king, this meant a lot, despite the external uncertainty of seemingly casually dropped words. Messages similar in meaning were sent to the leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya Gaddafi and the leadership of Iran. These countries were assured of "sincere" friendship and willingness to help.

While the ring of search operations narrowed, the fate of the Soviet hostages being held became more complicated. One day at dawn they were taken, blindfolded and with their hands tied, to a small garage. There, the captives were wrapped from head to toe with wide adhesive tape, like Egyptian mummies. Only a small slit for the nostrils was left in the continuous tape surface.

Wrapped up like this, they were placed in a secret flat container for transporting people and, possibly, weapons, placed under the body of a small truck. In terms of height, he hardly allowed to squeeze in a person "packed" in this way.

The route of movement lay along the sea coast, and then through the mountain range to the Bekaa valley. This was felt by the operation of the engine and by the characteristic effect on the ears of increasing height. It became clear to the captives why they were "packed" like that. Without such precautions, it was impossible to travel with them through the mountains, bypassing the numerous posts of the ISP, the Syrian National Party of Lebanon and the SAR. The hostages were wrapped so tightly that they could not detect themselves by voice, knocking or even moving when passing through these

posts.

In the Bekaa Valley, they were unloaded at a transshipment base - in a stone hangar full of boxes with artillery shells and mines. After that, all three were loaded into the trunks of two cars and soon taken to a large village house. He stood on the outskirts, mountains were visible in the distance. The hostages were placed in a barn, fastened to each leg by a meter long iron chain fastened to the floor with a padlock.

At the end of October, the Center recommended that the Soviet intelligence resident in Beirut meet again with the spiritual leader of Hezbollah. In a telegram from Moscow, it was indicated that in a conversation with the sheikh, if necessary, one should even put psychological pressure on him.

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nie. Having received carte blanche, the resident stated in a tense conversation with Sheikh Fadlallah that in the current situation the Soviet Union showed maximum patience, but it could move from waiting to serious actions ... Ayatollah tensed, thought hard, and then replied that he hoped very much for the help of Allah in releasing the hostages. After a heated dialogue, Abu Saeed, head of the PSP security service, who accompanied the resident, remarked on the way back that he was worried if they could even get out of the Hezbollah headquarters.

Quite a bit of time has passed. On the evening of October 30, 1985, a border guard on duty at the main entrance to the Soviet embassy in Beirut peered at the television screens reflecting approaches to the Soviet diplomatic mission. Three bearded strangers in tracksuits rang insistently at the door. They were not immediately recognized as former hostages Valery Myrikov, Nikolai Svirsky and Oleg Spirin.

The day before, they were brought blindfolded to a wasteland near the Soviet Embassy. The abductors demanded not to remove the bandages until the noise of the departing car subsided. When the rumble of the engine died down, our compatriots, having removed wide towels from their eyes, immediately rushed to the embassy.

It deserves special attention that shortly after this liberation of the citizens of the USSR, some Western newspapers published speculation that Soviet intelligence, in order to free their hostages, captured and tortured persons associated with the abduction, even allegedly castrated one of them and threatened to do so. the same goes for other terrorists. Allegedly, only after that the extremists released the Soviet hostages. These rumors are not true. Moreover, it must be emphasized that even after the release of the hostages, the Soviet side did not take any repressive measures against the organizers and perpetrators of the abduction. However, those who were behind it at that time realized that it was not only useless to talk to our country in such ways, but also to their own detriment.

It should also be noted that the political and operational work to free the Soviet hostages was accompanied by special information and propaganda activities carried out through TASS, APN and Soviet intelligence. As a result of collective action, the "information war" against terrorists was won. In Lebanon and most of the Arab states, the news of the successful release of Soviet citizens in the shortest possible time was received with great satisfaction.

And in the capital of Lebanon, a real salute began! On the streets of Beirut there was a shooting that lasted everywhere for at least an hour. Central television announcers were even forced to calm down

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to attack citizens, announcing what was the matter and that this was not the beginning of new armed clashes.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that after the release of the hostages and the salute sounded, the confidential confession in a conversation with an employee of the Consular Embassy of his American colleague: "Now I am convinced and amazed how many friends you have here!"

At one of the diplomatic receptions, President A. Gemayel, assessing the operation to free fellow citizens, said: "We would not have hostages at all, or their number would be reduced to a minimum if the search and rescue were carried out the way the Russians did."

Prisoners of the Golden Triangle

At the junction of South and Southeast Asia, between India from the northwest, China from the northeast and Thailand from the east lies the ancient and original country of Burma!.

The Burmese state went through difficult historical paths - it waged protracted bloody wars with its neighbors, in the 19th century it became a colony of Great Britain, after the Second World War, in 1948, it regained its independence.

In the mid-1950s, political and economic ties between Burma and the USSR began to develop.

In subsequent years, serious internal political events took place in Burma. Attempts to instill the foundations of parliamentary democracy on Burmese soil have not been successful. The fierce rivalry of political parties led the country to a dead end and brought it to the brink of civil war and split.

During this difficult period, the high command of the Burmese army, led by General Ne Win, took power in 1962, restoring relative political stability in the country with decisive action.

Burmese-Soviet cooperation under these conditions not only survived, but also received further development. The construction of all the facilities outlined by the agreements was completed, including the hospital in the city of Taunggyi, the administrative center of the Shan National Region, where several Soviet specialists began to work.

Choosing Taunggyi to host a new hospital, the Burmese government proceeded from the policy of attracting to its side the numerous national minorities inhabiting this region, a significant part of B was under the influence of separatist elements.

Taunggyi is a small city located about 700 km from Rangoon, in the western part of the Shan Highlands. The southeastern part of the highlands, where the borders of Burma, China, Laos and Thailand converge, from

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known as the Golden Triangle. It is one of the largest drug production centers in the world. Here, in remote mountainous areas, the local population has been growing opium poppy for many years - in fact, the only commercial product that gives them a livelihood.

Opium raw materials are bought up by mafia groups operating in the area, who manufacture heroin from it on the spot, then transporting drugs through Thailand to the coast of the Gulf of Thailand, where they flow into the channels of the international drug smuggling trade. All attempts by the authorities to forcibly eliminate drug production or, with the help of the UN, to replace opium poppy with crops suitable for these places have a limited and temporary effect due to the high cost of the measures being taken and the fierce resistance of the drug mafia.

For the time being, everything was calm in Taunggyi, although the presence of a "bouquet" of potential dangers for our citizens who worked there caused concern for the leadership of the embassy and foreign intelligence in Rangoon. Employees of our residency periodically traveled to Taunggyi to get acquainted with the operational situation and carry out appropriate work with Soviet citizens. However, the trouble did happen, and it came from the Golden Triangle.

On a day off on April 15, 1973, hospital doctors Boris Pyatnitsky and Stanislav Vinogradov were walking with their families along the street not far from their cottages on the outskirts of Taunggyi. Suddenly, a detachment of soldiers in the form of the British army caught up with them. This alarmed no one, since the presence of the military in such a "front-line" city as Taunggyi was a common occurrence.

However, the unexpected happened next. People in military uniforms, and there were about twenty of them, pushed Boris and Stanislav away from their wives, handcuffed the doctors and led them towards the mountains overgrown with forests.

The discouraged women at first could not understand what had happened. They hoped that the misunderstanding would soon be resolved safely and their husbands would return home.

By the time they raised the alarm and turned to the local authorities for help, it was already too late. Combing the area in the area of the abduction did not yield any results. The kidnappers, along with their victims, fled into the jungle.

The report from Taundzhi about the abduction of Vinogradov and Pyatnitsky caused great alarm and concern in the collectives of the Soviet Embassy and our residency. After appropriate consultations with the Center, the residency began to implement additional measures to ensure the security of Soviet citizens working in Burma. Simultaneously in work with agents and operational communications

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We focused on obtaining information about the whereabouts of our people and possible ways of influencing their captors.

Certain hopes were pinned on the existing confidential contacts among the former members of the leftist and nationalist organizations that had come out of the underground and legalized, previously based in the Shan Highlands. However, the development of these activities took a lot of time and effort, and the return from them was negligible. Through the Soviet Embassy at all levels, the issue of ensuring the safety of Soviet citizens and the adoption of urgent measures by the Burmese authorities to release Vinogradov and Pyatnitsky was raised. However, the Burmese side in the first days after the incident was in the dark about the perpetrators of this terrorist act and actually did nothing. The whole burden of work on the liberation of the Soviet people fell on the embassy, and practically - on the residency.

The deputy resident of foreign intelligence immediately flew to Taungji to clarify the details of the incident on the spot. The first thing he had to do was to find out who and for what purpose carried out the abduction of Soviet citizens.

In a conversation between the operative and the commander of the government troops deployed in this region, it turned out that aerial reconnaissance a few dozen kilometers from the city in the jungle discovered a caravan of pack horses moving in the direction of the border with Thailand. The military assumed that people from this caravan had kidnapped the doctors. But that was just a guess.

The question of which particular group went to the hostage-taking, what was the purpose of the kidnappers, remained open, although the answer to it was of great importance for clarifying the circumstances of the case and subsequent actions to release Vinogradov and Pyatnitsky. The first information about this was obtained informally.

The operational worker, who arrived in Taunggyi, settled in the only hotel in the city. In the evening, in the lobby of the hotel, he managed to get into conversation with a Burmese from Rangoon, who, as it turned out, was often in Taunggyi on business and had good connections here. An experienced operative intuitively felt that the Burmese could help clarify many issues.

However, the interlocutor turned out to be sharply opposed to the Burmese military regime and reproached the Soviet Union for helping Ne Win. It took a long time to prove to him that the USSR was providing assistance not just to the ruling regime, but to the people of Burma, which was also evidenced by the selfless work of Soviet doctors in the Taunggyi hospital.

As a result of a long conversation, the Burmese finally agreed with the arguments put forward and volunteered to help in clarifying the details of the incident and the fate of our doctors.

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Intuition did not fail the intelligence officer - the next evening a new acquaintance informed him that, according to local business circles, Soviet citizens were captured by people of the Shan drug lord Kun Sa. This figure was quite well known to the residency. Kun Sa is the head of the Shan separatists, a well-known adventurer and a major mafia figure who traded drugs and precious stones from Burma. Having considerable funds at his disposal, he maintained well-armed detachments of his supporters, who ensured the safety of his criminal "business". The main bases and strongholds of the "troops" of Kun Sa were located in the highlands in the north-east of Burma - in the area of the "Golden Triangle".

For several years, the "army" of Kung Sa, in agreement with the Burmese government, was engaged in the "protection" of a large section of the northeastern border of Burma. This position gave Kun Sa freedom of action in the border areas and allowed him to safely engage in drug trafficking.

In the end, the government of Burma, realizing the futility of cooperation with Kun Sa, decided to restore order in the Shan region. Kong Sa was arrested and placed in the Rangoon prison. The Burmese army launched military operations against the Shan separatist formations, seeking to take control of the entire territory of the Shan Highlands, including the Golden Triangle area.

However, the government forces failed to complete this task. The actions of the Burmese army made it difficult for the people of Kun Sa to engage in drug business, but could not paralyze it. Detachments of Kun Sa militants most often escaped from the blows of the army and hid in their forest camps, arranged in remote, hard-to-reach places of the Shan Highlands, where government troops did not dare to be drawn in without the support of military equipment.

So, Kong Sa ended up behind bars. Under the conditions of the military regime, the stay in prison could drag on for a long time. In such a situation, supporters of Kun Sa, apparently with his knowledge, undertook an action to seize foreign hostages in order to obtain the release of their leader from the Burmese government in exchange for them.

The information obtained by the scout in Taunggy proved to be extremely useful in negotiations with the Burmese authorities. Soon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to officially admit that our doctors had been kidnapped by the Shan separatists, who offered the Burmese government to exchange them for Kun Sa. At the same time, with reference to the opinion of the top Burmese leadership, it was stated that the Burmese side decided not to accept the conditions of the Kun Sa supporters and launch a new military operation against terrorist drug traffickers, during which they would free the hostages.

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This did not bode well for our people. For the Burmese, the main thing was to defeat the separatists, and not to free their captives.

As Vinogradov and Pyatnitsky said after their release, the Shan detachment with the hostages was on the move all the time. Days passed in transitions from one camp to another. The militants stopped in mountain villages, where they always found huts for the night, water, food.

Parking in the villages were short. A day or two, sometimes longer, and then again crossings, forest paths. Only in one place, probably in some base camp, the detachment stood almost month.

Stanislav and Boris were given paramilitary uniforms - jackets and trousers, soldier's boots. The food was monotonous: rice, some vegetables, some meat.

Guarded constantly and carefully. At the huts where the hostages spent the night, there were sentries, one of the guards was always inside the premises. The "guardian" assigned to the captives, who spoke English, periodically reported that the Shans were negotiating the fate of the captured doctors and would soon release them. But day after day passed, and nothing changed. The hostage detachment continued to circle the Shan Highlands, evading clashes with units of the Burmese army, which actually took active steps using aviation.

At the end of May, the detachment unexpectedly split up, and Boris and Stanislav were assigned to different small groups, for whom it was easier to evade the bombing of the Burmese aviation. They briefly saw each other again four months later, when their groups met at a parking lot in one of the villages, and then again in 1974, two weeks before the release of Stanislav Vinogradov.

In connection with the clearly defined trend of the movement of our citizens in the direction of the unguarded Burmese-Thai border and the real possibility of Shan separatist groups entering the territory of Thailand, the leadership of foreign intelligence decided to involve the residency in Bangkok in the work to obtain information on the whereabouts of the abducted Soviet citizens and the search for ways to free them. The staff of the residency took this task of the Center seriously and responsibly. The scouts discussed the problem together and outlined priority steps.

The long and hard work began. As a result, the residency contacted representatives of the highest military circles in Thailand, who instructed one of the generals to directly deal with the problem of releasing our doctors.

The Thai military has determined that our doctors are alive and relatively safe, as they are being kept away from the main Shan forces that the Burmese government forces are fighting against.

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Due to the tough negative position of the Burmese authorities, the Shans lost hope of exchanging the hostages for Kun Sa. Therefore, the proposal of the Thai mediators, formulated by our residency, to discuss the conditions for the release of Soviet doctors for a ransom, turned out to be very opportune here.

The following proposal from Moscow was brought to the attention of the Shan leadership: the Shans take the hostages to the Burmese-Thai border and hand them over to the Thai authorities; money is received from intermediaries after the release of both doctors.

Due to the specific conditions in which the contracting parties found themselves, the negotiations proceeded slowly and for a long time. And as time went on, each week in captivity was difficult for the captives, and the further - the harder it was. Finally, at the end of 1973, the Shans agreed to the release of the Soviet citizens they had captured for a ransom of 250,000 US dollars.

By this time, the Burmese troops, having not achieved their goal, had practically already curtailed operations against the Shans. The way to the south became clear. The Shans began to complete a caravan with smuggled goods for a trip to the Thai border.

Nevertheless, Boris Pyatnitsky and Stanislav Vinogradov met the new year 1974 in the jungle of the Golden Triangle.

In early January, the detachments in which the hostages were located again converged in one of the mountain villages. Everything indicated that the Shans were preparing for a big campaign: there was a packing of bales with luggage, new horses were brought in, the number of armed militants increased.

The doctors were told that they would soon be released. One will go to the Thai border with this caravan, the second ~ with the next one. It is not known what considerations the Shans were guided by in this case. But they did just that.

The first to go was Stanislav Vinogradov. Boris Pyatnitsky wrote and gave Stanislav a letter to his family. Now he was the only hostage.

By the end of the month, the caravan reached the Thai border, but there were no signs of the border here. All the same low mountains covered with forests, valleys, rivers. No border structures, pillars, lanes, barriers and posts, no border guards.

Stanislav Vinogradov realized that he was in Thailand only when, one day, a helicopter with unfamiliar identification marks landed near the camp of his detachment, and pulled-up military men in a uniform that differed from the Burmese got out of it.

The senior Thai officer had a short talk with the Shans about something, asked Stanislav for his last name, and wrote something down. The helicopter soon took off. Stanislav realized that liberation was really close.

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Two agonizing days later, the same helicopter returned with a military man of clearly a general's rank, judging by the epaulettes and the respect with which those around him treated him.

Vinogradov was invited to the helicopter. The rotorcraft took off, leaving the Shan camp below, and after about an hour's flight landed on the lawn near a neat cottage within the boundaries of a rather large settlement.

After a short rest, Stanislav, together with the general, was taken by car to Bangkok.

We drove for a long time, eleven or twelve hours. We arrived in the Thai capital at night, right at the general's villa. Stanislav was given a room where he spent the night.

By noon, a car with a Soviet consular worker drove up to the villa, and Vinogradov said goodbye to the general's hospitable house. Less than an hour later, Stanislav arrived at the Soviet embassy in Thailand. Here he spent several days waiting for an Aeroflot flight to Moscow.

The day has come to fly home. On February 11, 1974, one of the operational workers of the Bangkok residency brought Vinogradov to the same villa where Stanislav spent the night after arriving in Bangkok. There they moved into the car of the owner of the villa, which delivered them directly to the gangway of the Soviet aircraft IL-62, ready to fly to Moscow.

Stanislav said goodbye to his companions and went up to the cabin of the airliner. Ahead was Moscow, meeting with relatives at the Sheremetyevo airport and returning home.

Boris Pyatnitsky remained a prisoner of the Shans. It took them another four long months to equip a new caravan and bring it to the border with Thailand.

On June 14, 1974, Boris ended up on Thai territory, and on the evening of June 18, in Bangkok, in the same villa where Stanislav Vinogradov had spent the night.

This time, the Thai leadership decided to transfer the Soviet doctor to the USSR Embassy in an official way.

On June 20, 1974, Boris Pyatnitsky was taken to the headquarters of the Central Command of the Security Forces in Bangkok, where Thai Defense Minister Tavi Chulasap and Soviet Ambassador Boris Ilyichev were already there. A press conference was held in the presence of almost 40 local and

foreign journalists, during which Tavi Chulasap announced the release of Boris Pyatnitsky and his transfer to the Soviet embassy, emphasizing that this was an act of goodwill on the part of the Thai government.

After the press conference, Pyatnitsky and Ambassador Ilyichev arrived at the USSR Embassy. The main disturbances are behind us.

On June 21, a foreign intelligence resident met with a representative of the Thai military circles, who was directly involved in

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the problem of the release of our doctors, and, in accordance with the agreement, gave him 250,000 US dollars to transfer to the Shans.

Thus ended the operation to free Stanislav Vinogradov and Boris Pyatnitsky from
Shan captivity.

On June 25, 1974, Boris Pyatnitsky flew from Bangkok to his homeland on an Aeroflot regular plane. In Moscow, he met with Stanislav Vinogradov, had a short rest and returned to the Siberian city of Kemerovo, where Boris worked before his business trip to Burma and where
his family lived.

Although in the times described here, foreign intelligence did not yet have much experience in the direct fight against terrorists (hostage-kidnappers) in foreign conditions, its employees in residencies in Burma and Thailand worked to solve the task set by the Center quickly, competently, patiently and persistently, and as a result, we achieved the release of our citizens from captivity. At the same time, the scouts managed to maintain a sufficient level of secrecy during this operation, which helped to avoid possible complications.

: Geographical and political terms mentioned in the text are given in the variants used during the period described.

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Lessons from the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant

In the history of scientific and technical intelligence there are examples of operations that do not fit the category of intelligence, but also deserve public attention. An example of this kind, in particular, is the participation of scientific and technological revolution in the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

This accident is known to have occurred on April 26, 1986. On April 29, the intelligence leadership instructed the NTR to urgently request from a number of residencies information on the experience of extinguishing fires at nuclear power plants, primarily at the American nuclear power plant Three Miles Island. Almost at the same time, an official message about the accident was broadcast on television. The next day, the NTR requested permission from the leadership of the USSR State Security Committee to send a representative to the accident site and join the work being carried out there. The then chairman of the KGB, V.M. Chebrikov instructed to use all the possibilities of the scientific and technological revolution to help carry out work in Chernobyl.

On May 2, an employee of the Scientific and Technical Revolution, a specialist in the field of plasma physics, Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, A.V. Belov!. By this time, a large group of scientists-specialists from the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building had gathered in Chernobyl. This group analyzed the situation at the scene of the accident, carried out an examination of the proposed solutions and prepared proposals for the commission. The necessary information came to them from various ministries and departments. In the task of our

of the employee included, first of all, providing the commission with foreign scientific and technical information.

The accident gave rise to many complex scientific and technical problems, in solving which the commission relied not only on the high qualifications and experience of Soviet scientists and specialists, but also on

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took into account the experience of foreign experts, the results of scientific and technical achievements of the West.

Upon arrival in Chernobyl, the STR employee was received by the Chairman of the Commission, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I.S. Silaev, who, in particular, said: "We attach great importance to intelligence information. Despite the fact that we have excellent specialists gathered here and practically all the best scientific forces of the country are at our disposal, the problem that we are faced with is so complicated, and most importantly, too responsible, that it would be right if we could receive recommendations on issues of interest to us by leading Western experts. We need information for comparison, and, of course, any other information that will help deal with this disaster.

The intelligence specialists looked for answers to the commission's questions in the materials available in the NTR data bank or received at our request from the residencies. Information search was carried out simultaneously in several countries. All operational possibilities were involved, in addition, our employees talked with foreign experts and from official positions. Understanding abroad of the seriousness of the threat of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in many cases contributed to a benevolent attitude towards our requests when applying for information. All the information received was summarized and transmitted by telegraph to the commission or our representative in Chernobyl. In parallel, documentary materials used in the preparation of generalized information were sent. The most important information was reported to the government.

With the representative of the scientific and technological revolution in Chernobyl A.V. Belov kept in touch by HF telephone. At the Vnukovo airport, an employee of the Scientific and Technical Revolution was constantly on duty, who, by agreement with the Ministry of Civil Aviation, could send information with the crew of the scheduled aircraft to Kiev, from where these materials were delivered by road to Chernobyl.

Round-the-clock duty of specialists - intelligence officers was also carried out in the central office of the scientific and technological revolution in Moscow.

Particularly intensive work was carried out in the first decade of May. During this period, foreign information was promptly summarized and sent to Chernobyl on a wide range of problems related to the construction, operation and safety of nuclear power plants. It must be said that by the mid-1980s, serious research work had been completed in the United States and a number of Western European countries and a significant amount of information on these issues had been accumulated.

At one of the first meetings of the commission, it was necessary to answer the question of how to fill up an emergency reactor in order to reduce the rate

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process and prevent the possibility of a chain reaction. The Commission was seriously concerned about the risk that the six-meter reinforced concrete pan of the emergency reactor could burn out and the molten radioactive mass would penetrate into the upper layer of soil under the reactor. At the same time, the density of radioactive elements will increase, and a critical mass is formed in the melt, which is under high pressure, the result of which will be an atomic explosion.

The NTR sent to Chernobyl the results of foreign calculations of the sump burnout rate for various materials and temperatures, which convinced the commission of the need to create a special sump cooling system. It was equally important to determine the temperature inside the reactor. This could be done only with the help of special most modern instruments, which our country did not have at that time. The NTR was instructed to purchase a sample of such a device, and this was done in the shortest possible time.

The commission was also worried about the possibility of contaminated groundwater getting into the Pripjat River. Radionuclides accumulated in the silt and settled to the bottom of the river. With the beginning of the flood, the flooding of coastal areas threatened to infect large areas. The increase in groundwater flows during this period further increased the risk of radioactive contamination. The scientific and technical revolution summarized Western information on this problem and sent a message to the commission, the governments of Ukraine and Belarus about foreign experience in building coastal barrage dams to protect rivers from contaminated groundwater.

A lot of work has been done to collect foreign norms for permissible doses of radioactive exposure to people, animals, as well as contamination of food and the environment. On May 10, a document summarized on the basis of foreign materials was sent to Chernobyl "On Foreign Standards for Exposure of Various Population Groups and Permissible Levels of Radioactive Contamination of Soil, Air, Water and Agricultural Products".

Intelligence also informed the commission on such issues as the mechanism and assessment of the processes of spread of radioactive elements in the soil, foreign methods of treating patients with high doses of radiation, the problems of using contaminated areas of the territory for growing agricultural products, the expected level of diseases of the population after accidents and their long-term consequences. The materials of scientific and technical revolution turned out to be, in particular, useful in solving the problem of preventing the transfer of radionuclides with dust and sand during strong winds from contaminated sites. Using these materials, the commission organized the production on site of a special polymeric liquid, which, when

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spraying covered the infected areas of the soil surface with a thin polymer film.

At about the same time, the Scientific and Technical Revolution prepared and sent to the interested ministries and departments a number of generalized documents on the prevention and elimination of the consequences of accidents at nuclear power plants.

The effectiveness of the participation of the scientific and technological revolution in the information support of the work on the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is explained by the fact that, in addition to other problems, the sphere of its information interests included a wide range of issues of nuclear energy and related fields of science and technology. The commission's orders, as a rule, did not go beyond the competence of intelligence. It had at its disposal information funds on most of the problems of interest to the commission. In addition, there were many qualified specialists in the field of nuclear energy in the central intelligence apparatus and in foreign residencies.

The experience accumulated by the NTR in the process of working on nuclear problems provided its specialists with knowledge of the situation with information in this area abroad. They knew well where to look for the necessary materials and whom to contact. The presence of A.V. Belov, a qualified specialist in the field of nuclear power engineering. He returned from Chernobyl after staying there for several weeks and was awarded an order for his work.

The NTR used its positive experience once again by participating in the work to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia. An employee of the NTR, a doctor by profession, went there. In addition to coordinating the provision of work with information, instruments and equipment supplied through intelligence channels, he also provided medical assistance to the victims.

Speaking about the participation of the Scientific and Technical Revolution in the work to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, it would be appropriate to mention one more conversation that took place there between an employee of the Scientific and Technical Revolution and a member of the commission, Deputy Director of the Institute of Atomic Energy named after I.V. Kurchatov Academy of Sciences of the USSR by the late Academician V.A. Legasov. In particular, he said: "The Chernobyl accident was a serious lesson and a warning to all those involved in nuclear energy both in our country and abroad. I think that the appropriate conclusions from this catastrophe will be drawn by everyone. But I am no less worried that in our country today there are a large number of industries that are potentially dangerous and, if something like Chernobyl happens there, the consequences could be more terrible than in this case. I mean, first of all, chemical production and some enterprises of purely defense significance. Let's hope that these problems

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the Chernobyl disaster will attract the attention of those who are supposed to deal with it.

Years have passed. The Chernobyl disaster and its consequences received a wide public response. Previously unpublished facts became known. The scale of the disaster that befell the country was very significant. At the same time, there were signs that the attention of the country's government, state structures and a number of officials who are obliged to do everything necessary to help the affected people and quickly eliminate the damage from the accident and its consequences has weakened. Many important issues remained largely unresolved.

It became known that the All-Union Scientific Center for Radiation Medicine located in Kyiv and a number of other similar institutions in Ukraine and Belarus experienced a serious need for foreign information materials. The Bryansk region of Russia, which was seriously affected by the Chernobyl accident, turned out to be completely unprovided with such materials. They discussed the creation of a large research center to deal with the consequences of the catastrophe, but there were not enough materials for the deployment of its work. Research and development staff traveled to Chernobyl, Kyiv, Minsk and Bryansk to find out the need for local specialists in information. After some time, they were sent the necessary materials on a wide range of technical and biomedical problems.

The experience accumulated as a result of cooperation between domestic science and specialists with the scientific and technical intelligence of Russia made it possible to compare different ways of dealing with the consequences of an emergency situation at nuclear power plants and to choose the most effective ways to overcome damage to the population and the ecology of the country, to take a fresh look at the features of the development of modern nuclear power industry and related areas, to take measures to prevent such catastrophes in the future.

This experience was an important contribution of the SVR to ensuring the security of a vital sector of our society, and helped to draw lessons for the future.

'
Last name changed.

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Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov

It is difficult and responsible to write about Andropov. It is difficult because he himself was a difficult person and hardly completely frank with anyone. Responsible because he was at the helm of our state, and this in itself requires the writer to take such leaders seriously. Therefore, my pages about Andropov are only sketches, an attempt to recreate some of his character traits, recall the circumstances of meetings and conversations with him, and also express my opinion about Andropov's attitude to intelligence.

To begin with, the State Security Committee clearly needed the arrival of a person of such stature as Andropov. On the one hand, an experienced statesman was needed, and on the other,

a person who would be interested in this service and who would be able to reach the bottom in his work, to understand the problems of ordinary performers. Andropov, in my opinion, possessed such qualities to the greatest extent. Where he found the time for a comprehensive coverage of the activities of the KGB remains a mystery. Here, of course, both a special gift and a mood for such work were manifested. But at the same time, each person in itself was interesting to him, he constantly searched for active and meaningful people in order to use them in the most effective way.

Each of Yu.V. Andropov worked as chairman of the KGB for only a few years, and only he set an absolute record - he headed the state security service for almost 15 years. This period entirely falls on the so-called stagnant years, but for the employees of the State Security Committee, these were years of well-known stability, organization and order.

The first chairman of the KGB I.A. Serov was not free from the burden of past crimes that weighed on the state security agencies, and did not fit well into the changes in the country that took place in the 50s.

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A.N. Shelepin, according to the general impression of the staff, felt that he was a temporary person as chairman and did not take deep roots in the Committee, and his successor V.E. Semichastny was still far from being formed as a statesman, he had more Komsomol enthusiasm than political wisdom.

As for Yu.V. Andropov, by the time he was appointed to the KGB in May 1967, he already had a solid track record behind him: leading party work in Karelia, the posts of USSR ambassador to Hungary, head of department and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. And he, as it was felt quite quickly, came to the KGB in earnest and for a long time.

Having received the news of Andropov's appointment as chairman, the intelligence officers naturally tried to find out from their acquaintances in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU what he was like. The answers were encouraging, unambiguous and very concise: "Guys, you are lucky".

However, for Yuri Vladimirovich himself, joining the KGB was not easy. He was seriously worried about how he would be perceived here, obviously not yet fully aware of what changes had taken place in state security by 1967, when only a small number of employees who began working in the bodies in the 30s remained in the system.

In the Committee Yu.V. Andropov was greeted with the hope that under him there would be more order, organization, certainty and less folly, abuses and violations of the law. Andropov brought with him from the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU a small team, no more than ten people. At first, they kept in a close flock and everyone tried to find out if there was any ill will around Yuri Vladimirovich or, God forbid, if some sedition was ripening. This group was devoted to him personally and tried by all available means to work to increase his authority, which at times even looked ridiculous and naive because of the straightforwardness in praising the merits of the new chairman, which was not necessary at all. It must be said that Andropov also took care of his team. Maybe two or three people dropped out of it, and the rest became generals and took key positions in the state security system.

While the team was growing into the life of the KGB, Andropov himself was constantly looking for new people to be promoted to responsible positions. At first he was prone to quick charms and disappointments. Bold in his judgments, an erudite person immediately attracted Andropov's attention, he quickly moved him up, and then, it happened, organizational flaws and some other negative qualities of the nominee appeared. He quickly removed such an employee from a key position, transferring to a less responsible one. At the same time, Yuri Vladimirovich did not conceal

evil, hostility and remained benevolent towards those whom he moved first up and then down. Sometimes he complained that a person is difficult

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predictable. He seems to be good at his position, but move him one step higher, he is already confused and panicked, or - even worse - suddenly turned into a rude and dictator.

The fact that Andropov was not vindictive and did not seek to settle personal scores with people who once caused him trouble is evidenced by this fact. Once, in a conversation with me, he asked how one of our employees of the older generation felt and how he worked, and told me with a sad smile that this man, at the moment when the so-called Leningrad case was fabricated, singled out him, Andropov, the question in a separate proceeding, which meant in practice an inevitable arrest. Yuri Vladimirovich not only did not try to somehow punish this person, but did not even dismiss him for retirement, because he understood that not a specific person was guilty of such cases, but the time was cruel then.

Andropov paid special attention to the study of leading intelligence officers and, it must be said, succeeded in this. He knew quite well the heads of major KGB residencies, regularly communicated with the deputy heads of the First Main Directorate, as well as with the heads of the leading intelligence units, primarily with the heads of the information and analytical service, the foreign counterintelligence department, scientific and technical intelligence, the active measures service, heads of geographical departments.

Andropov's strength consisted in the fact that he led all the links of the KGB with equal activity and attention, constantly strengthening them and clarifying tasks in the course of the changing situation in the state, while carefully considering the international situation.

But as for intelligence, it can be said with confidence that he was especially interested in its affairs. This, however, is understandable, since in recent years, before joining the KGB, Andropov dealt with foreign policy issues (USSR ambassador to Hungary, head of the department of socialist countries of the Central Committee of the CPSU).

And of course, the scouts themselves aroused keen interest in him. He conducted a careful search among them for authoritative people who could serve as a support in the ongoing foreign policy actions.

Yuri Vladimirovich completely trusted the head of intelligence V.A. Kryuchkov, whom he brought with him to the KGB from the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU and appointed him in 1971 as first deputy, and in 1974 as head of intelligence.

Among the intelligence veterans, he singled out Ivan Ivanovich Agayants in particular and quite often repeated the phrase: "Agayants is Dzerzhinsky!". He did not reveal the meaning of this definition, but it can be safely assumed that he meant Ivan Ivanovich's fanatical devotion to the intelligence business, his determination, high professionalism and the highest efficiency, despite very poor health (lung disease).

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Sometimes Andropov, it is true, started conversations of a somewhat ambiguous nature, checking how people felt about this or that leader. He suddenly began to slightly scold some boss, drawing his interlocutor into the discussion. I myself was subjected to similar tests more than once, when Yuri Vladimirovich allowed himself critical remarks about a person whom, as I knew for certain, he treated with great confidence. Such a method may be justified if the KGB chairman needs additional information about the attitude towards those people who stand around him, but I personally did not really like such games.

It was not at all easy to talk to Andropov. He absolutely did not tolerate boring reports built according to a standard scheme. Irritated, interrupted the speaker, asked a lot of unexpected questions, and usually such an unsuccessful report ended with a polite scolding and took a minimum of time. And vice versa, if the speaker came across informative and told interesting things, accompanying them with original conclusions and proposals, the conversation dragged on and, in terms of its fascination, became akin, in the language of literary critics, to an intellectual feast.

Participating in Andropov's negotiations with foreign delegations, being present at the reports of intelligence residents, discussing endless problems like the Afghan one, I often left the chairman's office with a feeling of dissatisfaction with myself, since his level of thinking, knowledge, ability to conduct non-standard and exciting the conversation was forced to realize, and sometimes quite sharply, their own incompetence in a number of issues, the inability to understand the essence of some problems in the same way. In other words, Andropov suppressed his interlocutor not by his position, for he was simple and for the most part friendly, but by his erudition, knowledge and original vision of things and events.

If, receiving in his office foreign delegations, Soviet representatives, KGB officers, Andropov conducted conversations freely, without constraining them within the framework of a strictly prescribed program, then in preparing his public reports and speeches he was distinguished by special thoroughness and punctuality. Having received material compiled according to his theses from his assistants, he disconnected from current affairs for two or three days and worked with all scrupulousness on the text, carefully checking all its provisions.

Knowing the dynamic and even harsh manner of Andropov's conversations, I warned the residents that it was necessary to prepare very thoroughly for reports and reports, that it was necessary to know all the details of the issues under discussion and to focus on conducting a dialogue, and not on calm narration. "Remember, he will not let you speak calmly for more than five minutes, but will ask the most unexpected questions," I gave something like this "introductory" to the chairman going "on the carpet".

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Andropov was a modest but firm man. He positioned himself in such a way that people, as a rule, did not dare to compliment him, and anyone who tried to break this taboo received a sharp rebuff and could lose his favor. For a person of this level, the rejection of flattery is undoubtedly a rare quality, especially since the atmosphere around Brezhnev abounded with the opposite phenomena. He always fought against corruption and wastefulness, and one of his first acts after taking the post of General Secretary was the removal of Minister of Internal Affairs Shchelokov from his post. As far as I know, Andropov handed over the gifts given to him to the state treasury and demanded the same from his deputies.

He also knew how to count state money, resolutely rejecting various expensive projects in the KGB and demanding a reduction in spending even on reasonable and justified intelligence activities. In some cases that required his chairman's consent, it was necessary to make three visits to him until he gave the go-ahead or finally refused.

He never spoke about his position in the highest echelon of the state, did not emphasize his importance, and only sometimes, talking about some complex lawsuit with one of the high officials, he used the following phrase: "I answered him and said: 'I am also not the last person in the state.'"

Yuri Vladimirovich, no matter how trite this statement sounds, loved people. It would seem that visitors and subordinates rushing into his office should have bothered him quite a lot, and in his state of health it would be more natural to expect a desire to retire for a while and take a break from endless problems and conversations, and he was drawn to people, constantly

I wanted to expand my circle of acquaintances. This sociability, ability to listen and tell, I felt well during the trip on December 28-29, 1981 to Hungary, where he made his last official visit as chairman of the KGB. The signing of the next working documents on cooperation, the presentation of USSR state awards to employees of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the meeting of the already ill Andropov with the decrepit Kadar took place there.

The delegation traveled by train in two special carriages. We rode cheerfully and amicably. They all dined and dined together in Andropov's carriage. The conversations were on various topics - from high politics to elementary anecdotes, communication was informal, and the journey was truly enjoyable. Unfortunately, the theme of diseases kept intruding into the cheerful and relaxed conversation. The fact is that even the KGB, Yuri Vladimirovich, came already a sick person, and his rapid extinction was happening before our eyes.

At receptions on the occasion of the stay of various delegations, he did not drink anything strong, but only sipped light wine. He also followed a strict diet. And once he had an excellent appetite, and now

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sometimes there was a great desire to eat some real "male" food.

One of the people close to his house told how one day Andropov was determined to eat a good shish kebab and ordered the cook to prepare this dish in its entirety. The cook reported the received command to the doctor. The doctor silently shook his fist at the cook. After that, the cook, with the consent of the doctor, depicted from boiled meat something resembling a barbecue - pieces of boiled meat on skewers with onions and tomatoes. Yuri Vladimirovich was offended and did not eat this dish.

The harsh criticism of the former KGB in recent years, accusations of lawlessness committed by state security agencies, of aiding terrorists are well known. A few phrases about the attitude of Yu.V. Andropov to comply with the laws. The laws and orders that existed then in our state, Andropov honored and impeccably carried out. He strictly demanded from employees of all ranks absolute obedience to the law. Therefore, criticism of the former KGB, it seems to me, should not be separated from criticism of the laws and orders of the entire system that existed at that time. That would be more correct.

By the way, Andropov was a very cautious person and never took on too much, something that could be interpreted as exceeding his authority. On all more or less serious issues, papers were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU or directly to the General Secretary in order to obtain consent to this or that proposal.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that Andropov, of course, was not a liberal or a pacifist either. He demanded that fighting spirit reign in the KGB units, that the personnel be ready for action in extreme and crisis situations, that they be able to use operational equipment and weapons.

During Andropov's tenure as chairman of the KGB, the level of professional training of intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers increased significantly. There was no corruption in the ranks of the KGB officers, no major abuses of the material and financial order. It is especially valuable that Academician A.D. Sakharov, whose impartial opinion about the KGB no one seemed to doubt.

Let us return, however, to Andropov himself... For a considerable part of the time in the last years of his life, Yuri Vladimirovich was in the Kuntsevo hospital, where numerous examinations and procedures were carried out for nephritis, chronic renal failure, as well as hypertension, diabetes mellitus and other ailments. In fact, he had a second apartment there, as it were. For the past two decades, he did not go in for sports at all and was a stranger to any

or physical activity - he didn't even like to walk, turned into an armchair recluse and, as they say, did not smell the fresh air.

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Once Yuri Vladimirovich made an appointment for a report in Kuntsevo at 12 noon on Sunday, in the dead of winter. Before going to the chairman, I did a good job of digging in the snow - I cleared the path from the dacha to the barn. The sun was shining brightly, and it was a little blizzard. A slight frost, sun and a pleasant fresh breeze. Cheerful, warmed up from work in the sun and in a good mood, I arrived in Kuntsevo, said hello and began with the weather:

— Yury Vladimirovich, the weather is wonderful today! Have you already walked?

- What a party there! You can't stick your nose out, the wind knocks down from your feet!

What was the root cause and what was the result, I don't presume to judge: either the illness separated Andropov from communion with nature, or, conversely, the neglect of walks and sports led to numerous illnesses. But not only a set of various diseases complicated Andropov's activities as chairman of the KGB, there were also special circumstances that prevented him from concentrating on business.

It is known (and this has already been written about) that Brezhnev appointed his close friends to Andropov for the positions of second persons in the State Security Committee - S.K. Tsvigun and G.K. Tsinev, because of which the situation in the Committee was not easy: Yuri Vladimirovich had to constantly look back at these deputies, look for special approaches to them and engage in diplomacy instead of confidently demanding from them a working return as from his main assistants. Both of them were constantly reporting something personally to Brezhnev, and this put Andropov in an uncomfortable and delicate position. All the more or less responsible officials of the Committee were aware of the difficult situation at the top and sympathized with Andropov.

In general, relations with his closest assistants were very difficult, and for all his restraint, Andropov sometimes complained to his close and even relatively close interlocutors about the conditions in which he had to work.

I met Yuri Vladimirovich quite often both when I was working in Cairo and when I was the head of illegal intelligence, and even more so since 1979 as the first deputy head of the PGU, when I had to periodically act as head of intelligence. I remember Yury Vladimirovich's last report. It was January 25, 1982, shortly before his departure from the KGB.

Already seriously and terminally ill, Andropov considered cases without the former vivacity. It was difficult for him to read. After reviewing several documents, he asked me to read him short papers, while the content of the long ones was simply stated. Sometimes he was distracted by phone calls, and from time to time he started conversations on topics not related to the report: he just needed rest and switching attention. Suddenly there was one phone call, and then several phones rang at the same time. Andropov was reported

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from different places that M.A. died Suslov. I asked permission to interrupt the report so as not to interfere with Andropov's discussion of the situation, and he let me go for ten minutes. I went to the office opposite, to the head of the secretariat, told him the news, and without batting an eyelid he said: "That's it ... Yuri Vladimirovich is leaving us for the Politburo!". As I understand it, this was a matter decided long ago: Andropov sits in Suslov's chair. Then the report continued. Yuri Vladimirovich somehow relaxed and said:

"Oh, I'm tired of all these papers, you don't hear a living voice behind them. Let's talk about something else. For example, I'm trying to read the translation of the Koran and not a damn thing

I understand what is written there. Or am I completely stupid?

I told Andropov that even Muslims, even educated ones, by no means understand the Koran, and that one can understand it only by specially studying this subject. Then the talk turned to the prophet Mohammed, his life and environment, various trends in Islam, the role of Islam in politics and the life of Arab society. Yuri Vladimirovich unexpectedly perked up and asked, as in the old days, a lot of questions. The discussion on this topic took over an hour. Finally

He said:

Thank you very much for an interesting conversation. Now it happens less and less!

Thus ended our last meeting. Then there was another farewell phone call. I called Yury Vladimirovich, thanked him for everything he had done good for the intelligence team, and said that we all sincerely regret his departure from us. According to his answer, it was felt that it was also difficult for him to break away from the team and switch to a new job. And at the very end of the conversation, he unexpectedly advised: "But you still be more careful!"

This mysterious wish ended our many years of communication. What should have been more careful? Most likely, in acute situations, when it was necessary to give sharp assessments to some of the employees who had family ties in Brezhnev's entourage. This is probably what was meant.

Andropov's era in the State Security Committee is over, but he himself remains in the memory of his employees as a living person and a great worker.

One more thing. In our uncensored age, when all kinds of mockery and cynicism are allowed in the media and in book production, no publications have appeared that make Andropov look stupid, following the example of other former leaders of the state. Someone did not like him, someone, perhaps, hated him, but everyone saw in him an intelligent person, a major statesman, a supporter of cautious reforms, who, alas, had no time to implement them.

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Najibullah - Afghan security chief and president

Najibullah, as a statesman and politician, was and remains one of the most prominent and tragic figures in Afghan history. He can rightly be placed immediately after Emir Amanullah (1919-1929) and after M. Daud, first the Prime Minister of Afghanistan (1953-1963), and then the head of state (1973-1978), pursuing a course towards the modernization of a backward Asian country.

During the years of the deepest military-political and socio-economic crisis, Najibullah, while in power, did everything possible to bring Afghanistan out of the impasse, stop the war, return the population to peaceful life, and alleviate its suffering. However, the foreign and domestic political situation, the most difficult conditions in which he found himself and was forced to work, the hostile forces that opposed him did not allow him to achieve success. His ascent to the Olympus of power, the policy he pursued, his fall from the heights of leadership, personal tragedy and terrible death are inextricably linked with the fate of the Soviet state. The drama of Najibullah was not only his own, but a drama for the fate of Afghanistan and, by and large, the USSR, and its legal successor, Russia.

Mohammad Najibullah was born in Kabul on August 6, 1947, his father Akhtar Mohammad, a wealthy man, at one time was the Afghan consul in Peshawar, enjoyed authority among the Pashtun tribes, he himself came from an influential Pashtun tribal association of the Ghilzai, the Ahmadzai clan, Suleimanheil tribe in the province of Paktia. Najibullah was a tall, stocky, physically strong man. Since his student days, the nickname "Bull" has stuck with him, partly because of his appearance and gait, partly because of his

personal qualities: he was strong-willed, energetic, assertive, sometimes going ahead for achievements of those

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other purposes. He was trained as a surgeon, and our advisers, diplomats and military officers usually called him "Doctor" among themselves.

In 1964, after graduating from the prestigious Khabibiya Lyceum, he entered the medical faculty of Kabul University, where he joined the leftist anti-government movement and became its activist. In 1965, he joined the newly created People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), linking himself with its "parchamist" wing, which was headed by B. Karmal. Soon he was already in the leadership of the illegal party organization of the university. Twice he was arrested and imprisoned "for participation in illegal strikes and demonstrations".

In 1975 he graduated from the university and, having received a medical degree, worked in medical institutions of the capital. On behalf of the party, he was engaged in the creation of the primary structures of the democratic organization of the youth of Afghanistan and established himself as an active functionary. In July 1977 he became a member of the Central Committee of the PDPA, for some time he headed the Kabul City Party Committee. With the coming to power of H. Amin, he was sent as the ambassador of the DRA to Tehran, but soon, for belonging to the "Parchamist" wing, by the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee, he was expelled from the ranks of the party, removed from all government posts. Until December 1979, he lived in Yugoslavia as a political emigrant.

After Afghanistan was headed by B. Karmal, in December 1979, Najibullah returned to Kabul. By decision of the Central Committee of the PDPA, he soon headed the State Security Service - KHAD, later renamed the State Information Service - SGI, and then - the MGB. He was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general. From June 1981 he was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA, in November 1985 he was elected secretary of the Central Committee, supervised the work of state bodies with the Pashtun tribes, that is, one of the most important areas of state activity in the country. At the 18th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, on the initiative and insistence of Moscow, he was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA instead of B. Karmal. In October 1987, he became the Chairman of the highest state body - the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and on November 30 of the same year, in accordance with the Constitution, he was elected by the deputies of parliament with the approval of the Ulema Council (a meeting of prominent and authoritative Muslim figures of the country) President of Afghanistan.

With his leftist views, Najibullah was first and foremost the son of his people, a Pashtun Afghan from a large and influential tribe. As a person, he was formed under the direct influence of the Muslim religion, national traditions, age-old and unchanging Pashtun customs and way of life. But at the same time he

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was an educated modern politician, with a broad outlook and extensive knowledge. He said: "Every year I went on vacation to Peshawar, where my father served, and along the way I usually made a halt somewhere beyond Jalalabad. Everyone was resting. Women climbed a little higher up the mountain, and men settled down at the waterfall in the lowland. Once I saw a woman running down the path and shouting to one of the men: "Your son was born!". Everyone rushed upstairs. And now I see how the woman who had just given birth, twenty minutes later got to her feet, wrapped her son in a shawl, and set off along with the whole caravan. I felt some kind of internal push, a shock, I was trembling. Why, I thought, should an Afghan woman give birth on the ground, among stones, like a wild animal? Then, believe me, I had no thought of any revolution, I was just hurt and ashamed, anger choked me. After all, I loved my land and my people. How so? What is this? Why should he live worse than the whole human race?

These impressions and the episode itself, apparently, deeply sunk into the soul of Najibullah, and later he will say: "The revolution can only be with the people, and not over the people. The Afghan nation is an Islamic nation. Therefore, the Afghan revolutionaries are obliged not only to take into account the principles of Islam, but also to be constantly guided by them. If you go to the people not out of conviction, but only for political and tactical reasons, your success will be short-lived, the people will quickly figure out with whom you are with them, or you just want to achieve benefits and power at their expense. Explaining the motives that guided him in his revolutionary activities, he said: "Some people think that we rushed into the revolution for a personal career. But some of us could have lived in prosperity even under the previous regimes, and many of us would not have been offended by high posts. But if the human prevails in a person, then he thinks not only about his plate, he looks at the world more broadly. And he perceives other people's pains as his own. Najibullah remained faithful to this moral choice until the last hour of his life.

Speaking of him, one cannot avoid another side of his political biography: his fate and the formation of his personality turned out to be closely connected with the KGB of the USSR in general and foreign intelligence in particular. There is no exaggeration here. Yu.V. Andropov, V.A. Kryuchkov, other leaders of the KGB. In Kabul, when he was the head of the state security agencies, representatives of the KGB V.N. Spolnikov, B.N. Voskoboynikov, N.E. Kalyagin, V.P. Zaitsev, V.A. Revin, their deputies, and other experienced intelligence officers who were then working in Afghanistan. Moreover, these meetings were held both in official and informal settings. foreign intelligence advisers

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As a rule, they were not only workers with extensive experience in special service, but also orientalists who knew the specifics of the East and Afghanistan not by hearsay, but in practice. They quickly established business and personal contacts with Najibullah, always had topics for interesting conversations, knew how best to approach solving professional problems.

There is no doubt that all this together had a noticeable impact on the formation of Najibullah as the head of security agencies, as a political and statesman, and the future president of Afghanistan. There is another important aspect in this matter. Top officials of the Soviet leadership, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other departments of the USSR quite often communicated and discussed current political and international problems with Najibullah. He was well known in Moscow. Unlike B. Karmal, a lover of oratory, reasoning and speaking on abstract topics, Najibullah was primarily a man of action, this quality of his was confirmed many times in practice when he headed the state security agencies, and later. It seems to have largely determined the choice of the Kremlin for promotion to the highest government post in Afghanistan. It was easy to find the best candidate back then.

impossible.

The contribution of the Soviet side to the construction, formation, development and strengthening of the Afghan security organs is, without exaggeration, very large and, most importantly, constructive. With the direct participation of the KGB and under the leadership of Najibullah, they turned from punitive ones, as they were under N.M. Taraki and H. Amine, into a modern, qualified and capable intelligence service, which was up to the task of solving urgent issues of ensuring the security of the state in a difficult situation, in conditions of war. Its repressive functions were generally limited, although, of course, during the war years, it was also impossible to do without them. The number of those arrested and convicted under Najibullah fell sharply. During the years that he headed the security agencies, he became a true professional, not only led the Service with skill, enjoyed the well-deserved authority of its employees, but also personally took part in individual operations, worked with agents.

On the account of the Afghan security agencies of that time, there were many successful reconnaissance and counterintelligence operations, as well as military sabotage activities. Opponents of the regime were forced to reckon with them. KHAD-SGI-MGB managed

to create an extensive and efficient intelligence apparatus, including in the "Islamic parties" and combat detachments of the Mujahideen who fought against the Kabul government. In contact with KGB advisers, Najibullah was personally involved in the planning and implementation of special operations, controlled their progress and results.

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tats. The information obtained by the Service was taken into account by the command of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (OKSV) and the Afghan army. An important activity of Najibullah at that time was his direct work with the leaders of many Pashtun tribes, he knew the situation and the balance of power in the tribal zone well and, one might say, in detail. He considered the participation of security agencies in the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation (PNP) mandatory and a priority. He paid much attention to the formation and training of a combat-ready national guard, special forces units, security services, and was personally involved in the establishment of political and educational work in the security agencies. He himself and the security agencies under his leadership did a lot in the fight against child homelessness, provided real assistance to sponsored orphanages.

The media of Western countries, negatively inclined towards Najibullah, have repeatedly tried to portray him as a cruel tyrant, even calling him an "executioner" because of his work in the security system. This is wrong. The activities of the Afghan security agencies under his leadership cannot even be compared with the massive, bloody and senseless terror that reigned in the country under Taraki and especially under Kh. Amin and was carried out by their special services.

In terms of his character and personal data, Najibullah was not at all distinguished by ruthlessness, although at the right moments he could show firmness, and sometimes cruelty. He was the son of his people, and as an Afghan, he was undoubtedly characterized by cunning, deceit, and craftiness. But the fact remains: under him, humane deeds and tolerance clearly prevailed in the work of the KhAD SGI-MGB over their punitive and repressive functions. Can't be ignored

and Afghan, in particular Pashtun, customs, traditions, stable standards by which they used to measure people. They are sure that the boss must be imperious, firm and authoritative, and, if necessary, resolute and even cruel, otherwise he is not the boss. If he is verbose, if he does not order, but persuades, and even worse - begs, then such a person cannot be a leader, cannot be trustworthy, he will be considered a weak and worthless boss. Najibullah, of course, took into account these peculiarities of the Afghans, however, as a rule, he did not raise his voice, his orders were short and clear. In the eyes of both his supporters and his opponents, Najibullah was a strong personality, they reckoned with him, they were afraid of him. Even irreconcilable opponents of the Kabul regime agreed to deal with him. The well-known field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud even offered to help him so that he would not fall into the hands of the Taliban advancing on Kabul in 1996. When characterizing Najibullah as a leader, it is important to note the fact that, despite his belonging to the "Parchamist" wing of the PDPA,

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managed to stay out of factional struggle and intra-Party strife. Perhaps he was one of the very few "parchamists" whom the "Khalqist" functionaries, who held leading positions in the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other departments, recognized and with whom they were ready to cooperate.

Becoming at the age of 32 at the head of the security agencies, Najibullah, in the five years that he worked in this post, gained extensive experience in state, political and economic activities. He had to delve into a variety of problems: from organizing business at energy facilities, where there were many saboteurs, establishing party work in the territories occupied by the Mujahideen, to distributing matches and flour that came as humanitarian aid. After his forced departure from the political scene, the population of the country

more than once demanded his return to power, remembering that under him there was some stabilization of the situation and a revival of economic life, order prevailed over chaos.

By 1984, in the development of the Afghan crisis, the prospects for its possible resolution with the help of new approaches, the rejection of the course pursued until now, when the main stake was placed on military force and coercion, were outlined. Moscow saw that it was impossible to achieve a settlement of the Afghan problem by military means and direct support for the unpopular regime of B. Karmal; It should be noted that the KGB office in Kabul understood this, perhaps earlier than others, and proposals were sent to Moscow on ways to find new solutions. Soviet military advisers also reported to the Center that "the operations took on the character of police, punitive measures, as a result we got involved in a war with the people, and it has no prospects," and they were right, because they realistically assessed the situation.

The Afghan people by that time were tired of the war, political turmoil, robberies, looting and the death of civilians. And although for the most part he still had a negative attitude towards the government of "godless" who had settled in Kabul, who let foreign troops into the country, secretly and openly supported the Mujahideen, considering them to be his Muslim brothers fighting for a just cause, nevertheless, moods and readiness to seek a way out of the impasse along the path of reasonable compromises and agreements with the authorities were growing in it. These sentiments became widespread, and the leaders of the Islamic parties, many field commanders, and even some of the forces supporting them abroad could no longer ignore them.

Not immediately, but part of the leadership of the USSR realized the urgent need to develop new ideas and approaches to the Afghan crisis. It became clear that the time had come to try to expand the social

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base of the Kabul regime by attracting moderate opposition to its side, neutral elements that could become potential allies, through negotiations on the division of power, cessation of hostilities, the creation of coalition governments in the center and in the regions on the basis of compromises. This new course was called the Policy of National Reconciliation (PRP). But to implement it, Afghanistan needed a new leader, authoritative, with political will, experience and knowledge of the real situation in the country not from paper reports, but in practice. B. Karmal was not suitable for this role: he had already exhausted his possibilities, his oratory skills were no longer in demand by life, he had lost the trust of the population. A man of action was needed.

The choice fell on Najibullah, and there were good reasons for this. It was he who established stable contacts with representatives of the religious-political and armed opposition, with many field commanders, leaders of individual large Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line that separated Afghanistan and Pakistan. He also had the possibility of tacit communication with the entourage of the former monarch Zahir Shah and the circles of the Afghan moderate emigration. Najibullah, to a much greater extent than other figures in the Kabul government, enjoyed a certain confidence among the political opponents of the PDPA. In his hands was a fairly powerful apparatus of the secret services, and he could guarantee the obligations he had assumed.

As head of state, Najibullah formally proclaimed a policy of national reconciliation in early 1987. He said: "The party, the state and the government are today taking a step of great political courage, calling for a ceasefire and starting the process of national reconciliation." I must say that at first the new course as a whole met with the understanding and approval of the Afghans.

The policy of national reconciliation was, in fact, the only correct one for resolving the tangled Afghan question complicated by the war, for finding a way out of the impasse. She was

necessary for both Kabul and Moscow. Its strength was that it emphasized the PDPA's rejection of its monopoly of power, its willingness to compromise, and its call for an end to bloodshed. The new course began to bear fruit: at least half of the field commanders of the armed detachments of the Mujahideen entered into negotiations with representatives of the Afghan government. According to Najibullah, 417 armed formations with a total number of up to 40,000 people took part in the talks.

Forces hostile to the Kabul regime inside the country and especially abroad met the new course with hostility. They did not want peace on Afghan soil while maintaining the friendly USSR

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activities in Kabul and with the preservation of Soviet military units in Afghanistan, although the decision to withdraw it had already been made in Moscow, and this was known. "Only the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will solve all problems," declared the US Congress, and such a declaration was not accidental either in time or in form. The Americans wanted to create the prerequisites for the seizure of power by the military-political opposition, which they supported in all respects. In short, hostile forces have torpedoed national reconciliation. In November 1987, in Peshawar, Mujahideen leaders G. Hekmatyar and B. Rabbani demanded the unification of all forces opposing the Kabul regime. In the armed formations of Islamic parties, counterintelligence work was noticeably intensified in order to identify and eliminate persons inclined to negotiate with Kabul. Many warlords suspected of disloyalty were replaced. The extremist-religious movement of the Taliban was sharply activated, which was assigned the role of a battering ram to overthrow Najibullah and seize power in Kabul.

On February 15, 1989, our troops left Afghanistan, but their withdrawal did not lead to a resolution of the crisis, but only put Kabul in a very difficult situation, which has inevitably worsened since then. Confusion intensified at the top of the Kabul leadership. Already on March 6, that is, immediately after the withdrawal of our troops, an armed rebellion broke out in Kabul against Najibullah, raised by a former member of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee and Minister of Defense, Colonel General Sh.N. Tanem. The rebellion, however, did not receive support and was quickly suppressed by the division of the Uzbek general A.R. Dostum, who at that time was loyal to Najibullah. Tanai fled to Pakistan, joined the Taliban and declared that he would continue the fight until the overthrow of Najibullah and "end the false reconciliation." These words of his confirm that national reconciliation was an unnecessary undertaking for the opponents of Najibullah. However, the defeat of Tanai significantly increased the authority of Najibullah, strengthened his position, and in terms of political weight, real influence in the country, he began to surpass even the leading leaders of Islamic parties, their chances fell.

I must say that Najibullah, with our direct help, managed to accumulate a solid margin of safety over the years in power, but after the withdrawal of our troops, this reserve ceased to be replenished. For some time still at the Kabul airport, as if by inertia, Soviet military transport aircraft continued to land, delivering the necessary cargo to Najibullah, but the number of flights decreased every day. Nevertheless, the troops loyal to him repulsed the attack on Jalalabad from Pakistan, defeated the Mujahideen in the Gardez region, unblocked the besieged city of Khost and achieved success in the battles in the suburbs of Kabul - Paghman, which, by the way, did not succeed. make even the Soviet troops.

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The truth is that with the continuation of our military technical assistance and moral support, Najibullah at that time could have led Afghanistan along the path of stabilization and, perhaps, to finding a compromise. He managed to consolidate all the forces he had at hand, turned the National Guard, which was structurally part of the MGB, into a well-armed combat-ready military unit, its personnel was brought to full-time position, reinforced with professional officer cadres, it was armed with armored vehicles,

artillery, SKAD and Luna-2M missiles, Uragan multiple rocket launchers and was able to defeat Mujahideen units. It was important that the attitude of the population, especially the urban population, to the central government began to slowly but steadily change for the better, gradually these changes also affected rural areas. Najibullah held the levers of governing the country, his regime controlled the main strategic centers, he did not miss the initiative. It was then that his opponents launched a ram in the form of armed fanatics - the Taliban.

The August events of 1991 in the USSR and its collapse predetermined the fate of Afghanistan, Najibullah personally and his regime. He was left face to face with the superior forces of the armed opposition. Moscow, preoccupied with its internal affairs, abstained from helping him. The fall of Najibullah became a matter of time. As always in such cases, a general flight of his former supporters from the sinking ship began. The pillars of the regime were crumbling before our eyes. The commander of the 53rd Infantry Division, General A.R., also changed his position. Dostum, whose troops were stationed in the capital and were considered loyal to the president. Dostum, an Uzbek by nationality, understood that in the event of a seizure of power by the armed opposition, dominated by Pashtuns, his fate would be unenviable if he remained loyal to Najibullah. He entered into an agreement with the leaders of the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" B. Rabbani and A.Sh. Massoud, who relied on the northern provinces of the country, where the ethnic majority were Tajiks and Uzbeks, and on April 27, 1992, raised a rebellion in Kabul and carried out a coup d'état, betrayed Najibullah and removed him from power. Dostum was resisted only by the national guard of the MGB, other military units were either inactive or fled.

During the rebellion, Najibullah was in the bunker of the presidential palace along with the guards. Realizing that he was doomed, he sent his wife, daughters and sister to the airport with the help of guards loyal to him, and they managed to fly to India. His brother Ahmadzai, the head of the security department of the MGB, the head of the secretariat Tuhi and bodyguard Jafsar stayed with him. They managed to convince him to leave Afghanistan too in order to preserve himself as the legitimate head of state.

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and political figure. But it was already too late. Najibullah's car was stopped at the Kabul airport, blocked by units of Dostum's General Omar Aka, his guards were disarmed, and he was forced to return to the city. There were no attempts to arrest him. From that day began his ascent to Golgotha.

On April 26, the deposed president was granted political asylum at the UN mission in Kabul. It was alleged that UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali guaranteed his personal safety. Najibullah could maintain telephone contact with his family and associates outside of Afghanistan. He was aware of events in the country and abroad, got acquainted with the press. Najibullah did not turn to Russia for help, and Moscow showed no initiative in this matter.

The new Afghan government headed by B. Rabbani turned out to be unprepared to govern the country. The economy fell into complete decline, devastation and famine reigned, interethnic conflicts flared up with renewed vigor, there was no calm in society, Kabul did not control the situation in the provinces. Hunger demonstrations began, the demonstrators demanded the return of Najibullah to power, shouted out toasts in his honor, and some even called for the return of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. Despite all this, the government of B. Rabbani repeatedly demanded that the UN extradite Najibullah, but received a firm refusal. Boutros Ghali kept his word.

Meanwhile, the Taliban detachments, having captured the eastern regions of the country and fortified in them, were approaching Kabul and threatening to seize power. By 1996, B. Rabbani actually lost control over the development of the situation. On September 27 of the same year, the Taliban broke into the capital and captured it practically without a fight. In a matter of hours, the troops of A.Sh. Masuda, G. Hekmatyar and the Hezaria detachments left Kabul. In fact, it was a disorderly flight. There was information that at the last moment A.Sh. Massoud invited Najibullah to leave the capital together

with his troops, but he refused and decided to stay in Kabul until the end. However, no one kept him in the UN mission, and in the ensuing turmoil, he could easily get lost in the crowd of people retreating and fleeing from the capital, but he did not. He only insisted that Touhi and Jafsar, who had been with him all these years, devoted to him, leave the mission and try to get to India, which they did. Only brother Ahmadzai remained with Najibullah. Who knows, maybe Najibullah still hoped for the guarantees given to him by Boutros Ghali and for the extraterritoriality of the UN mission, which the Taliban would not dare violate. However, fanatical extremists broke into the mission almost immediately, seized Najibullah and his brother, and ransacked the building.

According to the stories of A.Sh. Massoud, who remained in Kabul, Najibullah behaved courageously in the last hours of his life, rejected the provocative proposals of the Taliban, even used provocative

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against their tormentors with their remarkable physical strength. He did not compromise his honor. He was tortured and tortured, half-dead he was tied with a rope to a car and dragged through the streets of Kabul, and then hanged next to his brother at the gates of the residence of the Afghan rulers in the city center. The Afghan historian Gubar said: "The life and death of Najibullah broke the barrier to the eternal flow of the river of his being into the flow of Afghan history." It is obvious that Najibullah, as a statesman and political figure, grew up literally before our eyes, and who knows how the fate of Afghanistan would have turned out if what happened on September 27, 1996 had not happened.

But history does not know the subjunctive mood. Only after many years does it allow us to compare the true scale of such figures as Najibullah and appreciate his courage and devotion to the interests of the Afghan people.

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Glenn Souther's Choice

Since the 80s, an American citizen Souther Glenn Michael, a naval intelligence officer, born in Hammond (Indiana), began working in Soviet foreign intelligence under the pseudonym "Hugo". From 1977 to 1982, he served in the intelligence units of the US 6th Fleet, based in Italy, and at the same time was a public relations confidant and personal photographer for the admiral in command of this formation. From the photograph on Souther's own identity card of those years, a US Navy petty officer in a traditional white naval uniform looks at us, he has an open friendly look, a smile on his lips. There is nothing reminiscent of an experienced "sea wolf" in it.

From 1983 until mid-1986, he studied for an officer's rank at the military faculty at Old Dominion University in Norfolk (Virginia) and at the same time served as a reservist at the largest US Navy base in Norfolk, where was engaged in the processing of secret materials of space intelligence. Long before serving in the Navy, he showed a tendency to reflect on the meaning of life, to analyze the state of affairs in the world, to search for truth and awareness of the surrounding reality, and developed his own view of the world, which was based on "universal values": justice, equality, the universal community of people and the superiority of collectivism over individualism. This worldview became the foundation for the formation of Souther's personality and his beliefs.

In the early 1980s, he visited one of the Soviet foreign institutions in Rome. He was met and interviewed by an experienced resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence service. Souther did not ask for political asylum, did not say anything about any persecution of him by the American authorities, he simply said that he wanted to live in the USSR and asked

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apply for acceptance into Soviet citizenship. Later, recalling that conversation, our intelligence agent said that "at that time it never occurred to the American to offer us secret documents in exchange for our passport... . In this sense, there could not even be any talk of some kind of vulgar betrayal. For example, about the exchange according to a simple scheme: goods - money, money - goods. Moreover, he said then: "But I have nothing, no secrets." With this statement, he did not try to mislead us, he was conscientiously mistaken himself, not attaching importance to his capabilities. In fact, everything was completely different: the very fact of his service on the Nimitz aircraft carrier, on other American warships and especially command ships, was undoubtedly of interest to our intelligence, but something else was more important - documents of strict secrecy passed through his hands.

Already the first contact with Souter left a favorable impression of him – it was clear that he did not play, behaved sincerely, frankly sympathized with our country and wished to be useful to it. Our intelligence officer's intuition did not let him down: soon Souter became one of the effective sources of documentary information, which was often valued literally worth its weight in gold. He agreed to help our intelligence service solely out of his convictions, categorically refusing any financial reward. In fact, he was more like our voluntary assistant than a classic agent, because he chose this path of his own free will, established confidential relations with intelligence on his own initiative, and in intelligence work showed great ability to work, creativity, ingenuity and conspiracy.

Souter saw cooperation with us primarily as a struggle against the threat of atomic war. Service in the Navy finally shaped his worldview, strengthened him in the correctness of his understanding of the real meaning of the events taking place in the world.

In the early 1980s, there was a new sharp escalation of international tension, the Cold War was gaining momentum, and the offensive military doctrine adopted by the United States actually put the world on the brink of a general nuclear catastrophe. Souter, by the nature of his service, understood the scale of the danger hanging over the world, saw its personification in the actions of the Nimitz aircraft carrier, packed up to the upper deck with nuclear weapons. He knew well what a "nuclear winter" was and how it threatened our planet. In 1981, the US 6th Fleet was put on full alert, and this circumstance literally shook his imagination. Souter developed a resolve to actively oppose the possibility of realizing plans for nuclear strikes, and he translated it into concrete actions. Souter began a life full of anxieties, dangers, great tension.

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niya. Later, he admitted how difficult, and sometimes almost unbearable, while on a military post, he had to endure great nervous tension alone, the need to lead a secretive lifestyle, constantly be on the alert, not being able to share with anyone, even with his mother, whom he was very fond of and respected, overwhelmed by his thoughts and feelings.

Consciously taking risks, he regularly and timely transmitted important information of a military-strategic and military-tactical nature to our intelligence. It can be said without exaggeration that his contribution to the prevention of nuclear war was significant. In the West, he was subsequently called a "super agent", "a skillful extra-class agent". A representative of one of the American intelligence services even claimed: "Because of Souter and some others, we could lose the war to the Soviets." Pentagon press secretary P. Williams was forced to admit in July 1986 that prior to Souter's disappearance, the American counterintelligence services did not have any reliable information regarding his cooperation with Soviet intelligence, although they were investigating some of his suspicions. in espionage. This confession could mean only one thing: "Hugo" worked professionally competently, carefully, strictly observed secrecy, so that the American counterintelligence remained in the dark about the nature of his relations with us until the last moment. Its employees, understanding the Souter case after his disappearance from the United States, could not believe in the voluntary nature

his work for Soviet intelligence, in his disinterestedness, in the fact that he was guided by moral considerations and personal convictions, was "unmercenary." Souter himself emphasized more than once that the main thing for him was always not the material, but the moral, ideological side.

Information materials coming from Souter were of paramount importance for the defense of the USSR. After Souther's withdrawal to the USSR, the American media also reported that during the American air action in April 1986, aimed at the physical destruction of the Libyan leader Gaddafi, the latter allegedly managed to avoid certain death only thanks to the appropriate information. Souther was also accused of "giving us thousands of nuclear targets" around the world. Be that as it may, Souther's intelligence reports were always appreciated at the Center.

It seemed that nothing foreshadowed the clouds on the horizon for the fate of "Hugo". In June 1986, he was finishing his studies at the university, the ceremony of graduation of students was to take place soon, and then three-month courses of the Navy were coming, after which graduates were to receive officer ranks. Shortly before this, Souter had successfully passed a security clearance check.

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with the prospect of further service in the Naval intelligence center in Norfolk and felt confident. However, at the end of May of that year, he was unexpectedly summoned "for a conversation" to the local FBI office. Immediately, he was alerted by the fact that he was invited for a conversation by an employee of the special services, Schrader, who did not serve his courses, but by another person, a certain Holts.

According to the American counterintelligence, the reason for summoning Souter to the FBI was the words of his ex-Italian wife, expressed by her temper in her environment back in the early 80s, about a possible "husband's connection with the Russians." The absurd nature of this woman was known to Souter's command, he himself enjoyed an impeccable reputation, a civil marriage with an Italian woman was not officially recognized in the United States, and naval counterintelligence at that time did not attach much importance to the statements of the cohabitant. But after the arrest in May 1985 of John Walker, the former duty officer of the US Navy Command Headquarters in the Atlantic, who was accused of collaborating with Soviet intelligence, a new campaign of spy mania unfolded in the USA and in the West as a whole, and an active search for "moles" in the Navy was launched. , all materials containing even the slightest "hooks" on the subject of "Russian espionage" were raised. And then the words of the Italian were remembered, and the personal file of Souter from the naval counterintelligence was transferred by the FBI into the hands of the aforementioned Holts.

"Hugo" was placed under surveillance, it was conducted for about a year, but did not reveal any moments or evidence compromising him. It was then that Souter was called to the FBI office in Norfolk "to clarify some dubious points in his biography." Holts led the conversation in a friendly spirit, made it clear that he considered Souter a loyal and trustworthy person, but then changed his tone a little and began to ask specific questions, asking if Souter knew a certain "Russian Svetlana who was trained in KGB, etc. When the counterintelligence officer approached the words of the former Italian cohabitant about his "connections with the Russians", the goodwill finally disappeared and a formal, harsh interrogation began. Having not achieved the desired results, Holts said that only a polygraph test could finally dispel the doubts that had arisen regarding Souter, and, as if by the way, asked if Souter would challenge the results of the polygraph test in court. For "Hugo", in general, a polygraph test was not new: he had already been subjected to it more than once, but they were tests according to Navy standards, and he had good skills in preparing for them. There was no complete certainty that he would be able to pass the test under the FBI special program.

The situation that arose worried the Center: its analysis spoke of the threat of the arrest of "Hugo". Measures were urgently developed to ensure its safety, which included, among other things, the speedy

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waters from the USA. On June 9, 1986, having taken the necessary precautions, Souter arrived at the airport and left the United States forever on the plane of the Italian company Alitalia, which was flying to Rome with a stopover in Montreal (Canada). Just in case, he also purchased a return ticket to the United States to show that he intended to stay in Italy for a short time "on a personal matter". In this country, his "traces" were lost, and in the middle of 1986 he was already in Moscow, in complete safety.

Our intelligence did everything possible to ensure that Hugo did not feel like a "stranger" in his second homeland. By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 2, 1986, he was officially granted Soviet citizenship. He chose the surname Orlov, his first name and patronymic - Mikhail Evgenievich, and in a conversation he asked to be called in the Russian way - Misha. Souter substantiated his request for admission to Soviet citizenship on "political and personal considerations", in particular he wrote: "I declare with all responsibility that the US government will never do anything from sincere and honest motives to establish peace on Earth until it is firmly convinced of its complete military superiority. The United States has treated and continues to treat the fate of other peoples with disdain." Souter Orlov was not cunning, he wrote what he really thought and felt: he was always and in everything a frank and honest person.

Having learned to speak a little Russian, he already used in the conversation "we", that is, the Soviet people, and "they", that is, those who, in his opinion, were a threat to peace. He often said "with us", "here", i.e. in Moscow, which in his mouth meant that he and his fellow intelligence officers were fighting evil together, standing on the side of justice and good. In one of the personal records kept in the archives of the SVR, he noted: "Here I live among people who are busy solving everyday problems - they can be accommodating, or they can argue with each other over trifles, but none of them bears globalist ideas or intentions to kill others. Here my powers are put to better use than before."

Orlov-Souter surprisingly quickly adapted to new conditions, which are usually far from easy for foreigners. By nature, he was a deeply decent person, simple and unpretentious in everyday life, led a modest lifestyle, asked that he not be created any special, privileged conditions, intended to purchase with his own money a modest one, "like everyone else," he said. he, an apartment in the city, and a small dacha in the suburbs, where one could go jogging in the mornings in the summer and go skiing in the winter. Being an active, enterprising, life-loving person, he could not sit idle, having learned from a young age that the main support in life is socially useful work. Therefore, from the end

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In 1986, he enthusiastically got involved in scientific activities, constantly expanding the scope of his duties and the scope of scientific and applied work. For example, he was very proud of the unconventional English language training program he personally developed. He walked a lot around Moscow, traveled to other cities of the country, made acquaintances with ordinary citizens, peered into the peculiarities of our life, was interested in the way of life of ordinary people, their manners and customs.

He liked a lot in Soviet society, aroused sympathy, was perceived by him with all his heart: universal free education, health care, social security, developed public transport, he even wondered why in those years an accelerated "motorization" of Moscow was needed, since knew well all its negative consequences on the example of the USA and Europe. He also saw other, more significant shortcomings of Soviet society, and very soon came to the conclusion that although it is generally more just than in the West, it still does not correspond to the Christian ideal, but only approaches it. The beginning of perestroika

he took it positively, one might even say, with enthusiasm, but what was happening before his eyes - queues, empty shelves in stores, and especially the decline in the moral foundations of society - seriously disturbed him. He thought a lot and in August 1988 made the following entry: "Everything around is becoming more disturbing. Everywhere you start to face dishonesty. It's just incredible! I think that we will not have a real restructuring." While still in the USA, he was fond of the poetry of V. Mayakovsky, who became an idol for him, now he read his poems in the original, many of them he knew by heart. He also loved the work of F.M. Dostoevsky and A.P. Chekhov, because in their works he found consonant with his thoughts about a just social order, about compassion for the fate of ordinary people. Of course, he was not a Marxist, but he wanted to see in our country, in Russia, a society where the ideas of equality and brotherhood of people would be embodied.

Orlov-Souter developed good relations with prominent Soviet intelligence officers Kim Philby and George Blake, who had been living in Moscow for many years. He greatly valued his friendship with them, and they had a great positive influence on him. All three had similar fates, and Orlov-Souter was glad to receive practical advice from Kim Philby and Blake, to exchange opinions with them in order to better understand the processes taking place in our country, and the search for truth, the desire to get to the bottom of the issue were to him are always characteristic. It was no coincidence that he said about himself: "I spent my entire conscious life in constant movement and loneliness," and any moral support was extremely important for him.

In April 1987, he married a Soviet citizen, an English teacher at one of the Moscow universities;

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the daughter of Alexandra was born, to whom her father treated with great tenderness and love. Life seemed to be getting better, everything was going well, the experienced nervous and physical overloads were left behind. In Moscow, he is surrounded by the attention and care of his colleagues, the work provided to him gives satisfaction, he created a new family. In mid-1988, in an interview, he said this: "Now I have an interesting job, good conditions. New friends appear and, importantly, serious life plans. I see and feel that I live in a dynamic society, which has many problems, but also a great desire to solve these problems. Glasnost, democracy, perestroika are becoming for me, an American, close and newly conscious concepts.

At the end of the same 1988, Orlov-Souter's enrollment in active service in the KGB of the USSR with the assignment of the officer rank of "major" - in general, an exceptional case in the history of our foreign intelligence - opens up new broad prospects for the future for him. And in early 1989, the intelligence leadership petitioned for him to be awarded the Order of Friendship of Peoples with the wording "for the performance of important tasks and a significant contribution to ensuring and strengthening the security of our state." But, alas, it was not necessary to present this high award: three days before the solemn ceremony, he unexpectedly and voluntarily left life.

And he was also going to present his observations, thoughts and reflections in a book, made outlines of chapters, and concluded an agreement with a publisher for its publication. But I didn't get to write it. On that tragic night of June 22, he was alone at his dacha near Moscow, wrote several suicide letters addressed to those closest to him: his mother, wife, daughter, George Blake and fellow foreign intelligence officers. "This decision is mine and mine alone," he wrote in one of them, "it is the result of complete nervous strain. I'm just tired". In a letter to his daughter, he asked her to "love her mother and be a good person and citizen for her and our country, and work hard." He wrote to his mother: "Promise not to forget Sasha and my wife." Having finished with the letters, he went down to the garage, tightly closed the doors and turned on the engine of his car.

Even now, after a decade and a half, it is apparently impossible to name any one reason that pushed him to the fatal step. What affected and left a tragic imprint

on his state of mind: many years of nervous overstrain and psychological overload, intrusive attention to his personality and fate by the Western media, a sense of personal responsibility for the troubles caused to his mother, relatives and close friends, or a widening gap between his ideals and reality, the drift of the country to other shores - this, probably, is no longer possible to know, he took his secret with him. vidi

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mo, forever. With all certainty, one can only state once again: Orlov-Souter was deeply decent, honest, sympathetic, receptive, impressionable and easily injured. man.

To say goodbye to Orlov-Souter came leading intelligence officials, his fellow intelligence officers, in the guard of honor were the leaders of the KGB, headed by its chairman. On his last journey, he was escorted with full military honors, and his last wish was fulfilled - he was buried in the uniform of a state security officer. He rests at the Novokuntsevo cemetery in Moscow next to the grave of the legendary Kim Philby.

In an obituary about the sudden death of Major M.E. Orlov emphasized that he devoted his entire life to averting the threat of a nuclear catastrophe hanging over our country and all of humanity. The name of Mikhail Evgenievich Orlov-Souter is forever inscribed in the history of the Foreign Intelligence Service, it is carved in gold letters on the Memorial Plaque, which is located in the central hall of the Cabinet of the History of Intelligence, is on a par with the names of our outstanding intelligence officers - Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

In a letter written before his death to fellow intelligence officers, he firmly stated: "I do not in the least regret our relationship. They were long lasting and helped me grow as a person. Everyone was tolerant and kind to me. I hope you, as you always did, forgive me for not wanting to go to the last fight. Even earlier, in the second half of 1988, M.E. Orlov-Souter wrote this: "Russia was for me the place where I lived in my dreams, a country that fascinated me, despite the fact that sometimes it was difficult and lonely for me."

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Under the pseudonym Patria

Historically, during the formation of the VChK-OGPU, the personnel of the Soviet foreign intelligence was to some extent recruited from foreigners. They received Soviet citizenship, being members of the communist parties of other countries, joined the RCP(b) ~ VKP(b), were registered for full-time, often leading work in intelligence, they were awarded military ranks. The first chairman of the Cheka was the Pole Dzerzhinsky, one of the chiefs of foreign intelligence in the early 1930s was the Swiss Artuzov.

At various times, citizens or subjects of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia (until 1940), Austria, Italy, Switzerland, China, Korea, the USA, France, and England became career employees of Soviet intelligence. Although foreigners made up an insignificant part of the total staff, the results of their work in many cases were impressive.

Let us add that here it was said mainly about male foreigners. But the history of Russian intelligence is enriched by an exceptional phenomenon, when a foreign woman became a staff member. This fact in itself causes an increased interest in her personality.

Our story about the Spaniard Africa de Las Heras. We will call it the operational pseudonym Patria, which in Spanish means "Motherland".

She was born in 1909 in Ceuta (Spanish Morocco), where her father, a man of liberal views, served as a military archivist. She received an unusual name - Africa. Probably, the parents thus decided to "link" their daughter with the continent where she was born. After some time, the family moved to Spain, the daughter began to study at a school in Madrid, but soon the classes were interrupted: as a result of a coup d'état in 1923, a military-monarchist dictatorship was established in the country. Opposition

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the father and mother, who were on-line to the new government, were recognized as unreliable. They were expelled from the capital, and they again ended up in Spanish Morocco in the town of Melilla. There, the girl continued her studies at a school at one of the monasteries. In 1926, his father died. Living conditions worsened, at times the family was in poverty. After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1931, mother and daughter managed to move to Spain. Later, both joined active political activities within the organizations of the Popular Front, which was formed in early 1936, and began to cooperate with representatives of the Communist Party.

According to documents, in 1937 Patria was contacted by members of the Soviet intelligence service in Spain. However, Patria had to be urgently recalled to Moscow after the NKVD resident in Spain, Orlov, who knew her well, left his post in July 1938 and disappeared. In 1939, Patria was already in Moscow.

She began to adapt to a new life in an unfamiliar country. The development of the Russian language went quite successfully. It was more difficult to get used to the peculiarities of everyday life and way of life, to work in the team of one of the associations of the capital's artists ("Vsekhudozhnik"), where she was accepted as having the ability to draw. She maintained friendly relations with some of her compatriots who found themselves in Moscow after the defeat of the Republicans. Sad news came from Spain: the Nazis shot her mother as an active participant in the anti-Franco movement.

The Great Patriotic War began. To organize partisan struggle in the territories under German occupation, a special structure was created in the NKVD of the USSR. Within its framework, a military formation was organized - a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes (OMSBON).

Patria immediately began to ask for the front. Her voluntary appeal was taken into account and sent for training to the medical unit of OMSBON: the need for nurses and orderlies was covered by female volunteers. Then they were transferred to training courses for radio operators for partisan detachments. She successfully mastered the radio business, took a military training course: shooting from various types of weapons, grenade throwing, endurance marches with full gear, etc. After graduation in the spring of 1942, she was assigned to the detachment of the famous partisan commander D.N. Medvedev, the future Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, in his books "Strong in Spirit" and "It was near Rivne," he described in detail the events of the battle path of the "Winners" detachment.

In June 1942, Patria and a group of new fighters of the detachment were parachuted into the deep rear in Ukraine (she jumped for the second time in her life!). Heavy partisan everyday life began.

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The main tasks of Patria and her friends in the radio platoon were carried out at a high level. There was not a single disruption of bilateral radio contacts with the Center, reliable communication was maintained with three dozen combat groups of the detachment operating in territories remote from it. On instructions from Moscow, radio communication was provided with the partisan detachment of A.A. Kovpak during his raid in the Carpathians.

The working and living conditions of radio operators were incredibly difficult. No fixed daily routine. Everything depended on radio communication schedules: early in the morning, during the day, late in the evening. Almost every session was masked by false broadcasts on arbitrary frequencies (far from the detachment's location) in order to mislead the enemy's direction finding services. It happened that the Germans spotted the transmission sites, tried to surround the radio operators. There were skirmishes, it was necessary to hastily evacuate. The trips back and forth were mainly made at night, resting during the day in secluded places, while experiencing climatic hardships and a feeling of hunger.

In the detachment, Patria was loved, appreciated and, if possible, protected. She developed a touching relationship with an illegal intelligence agent N.I. Kuznetsov, who acted in the rear under the guise of a German officer. Seeing that the Spaniard does not tolerate the winter cold well, upon returning from another trip to the city of Rovno, Kuznetsov gave her a warm woolen coat he had bought there.
shawl.

She spent more than two years behind enemy lines. For military merits, she was awarded two orders and medals. She was especially proud of the medal "Partisan of the Great Patriotic War" [degree.

She returned to Moscow in the summer of 1944. After some rest, she was offered to start preparing for illegal work abroad. At the same time, it was emphasized that such a business trip can only be discussed if it voluntarily agrees. There were no objections.

Spain was chosen as the country of destination, and France was chosen as the springboard for moving there. We prepared the necessary documents, worked out the legend and action plan in France. At the beginning of 1946, Patria was already in Paris. To reinforce the legend, according to which she was listed as a fashion designer of women's dresses, she enrolled in artistic sewing courses, and then got a job in a fashion studio. (After a few years, the skills she acquired in this field were useful to her in a completely different country.) It seemed that the planned plan was being implemented successfully. However, with some delay, it turned out that among the Spanish emigration in France there are people who knew Patria from party work in their homeland and are aware that after the defeat of the Republicans, she ended up in the USSR. It was also established that in Spain itself she is registered with the police as a communist and is subject to detention if

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will appear there. The further stay of Patria in France became inexpedient. She was returned to Moscow.

The Center has developed a new plan. We decided to send her to a long-term settlement in Latin America. In this case, it was meant to organize a two-way radio communication channel with the Center.

Patria left for South America in 1948. She settled in the capital of one of the states. The difficult legalization began in the new place: getting a residence, looking for a job, acquiring useful connections, etc. It was necessary to behave in such a way that the environment would recognize and believe that the foreign woman who had arrived had some capital. As a front, as planned, she opened a fashion atelier that also served as a place of residence. Hard work made it possible to acquire a primary clientele and gradually expand its circle. Two auxiliary seamstresses were hired.

Thanks to perseverance and skillful use of already acquired connections, she managed to solve one of the important tasks of legalization - to obtain local citizenship. Around this time, she established radio contact with the Center, confidently received encrypted messages from Moscow.

It took the scout about four years to prepare the conditions for a solid settlement.

In 1954, Patria was summoned to the Center for additional training in the radio department and clarification of reconnaissance tasks. The Cold War was already in full swing. The main direction of work at that time was the line of the GP, that is, the "main enemy" (at that time - the United States).

In connection with this stay in Moscow, an episode is recalled when Patria's perseverance, which was especially characteristic of Patria, was manifested. She had to master a new complex equipment for her (and for the service too) - a fast-acting radio transmitter. Control sessions confirmed her ability to work with this technique. Educational transmissions were conducted from a secret apartment in the center of Moscow, the reception was made by a radio station located in the suburbs. It was this circumstance - the proximity of the reception center - that embarrassed Patria. After all, she had to work "very far away." Will a radio signal get through from there, how to make sure that long-distance communication will work the same way as it is now in Moscow? With this question, he turned to experts. They assured each other that everything would be all right. However, at the insistent request of Patria, these doubts were reported to the head of the illegal service, A.M. Korotkov, who was always attentive to the considerations of his charges. He considered her hesitations reasonable and decided to send her on a business trip away from Moscow for additional training, and he himself determined: Sukhumi, Abkhazia. As if justifying such a choice, he remarked: "And the climate there is similar to that of South America."

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After agreeing on the necessary issues, Patria flew to Sukhumi with an instructor-radio operator. From there, radio communication was established in a mode close to the conditions of a foreign situation. This experience turned out to be useful for Patria: she calmed down, gained additional confidence.

When, at the end of the war, she began to prepare for illegal work, she was recommended, in the interests of maintaining secrecy, to stop contacts with fellow partisans. Knowing her high discipline, the service believed that it would be so. But literally a day before leaving Moscow, she asked to contact her Moscow friends in the Medvedev detachment, the married couple N. (she gave the necessary coordinates) and to give them some things from her - a sweater, a jacket, etc., about which they were aware.

What was behind this act, how was it regarded in the service? A.M. Korotkov said something like this: "Here is evidence of a true soldier's friendship, sealed with the blood of the war years, an example of mutual trust and human sincerity." Naturally, her request was fulfilled.

Analyzing the position of Patria and the situation in the region, the Center found it necessary to send one more illegal immigrant to South America and thereby form a full-fledged illegal residency in the country. An experienced career intelligence officer Marco, an Italian by nationality, was elected as the leader. In 1956, he arrived at his destination and faced the same difficulties that Patria had at first, how to establish a foothold in the country for a foreigner. At first, it was only possible to replace the existing transit visa with a tourist one, and then extend its validity. But the main question - stable subsistence - remained open.

The solution was found by the illegals themselves. They suggested, "We'll get married." The legislation of the country provided: if a foreigner marries a local citizen, then he acquires the right to permanent residence, and subsequently can apply for citizenship. In Moscow, the initiative was approved, and soon the marriage took place. The formalities required for such a case were completed - marriage registration in the municipality, witnesses from both sides, congratulations from friends, a traditional feast, etc. Before that, Patria spread a legend among her entourage, according to which the "newlyweds" met back in Europe, where she really went in 1954, then the romantic relationship was maintained at a distance and logically ended here with the registration of marriage. There is no such version of distrust

who did not call.

Consolidation of Marco's position involved finding a suitable job for him so that he would not look like a dependent of his wife. After examining the situation, they decided to acquire the property of some

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trading point. The center supported these intentions, as a result, Marco became the owner of a small antique shop.

Thus, the legalization is basically completed. They had impeccable personal documents, their own apartment building, car, reliable cover.

Even before the leader's arrival, Patria completed a number of reconnaissance missions outside the country. The Center could not miss such profitable opportunities that arose for her in connection with obtaining a national passport. A middle-aged woman with a document from a "calm" South American country, she did not attract much attention from the border, customs, and police authorities. All this, combined with operational experience, allowed her to restore contact with two agents, contact with which was interrupted in the first post-war years, and to find out the position of another agent who lost contact with us about 15 years ago. Several times she traveled to illegal colleagues in a country where there was no legal residency of our intelligence, and carried out with them the voluminous and complex work prescribed by the Center.

Patria's local connections have already been mentioned, which helped her and Marco to legalize. Indeed, they had many acquaintances of varying degrees of intimacy. Even too much. The center had to recommend them "not to pursue quantity", but to focus on operationally significant ones. They developed two responsible government officials who were recruited by the legal residency and successfully cooperated with our intelligence service for a number of subsequent years.

Intelligence officers regularly provided political and economic information on the countries of the region. For the most part, it was relevant and served as a useful addition to the information treasury of intelligence.

Another important task of the illegal residency was also accomplished: two-way radio communication with Moscow was established. It should be emphasized that by that time our intelligence service had no experience of such radio communications from South America. Success did not come immediately. It took about a year to fine-tune the technique and develop methods of working on the transmitter. Regular communication functioned for seven years.

Meanwhile, each of the illegal immigrants exceeded fifty. They made themselves aware of age-related ailments. Marco was affected by the consequences of being wounded during the war years, and Patria did not feel quite healthy either. In the summer of 1964, disaster struck. Marco ended up in the hospital with a broken leg. At first it seemed that there was no serious threat to health. He was even sent home to recover. However, complications arose and he died suddenly. So in a foreign land, at a military post, the life of a Soviet intelligence officer under

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Colonel Marco. The exemplary intelligence team of like-minded internationalists ceased to exist.

Later, Patria recalled: "By nature, Marco was quick-tempered, but quick-tempered. With me he was kind, noble and calm. When it came to work, there was never any friction between us. We worked in close cooperation and harmony, with complete mutual trust.

He was my great friend and wonderful comrade. His death is a cruel blow to me. I don't know why, but next to him I always felt weak ... He treated me very well. However, sometimes he showed stubbornness and did not want to tell me what the Center told him on the radio in his cipher ... When he returned home from the hospital, he began to be overcome by bitter forebodings. He constantly said: "You will be left alone, you will be lonely," and tears rolled down from his eyes. I urged him not to lose heart, but the disease took its toll.

Marco held Patria in high esteem and constantly showed concern for her. The only thing they often argued about was her careless attitude towards her own health.

When Patria was called to Moscow in 1961 for retraining in radio engineering, Marco wrote to the Center: "I would like to hope that she uses her time at home not only to familiarize herself with new technology, but also for treatment. During the last winter she suffered greatly from rheumatism. It was impossible to refer her to a doctor. She has had heart problems for a long time. Even if there is no time for treatment, you must insist that she do it, because she is very prejudiced against doctors. If she delays returning for more than a month, this will not be unusual, since no one from here travels to Europe for less than three months. In Moscow, she underwent a medical examination, received some medical treatment, but resolutely refused to linger for a thorough correction. Came back after a month and a half.

After Marco's death, the Center was ready to stop Patria's business trip, but she considered it possible to stay for a while to complete the work she had begun. Moscow agreed, and she stayed there for another three and a half years. Continuing to engage in information work, she prepared a legend of her departure, sold an antique shop, a car, some property, and gradually curtailed the work of her fashion studio.

At the end of 1967, Patria returned to the Soviet Union. Her business trip lasted almost twenty years.

After the report and a short rest, Patria strongly spoke out in favor of continuing her work in intelligence, despite the fact that she had already reached retirement age. She reported: "I think

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that I can work as an instructor, passing on experience to young employees, providing them with practical assistance, accompanying them, if necessary, on foreign trips ... In any case, I am full of desire to work and believe that, to the best of my ability, I can continue to benefit our Motherland".

Patria's intentions coincided with the interests of the service, which prepared the youth, especially its female part, for illegal work. As a native speaker of a foreign language and an experienced practitioner of illegal immigrants, she was well suited for this role. She was given a group of pupils and pupils, and she began to study with them according to individual plans.

In 1969-1970, she made two multi-month trips to Europe and Latin American countries. Later, several foreign trips with specific tasks took place.

Focusing on pedagogical and educational work, Patria helped her students improve their knowledge of the Spanish language, introduced them to the norms of behavior adopted abroad in various situations, and supervised their mastering the science of reincarnation into a foreigner.

She worked with great willingness, with inspiration, and in a highly professional manner. She called her wards "my children." This episode is typical. While on one of her trips abroad, she wrote to the Center: "If you allow me, I would like to use my stay here to purchase some materials for future "children" with whom I will study upon my return. I already have publisher catalogs and other things that are absolutely necessary for the subsequent work.

Her former student T. recalls:

"In the 1970s, I happened to work with Patria on regional studies and the polishing of the Spanish language. Meetings and close communication with her convinced: Patria is an absolutely wonderful person and

extraordinary. She was an excellent mentor. The concept of the time frame of the lesson did not exist for her. Often these were meetings and classes at her apartment, interrupted by tea, lunch, and sometimes dinner. Sometimes, after sitting up late, I stayed overnight. She talked about the events of her difficult life in Spain, constantly monitored the situation in her homeland, and remembered it with love and some sadness.

I had to get acquainted with the peculiarities of the Western way of life. To expand this knowledge and gain some practice, my husband, Patria, and I were sent to a resort area on the Black Sea coast. For a month under her care, we behaved "like foreigners." Her everyday advice, which was not written in any textbooks, was very useful: how to build a family budget, how to choose the right wardrobe, use jewelry, perfumes, observe personal hygiene, etc. Later,

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already at independent work, we often recalled and applied her recommendations.

What features do Patria remember? She valued sincerity, obligatoriness, adherence to principles in people. That was exactly what she was. With deep respect, she recalled her first leader A.M. Korotkov. She spoke warmly about many other employees with whom she worked at different times. For her, hypocrisy, falsehood, demagoguery were completely unacceptable - no matter who they came from. She did not hide her opinions, she expressed them frankly. So, she believed that it was not necessary to conduct a campaign in such a sharp form to expose the cult of Stalin. Although she criticized the shortcomings in our life, she constantly emphasized and proved with examples that we have a lot of positive things that are not even in the most highly developed Western countries.

Everyone who knew Patria notes her broad outlook, erudition, high cultural level and extraordinary modesty. She collected a good library, was engaged in painting. She followed the developments in the world with interest, willingly discussed them, not missing the opportunity to argue. She defined her political credo as follows: "I am a Spanish-Russian communist-internationalist." She has been gone for many years, and everyone who had the opportunity to work with her remembers her with unfailing warmth and love.

Patria kept in close contact with her friends in the partisan detachment. They often saw each other at her house, visiting the widow of their former commander, Medvedev. On holidays, they gathered in the traditional places of meetings for Muscovites for veterans. She cherished this friendship very much, and the partisans answered her with complete reciprocity and deep respect.

The wife of a service veteran L. recalls:

"In 1978, my husband and I were in the Moscow House of Journalists, where the 80th anniversary of the birth of D.N. Medvedev. Many partisans gathered there, and there was also Africa. We met for the first time after we met back in 1954. My husband was working with her at that time, and I was allowed to attend several non-official meetings in order to somehow diversify her short stay in Moscow. And here is the meeting after 25 years.

The gala evening ended, and we headed home to Africa. With us was a close friend from the detachment, Valentina Dovger, who had come from Voronezh, who was staying with her. In the ensuing conversation, Africa was keenly interested in our family affairs: where and how children study, what they are fond of, what foreign languages they study, etc. It was felt: the children's theme worries her. She sadly noticed that she had no children of her own. I reminded her of one incident. Before going abroad, Africa gave me a bottle of French

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perfumes (for the first time in my life I had such perfumery). In response, I handed her a modest silk neckerchief. Then the unexpected happened. Africa went into the next room and brought... the same handkerchief. Embracing, both of us for a long time could not hold back the tears.

After I learned about the work of Africa abroad from publications and television films, a memorable statement by L.N. Tolstoy: "A hero is one who, in his place, does what needs to be done." That's right - it's about Africa.

I remember December 1985, when veterans - participants of the Great Patriotic War, a group of middle-aged employees, young workers met in one of the divisions of the Main Directorate. All with wives. Patria was the guest of honor. They listened to her with great attention. Everyone noted the sharpness of her thinking, sincerity, sense of humor. The partisans, who personally knew Patria from the war period, and the fighters of the OMSBON shared their memories. With excitement, "the soldiers recalled the past days." The veterans named mutual friends in partisan detachments, talked about their fates, and re-enacted individual episodes of military operations. We honored the memory of the dead and departed comrades. The Patrias asked many questions. There was, for example, this one: "What were the biggest difficulties you experienced while being in the rear of the Germans?" She answered: "The frosts of the Russian winter." Note, not the fear of dying in battle, not the risk of being surrounded, not other hardships of partisan everyday life, but only cold. That was Patria.

In 1976, for services to the state, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, she was awarded the Order of Lenin. Veterans know that such an award in intelligence was awarded few.

In 1979, the seventieth anniversary of the intelligence officer was celebrated in a solemn atmosphere. She was cordially greeted by her partisan friends and numerous colleagues in the service.

In 1985, Colonel Africa de Las Heras retired at the age of 75.

At the beginning of 1988, Patria was presented for the award with the badge "Honorary State Security Officer". This distinction is considered the highest departmental award. The presentation of the badge was timed to coincide with the traditional March women's holiday. However, on March 8, 1988, Patria passed away.

On her tombstone at the capital's Khovansky cemetery is inscribed:

Patria Colonel de Las Heras Africa

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Jeanne and Sep

On one of the frosty winter days of the early 1970s, a plane of a foreign airline landed at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport. The married couple, who did not stand out among the middle-aged arrivals, was met by a restrained young man. An exchange of greetings and handshakes, getting into the car, and the black "Volga" rushed with passengers to the capital. Hugs and kisses, smiles and a friendly feast awaited them ahead. After 15 years of work in special conditions abroad, illegal spies Mikhail and Galina Fedorov returned to the Center.

It all started with the meeting of Galina and Mikhail back in 1947. But first, let's talk a little about the life path of each of our heroes up to this momentous moment.

Mikhail Vladimirovich Fedorov was born on January 1, 1916 in the city of Kolpino near Petrograd in the family of a St. Petersburg worker. At that time, his father worked at the Izhora plant in a steel foundry, and his mother was engaged in housework. When in 1922 his father returned from service in the Red Army, the family moved to live in the city of Yamburg, which was soon renamed Kingisepp.

Mikhail spent his childhood and youth in Kingisepp. At school, he was fond of sports, so after graduating from ten years in 1935, he entered the Leningrad Institute of Physical Culture named after P.F. Lesgaft.

After graduating from the institute on September 1, 1939, on the day the Second World War began, Mikhail was enrolled in the 5th Directorate of the Red Army, as Soviet military intelligence was called at that time. And already in early October of the same year, he was sent for reconnaissance training on an individual basis to the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Special Military District in the city of Bialystok. The training included the study of two foreign languages, radio and photography, and ciphers. I had to study every day, from morning to late evening, almost without days off.

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The training program was designed for eighteen months. It was planned that at the end of June 1941 he was to illegally go to Poland, and then, having acquired Polish documents there, try to settle in Germany. However, the plans of the leadership were not destined to be realized. When the training of the scout was practically completed, the Great Patriotic War began.

Caught by the invasion of German troops in Bialystok, Mikhail, together with other employees of the intelligence department, left the encirclement, broke through to his...

At the end of July 1941, Mikhail was sent to the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front in the Vyazma region, at the Kasnya station.

As a deputy commander of a reconnaissance group, until December 1941 he was behind the front line - in Velikiye Luki and Nevel. Members of the group conducted reconnaissance on the deployment and movement of enemy units, mined roads, destroyed communications, and punished traitors to the Motherland.

In early September 1942, Mikhail, as part of a special reconnaissance and sabotage detachment, was parachuted out near the city of Baranovichi, Brest Region. For participation in military operations he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

In total, Mikhail Fedorov spent more than 27 months behind enemy lines. He learned to endure difficulties, navigate in difficult situations, mastered the radio business to perfection, acquired the skills of conspiracy, improved the German and Polish languages.

The experience of the war years greatly helped him in his subsequent intelligence work.

After returning to Moscow from behind the front line in August 1944, M. Fedorov was seconded to the disposal of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. He underwent the necessary training and in August 1945 was sent to work illegally in England. He worked there in the diplomatic mission of one of the foreign countries. He transmitted important information of a military-political nature to the Center.

However, a year and a half later, due to an absurd accident, the scout had to stop his business trip. And here's what happened. On one of the ordinary days, Mikhail was walking along the corridor of the institution where he worked, and suddenly in his opposite side he saw his friend - a former teacher from Bialystok, from whom he took foreign language lessons. Direct contact was avoided, but Mikhail was not sure that the woman had not noticed him. The next day, he found out that the teacher was in England on a business trip and visited the embassy on her personal business. A radio message about the incident went to Moscow. The Center decided not to risk the scout...

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Already in Moscow, in the middle of 1947, M. Fedorov was transferred from military intelligence to work in the Committee of Information under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (as the foreign intelligence of state security was called at that time) and began to intensively prepare for a new assignment abroad. But chance again intervened in the preparation plans.

From the memoirs of Mikhail Fedorov:

"I go into the dining room. The queue is short, but I was in a hurry somewhere. I see my colleagues are standing, me to them:

Did you warn me that I would? – and I myself make signs, they say, help me out. They were just about to answer when a thin voice came from behind:

No, they didn't warn you.

I turn around and ... I meet the gaze of burning black-tar eyes looking at me with a challenge and reproach.

So I met Galya ... ".

Galina Ivanovna Markina (married Fedorov) was born on February 17, 1920 in the city of Saratov in a working-class family. My father was a self-taught electrician. Later, after completing professional training, he received the position of director of the mill, where Galina's mother also worked. Immediately after the revolution, he joined the Bolshevik Party. The last years of his life was in the party work.

After the death of her father in 1932, it became very difficult for her mother to raise four children: her older sister Gali was fourteen years old at that time, her younger brothers were less than ten. From the age of twelve, Galina was brought up by her aunt, her father's sister, who lived in Moscow. In 1937, the girl graduated from a ten-year school. She began to work in a technical position at the USSR Narkomfin and at the same time study at the evening faculty of the Moscow Higher Technical School named after N.E. Bauman.

In January 1939, on a Komsomol voucher, Galina came to the state security agencies. At first she worked in the Transport Administration of the NKVD, dealt with technical issues, but was also involved in the performance of individual operational tasks.

During the Great Patriotic War, Galina was at the disposal of the Special Purpose Group of the Fourth Main Directorate of the NKVD, which trained personnel for underground work behind enemy lines. During the war, she had to perform difficult and responsible tasks. I also had the opportunity to look after the wounded soldiers in the sponsored military hospital, which at that time was located on 3rd Meshchanskaya Street. Night shifts, substitution of nurses, reading newspapers and personal letters to the wounded - all this during the hours cut out from the main work, at the expense of rest. The war hardened Galina as a future illegal intelligence officer.

In 1946, Galina completed a two-year foreign language course at the Higher School of the USSR Ministry of State Security. She was offered to go to work in foreign intelligence

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ku, to a unit that was engaged in intelligence from illegal positions. Colonel Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, head of illegal intelligence, spoke with her.

Galina Ivanovna says: "With extraordinary excitement, I entered the office of the head of illegal intelligence. A tall, broad-shouldered, middle-aged man got up energetically from behind a large table in the back of the office and, with a friendly smile, walked towards me. She drew attention to his courageous, strong-willed face, strong chin, wavy

Brown hair. He was dressed in a dark suit of impeccable cut. The penetrating gaze of gray-blue eyes is fixed on me. He spoke in a low, pleasant voice, with benevolence and knowledge of the matter. After shaking my hand firmly, he introduced me to the employee in the office. The three of them sat at a small table that stood perpendicular to the large one.

The conversation was thorough and very friendly. I was greatly impressed by his simplicity in communication, his frank manner of conducting a conversation, and humor.

After the conversation, when the issue was resolved in principle, Alexander Mikhailovich joked: "Looking at her, no one will think that she can be engaged in intelligence."

It was a pebble in my garden. The reason, apparently, was my short stature, discreet, modest appearance.

What led the young girl to intelligence? Galina Ivanovna talks about this in her memories:

"My idea of this kind of activity, like that of many, was very meager. I heard that especially talented employees are selected there, that training takes a very long time, that the work itself stretches for years and years. In addition, a deep knowledge of foreign languages is required. Here I had a plus: languages were easy for me, I read a lot, even translated just like that, for myself. And, of course, I was worried: would I be suitable for such a service?

After a thorough and very friendly conversation with the head of illegal intelligence, Colonel Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, the issue was resolved.

I went to work in intelligence consciously, with a full understanding of the significance of this service for the state and the responsibility that I assumed. Neither at that time nor subsequently did I have the slightest hesitation or belated doubts about the correctness of the path chosen in my youth. I am happy that exploration has become my life's work.

Soon there were pleasant changes in the personal plan. As a gift of fate, he appeared - Michael. Strong, kind, sensitive, loyal and reliable friend. From the first days of our acquaintance, there was a feeling as if we had known each other for a hundred years...»

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The young people decided to get married, and the staff of the Center... were forced to change the plans for Mikhail's training and began to develop a variant of their joint trip for illegal intelligence work.

Among foreign intelligence officers, the expression "illegals are not born, they are made" is perceived as a truth that does not require proof. It's just that at some point, intelligence, based on the tasks that have arisen or assigned, requires a specific person who enjoys special confidence, has certain personal and business qualities, professional orientation and the necessary life experience in order to send him to work. to a specific region of the world. For the Fedorovs, Australia was such a region.

Sep and Zhanna (such were the operational pseudonyms of Mikhail and Galina Fedorov) were given the task of settling firmly in Australia, finding a suitable job and gaining a foothold in the country for "permanent" residence. A tense period of preparation for leaving the cordon began: the scouts got used to their new biographies, studied ciphers, cryptography, radio business, improved foreign languages. And when everything was ready, the plans changed again. One of the officers of the foreign intelligence station in Australia, who could have known Sep, went over to the side of the Americans... Sen and Zhanna were sent to an intermediate country - Poland. They were given six months to acclimatize in it. It was necessary not only to get used to the image

Poles, but also to understand their psychology, to study the history and geography of Poland, from Gdansk to Krakow and from Lublin to Szczecin, modern Polish art, culture, to learn the latest cinema and literature, to see large churches, shops, learn from folk vocabulary jokes, jokes and anecdotes.

Exactly six months later, a representative of the Center arrived in Warsaw and announced a new task: to go to illegal work in one of the countries of Western Europe, on the territory of which important objects of the NATO bloc were located. Sep and Zhanna were to create in this country a regional point of illegal communication with Moscow, which, in the event of hostilities against the Soviet Union, was to switch to a combat mode of operation.

Deep subsidence... Now, after many years, it can be said that the long stay of illegal intelligence agents abroad was successful and went almost without problems due to their high professionalism. But then, in the mid-1950s, everything was just beginning, and the unknown stretched out before Sep and Zhanna. They practically had to start life from scratch.

They allegedly arrived in the country after many years of emigration. The war left them without relatives and friends. At first, Sep worked

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shed in a car repair shop. Zhanna worked as a secretary in one of the local firms.

The scouts also had to endure serious long-term interest from the local special services. The point was that the local authorities and their special services were distrustful of repatriates from socialist Poland. And the spouses were taken to test development. Local counterintelligence brought their informants from among their acquaintances to the scouts, organized surprise visits to their homes under far-fetched pretexts, and put them under surveillance. Zhanna was subjected to one of the sharpest methods of verification - "with a Russian text" when one of her acquaintances slipped her a note written in Russian. Zhanna coolly reacted to this provocation: she turned the sheet, expressing complete indifference and bewilderment.

On each fact of counterintelligence maneuvers around illegal immigrants, they informed the Center in detail. The tension grew. In Moscow, there was a well-founded concern about the fate of the intelligence officers, which resulted in a telegram with the following content:

"Given the intensity of the work of the special services, the duration of the activities carried out, and taking into account the difficult intelligence and operational situation in the country, we consider it appropriate to consider the possibility of your return to your homeland. We ask you to preserve operational communications. Recommended itinerary...»

In connection with this telegram, it would be interesting to quote here a small excerpt from the memoirs of General V.G. Pavlov, who at that time was one of the leaders of Soviet illegal intelligence:

"Being by that time the deputy head of the illegal service, I discussed in detail the problem of the security of the established regional communications station and with the leadership of the communications department. The original draft instruction contained a categorical order for illegal immigrants to go home, as there was a real threat of their arrest. But I knew that Sep had already been well trained in illegal work in England, was an experienced partisan and intelligence officer during the war, and was obviously able to determine for himself when the urgent need arose for their disappearance from the country. Therefore, reporting to the head of the service, he proposed to soften the instruction, while maintaining the possibility of a different solution. Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov agreed with my opinion, all the more so since he personally knew both Sep and Zhanna and retained the most positive opinion of them. He shared my confidence in Sep and my confidence in Jeanne's endurance.

In fact, the final decision on whether to continue or stop work from illegal positions was left to the discretion of the intelligence officers, who felt the situation around them better than the Center. And they made a decision: "Really assessing the situation

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both in the country and around us, we report that the legalization was successful in principle, the position at work in the company you know is solid. We consider the attention shown by the special services to be preventive, caused by the general intensification of the campaign of spy mania. In this regard, we consider it possible to continue our stay here to solve the tasks set. We ask for your consent."

After a thorough study of the situation, the Center agreed to continue the work. The period when for more than three years the local intelligence services kept the intelligence agents "under the hood" has ended. The serious professional examination imposed on them by counterintelligence was successfully passed. "In Moscow, it was unequivocally determined," notes V.G. Pavlov, that Sep and Zhanna, by their restraint, correct behavior and reaction to the activities of the special services, dispelled their suspicions and, having shown a subtle understanding of the plans, outplayed the special services. It was stated that now nothing interfered with the fulfillment of the main task." And in the next ten years, intelligence officers effectively carried out the most critical operations, without feeling the restless breath of counterintelligence behind their backs.

Having outplayed counterintelligence, Sep and Zhanna continued to get used to the environment, got used to everything and adapted to a new life. The first operational tasks that the Center set for the residency concerned the search for foreign intelligence agents in European countries, communication with which was interrupted with the outbreak of war. The scouts had to make numerous trips to the countries of Europe. First of all, this concerned Spain and Portugal, where the Soviet foreign intelligence did not have any positions at that time. They conscientiously fulfilled every task of the Center, demonstrating purposefulness in overcoming difficulties that sometimes arose.

Zhanna says: "In the life of a scout who is on a business trip abroad, as in a kaleidoscope, one event is replaced by another, successes alternate with failures, joys alternate with sorrows. Alas, only the danger that lurks him at every step remains constant.

A distinctive feature of an illegal intelligence agent is strict self-control, hour after hour, day after day, whether he is awake or asleep. The slightest mistake or reckless step can result in irreparable consequences. And another thing that distinguishes a scout is an almost inhuman endurance and incredible long-suffering."

Some time passed before they became the owners of their own company, acquired a small villa, convenient for radio communication with Moscow. The sums of money that were allocated to them by the Center and which they declared to the local financial authorities, made it possible to maintain the reputation of the wealthy

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Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov A.M. Sakharovsky, head of foreign intelligence (1956-1971)

F.K. Mortin, head of external V.A. Kryuchkov, head of foreign intelligence (1971-1974) intelligence (1974-1988)

L.V. Shebarshin, head of foreign intelligence (1989-1991)

IN AND. Trubnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (1996-2000)

EAT. Primakov, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the RSFSR, and then the Russian Federation (1991-1996)

S.N. Lebedev, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation since 2000

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Illegal scouts Gohar and Hero of the Soviet Union Gevorg (Amir) Vartanyan. Our days

I

A.M. Kozlov, illegal intelligence agent, V.A. Kirpichenko (1922-2005), Hero of Russia, famous scout

During the Tashkent conference on the settlement of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. January 1966
From left to right: A.N. Kosygin - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, M. Ayub Khan - President of Pakistan, L.B. Shastri - Prime Minister of India

This is all that remains of the modern building of the embassy of the former USSR in Kabul

Maiwand today. Once the busiest business street in Kabul

Meeting Yu.V. Andropov with the head of the state security agencies of Afghanistan M. Najibullah.
Moscow, October 26, 1981

Head of the Afghan security agencies M. Najibullah on vacation in Yalta with his wife (right) and her sister.
August 1983

M.E. Orlov (Souter Glenn Michael)

V.A. Kryuchkov hands Souter a passport of a citizen of the USSR

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Africa de Las Heras (Patria), Giovanni Antonio Bertoni, illegal spy Sep, illegal spy, 1948 Jeanne, illegal spy, 1955

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Galina Ivanovna (Zhanna) and Mikhail Vladimirovich (Sep) Fedorov. Mid 1990s

A.F. and M.I. Filonenko, illegal scouts. 1950s

M.I. Filonenko, illegal spy

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Anna Fedorovna Filonenko with children

Spouses Shamil Khamzin (Khalef) and Irina Alimova (Bir), illegal intelligence agents Bir, intelligence officer
illegal immigrant

Badge "5 years of the Cheka - Anniversary badge "10 years of the GPU" of the Cheka - OGPU"

Badge "15 years of the Cheka - Badge "Honored GPU" worker of the NKVD"

Badge "Honorary badge "For the service of a state security officer" in intelligence"

Badge "70 years of INO - Badge "75 years of INO - PGU" PGU-SVR"

Badge "Honored badge employee of the external "80 years of INO - PGU - SVR" intelligence"

Medal "For Distinction in Military Service" Medal "For Merit"

Monument to the Chekists-scouts who gave their lives for their Motherland. Moscow, SVR headquarters in Yasenevo

Emblem of the SVR

ny people. Soon it was possible to establish and test a radio communication line with the Center. It was possible to start performing specific operational tasks.

For many years of illegal work, Sep and Jeanne managed to do a lot. They ensured uninterrupted communication with Moscow, selected places for hiding places and carried out operations to lay and seize materials, studied people and carried out recruitment activities, were engaged in restoring communication with agents in various countries of Western Europe, and collected information on a wide range of problems, held meetings with valuable agents and transmitted information from them to the Center.

The information passing through the hands of intelligence officers mainly concerned various aspects of the activities of the North Atlantic bloc, in particular its military organization, whose headquarters was located in the small Belgian town of Mons near the southwestern border with France.

It hardly needs to be said that in those years this was an exceptionally important military-political problem directly related to the security of our country.

In Mons, plans were developed for the preventive use of nuclear weapons against the USSR, methods for delivering them to specific targets on Soviet territory were determined, and NATO staff military exercises were conducted with the maximum approximation to a combat situation. Sep and Zhanna timely informed the Center about the operational plans of the NATO generals.

At the beginning of 1959, the intelligence officers got in touch with an extremely valuable source - a high-ranking NATO official (let's call him "Brig"). Important information about the creation, rearmament and modernization of the German Bundeswehr, documents of the NATO Planning Committee on the tasks of individual military formations, their combat equipment, the command and control system, their strategy and tactics, as well as other military issues related to the bloc's offensive actions in Europe.

In the information flow, a significant place was occupied by detailed information about persons from among the senior staff of various NATO structures.

It was from Brig, in particular, that for the first time exceptionally valuable information was received about the creation within the bloc of intelligence and counterintelligence units that are part of an independent special service, autonomous from the relevant national structures and having a supranational status.

On the eve of the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly, the source transmitted confidential information about the upcoming position of the leading European countries on key issues on the agenda.

It is quite understandable that this information was very useful for the Soviet delegations traveling to New York.

Exceptionally important data came from Brig during the Caribbean crisis, when tense relations developed between the USSR and the USA. The operational work of the residency of Sep and Zhanna during this period was put "on a war footing":

"According to the NATO military command (Brig source), the White House has intelligence information about the construction in Cuba of 24 launch sites for small and 16 medium-range missiles, of the latter type, 42 missiles are located on the island. According to the Pentagon and the CIA, there are 5,000 Soviet specialists. The final number of missiles scheduled for deployment is determined at 64 units."

The spiral of the crisis unfolded at great speed. "Brig" reported that 40,000 military sailors were alerted in the United States, as well as 5,000 servicemen who were at the Guantanamo military base, that the 82nd land and 101st air divisions were put on high alert, 14 thousand reservists were mobilized, that the total number of troops deployed in Florida for a throw to Cuba approached 100 thousand people. All this information was immediately transmitted to the Center. And in the fact that in the end common sense won, there was, of course, a part of the efforts undertaken by "Brig", Sep and Zhanna.

... In the life of illegal scouts, various, as cosmonauts say, "emergency situations" often arise, which are simply impossible to foresee in advance. They can occur in the course of a reconnaissance operation, and during an innocent walk, and due to a random coincidence of some factors.

The ability to calmly weigh the degree of a real threat both to oneself personally and to the business as a whole and, depending on this, to act according to the situation is an indicator of the level of training of an intelligence officer, his professionalism.

Jeanne says:

"It is clear that an illegal Russian intelligence officer who is working abroad, in all cases of life there, should use only a foreign, local language, he should also think in it. This is an axiom, which I had to verify for myself.

One day I suddenly had pain in my right side. The doctor diagnosed her with inflammation of the appendix and insisted on an immediate operation, which should take place under general anesthesia.

How to be? The problem is not so much in the surgical intervention - the doctors there are experienced, but in my possible behavior when coming out of anesthesia: won't I speak Russian in half-consciousness? I inspired with all my might, convinced myself that my brain had already completely rebuilt,

I think in the local language.

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The appointed day came, I was taken to the operating room ...

I began to wake up from the nurse's light taps on my cheeks, and the first thing I said, while still in a semi-conscious state: "Where are my glasses? I can't see well without them." The nurse handed me the glasses and smiled warmly. So I really spoke the right way."

...The scouts were brought from the Sheremetyevo airport to an "intermediate" apartment. At the festively set table, glasses of champagne were raised for a safe return. During a lively conversation, one of the comrades jokingly asked:

What would you most like right now?

After some thought, Michael exclaimed:

- First of all, I would like to take a steam bath in the Moscow "Sanduny".

Everyone laughed merrily.

"Aya would like to call her aunt, who raised me since childhood, and please her with my return," Galina said, choosing her words with difficulty.

However, such simple desires of the scouts were destined to come true much later. For about two weeks they had to walk around Moscow, listening to the living speech of Muscovites and gaining lost conversational skills in the Russian language they had forgotten.

Our story about the life and work of a pair of illegal intelligence officers would be incomplete if we omit the very important and, undoubtedly, of interest to many, the question of creating a family during a long stay in the country of destination. After all, scouts work abroad in the best, youngest years of their lives, just when children usually appear in the family.

Galina Fedorova says:

"This question confronted us almost constantly during our stay abroad. In principle, the Center does not object to illegal immigrants having children, and we know cases when scouts returned home from a business trip abroad, even having two children. However, in our minds, we could not combine two concepts into one whole: on the one hand, our work, for which we arrived in the country of destination, on the other hand, the birth of children, the presence and upbringing of which, undoubtedly, would create for us many additional diverse difficulties, which would severely limit our operational activities. In addition, there was a certain risk in maintaining secrecy. After all, children are well-known "pochemuchki". We perfectly understood the positive side of having children: in the eyes of the Western environment, a positive image of the family is created and thereby the level of suspicion is reduced. And yet, in our reasoning, we put in the first place a sense of duty, the desire to be as useful as possible, and therefore we completely devoted ourselves to the assigned task, our nervous and hard work.

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The desire to bring great benefit to the Motherland always prevailed, so the creation of a full-fledged family was postponed until returning home. However, fate decreed otherwise: we returned at the age at which grandchildren are usually brought up."

After returning from a business trip, the service of Galina and Mikhail Fedorov in intelligence continued. When the need arose, they traveled abroad to solve specific reconnaissance tasks. In total, the scouts stayed abroad for about a quarter of a century.

The merits to the Motherland of the Honorary State Security Officer Colonel Mikhail Vladimirovich Fedorov were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, the Order of Friendship of Peoples, two Orders of the Red Star, many medals, including the medal "For Courage", the badge "For Service in reconnaissance".

Honorary State Security Officer Colonel Galina Ivanovna Fedorova was awarded the Orders of the Patriotic War and the Red Star, many medals, and the badge "For Service in Intelligence".

The time has come, and the Fedorovs, by age - Mikhail Vladimirovich at 66 years old, and Galina Ivanovna at 55 years old - retired.

From the memoirs of Mikhail Fedorov:

"When registering a pension in the district social security office, an employee, looking through the case of Galina, suddenly frowned and said with regret:

- What a failure! An error has crept into your years of service. Unfortunately, I have to return the case to the pension department for an amendment. You will have to visit us again.

- And what is this mistake? Galina asked.

- You see, in the column "length of service" is 50 years. It cannot be so, because the pensioner herself is only 55 years old, - she answered.

"Why can't it be," Galina objected and immediately added: "I worked for a very long time ... in Magadan, and there the work experience is considered two years. So many years have accumulated (according to the situation existing in foreign intelligence, the year of an intelligence officer's stay in illegal work abroad is counted as two years of service. - Approx. Aut.).

The clerk remained undecided for some time. Then, after thinking, she asked Galina to wait, and she herself went somewhere to consult. Absent for quite some time. When she returned, she apologized for the delay and duly executed the pension documents."

Having gone on a well-deserved rest and becoming pensioners, the Fedorovs did not break ties with the Service: they did a lot of public work, worked with young people who came to intelligence to replace the wind

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us, shared their invaluable experience of working in illegal conditions, helped young employees master the "technology" of the difficult profession of an intelligence officer.

In April 2004, Mikhail Vladimirovich Fedorov passed away. The illegal intelligence officers Fedorov wrote two most interesting books ("Everyday intelligence", Moscow publishing house "DEM", 1994, and "All life is a conspiracy. The history of a family of illegal immigrants", publishing house "OLMA-PRESS", 2002), in which they talked about its activities abroad.

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Radio operator Kat from Moscow region

The founder and for many years the permanent head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, in his book The Art of Intelligence, lamented that the American secret agency did not have such intelligence officers as Rudolf Abel (William Genrikhovich Fisher): "Everything that Abel did He did it out of conviction, not for money. I would like us to have three or four people like Abel in Moscow." And Sanche de Gramont, an American writer, author of the book The Secret War, added: "Abel is a rare type of personality... Knowledge was his ideal. We can only regret that such an amazing person did not come from the ranks of the intelligence of the United States.

Soviet intelligence, fortunately, had a whole galaxy of intelligence officers of the Abel class - modest, inconspicuous people who worked in the most difficult conditions of the deep underground in the Western Hemisphere.

The life of an illegal intelligence officer is a special fate. It's one thing when you "legally" work at an embassy, cultural or trade representation, when you have a passport of your native country in your pocket and you are protected by diplomatic immunity. And it's quite another thing when you have to hide under someone else's disguise, transform into a person of a different language and culture and you can only rely on your own strength. Soviet spies-illegals of the Cold War

Wars will forever go down in history as true heroes. And a worthy place among them is occupied by the Filonenko spouses, whose fate intersected with the fate of the legendary Abel.

Few people know that the famous and beloved by all of us multi-part television film "Seventeen Moments of Spring" was born largely with their help: Anna Filonenko became the prototype of the radio operator Kat, and Tikhonov, who played Stirlitz, borrowed a lot from Mikhail Filonenko.

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Anna Kamaeva, who later took her husband's surname, Filonenko, was born in the harsh year of 1918 in the village of Tatishchevo near Moscow into a large peasant family.

Childhood, accompanied, in addition to studies, by the sometimes desired summer vacation in the parental home, pioneer bonfires, participation in hayfields, work in the garden, evening gatherings with friends, ended with the end of school. Then followed studies at the factory school, where Anya mastered the art of weaving.

In 1935, a 16-year-old girl went to work as a weaver at the Red Rose Moscow weaving factory, which produced silk fabrics. The names of the famous weavers Maria and Evdokia Vinogradov rattled around the country, calling on their friends to actively join the Stakhanov movement. Soon, Anya Kamaeva became a production leader, a Stakhanovite, who serviced a dozen machine tools at once.

The road to life opened before her, which was described in the popular film of that time called "The Bright Path": the team of the Krasnaya Roza weaving factory nominated Anna Kamaeva as a candidate for deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, she was predicted for leadership work. However, fate decreed otherwise. The Electoral Committee rejected her candidacy, since Annushka was not yet 18 years old. And she continued to work as a weaver in the factory.

A sharp turning point in Anna's life occurred at the end of 1938, when, on a Komsomol ticket, a 20-year-old girl was sent to work in the Foreign Department (foreign intelligence) of the NKVD of the USSR.

It was a difficult time: during the mass repressions of the 1930s, Soviet foreign intelligence also suffered greatly among employees of state security agencies. By 1938, about half of its personnel had been repressed: dozens of employees of the central and peripheral offices of the INO were arrested and shot. As a result, the foreign intelligence of the state security agencies was extremely weakened, in some of its residencies only one or two operatives remained, while other residencies were completely closed. The repressions crossed out a lot of organizational work to create an illegal apparatus abroad.

In 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered the issue of improving the work of the Foreign Department of the NKVD. In order to restore foreign intelligence as soon as possible, a decision was made to strengthen and expand its staff. Considering the acute shortage of personnel in intelligence, it was decided to create the School for Special Purposes (SHON) of the NKVD for the centralized training of intelligence personnel.

So in October 1938, Anna Kamaeva became a student of SHON. The training schedule was tight and intense: she mastered the radio business, trained in shooting from all types of light weapons up to a machine gun, intensively studied foreign languages - Finnish, Spanish, Polish.

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After graduating from the SHON in 1939, the young graduate was enrolled in the central apparatus of foreign intelligence of the state security agencies. She conducted the operational affairs of illegal intelligence officers,

operating in Europe. However, she did not work in this area for so long - until the thunderstorm of 1941 struck ...

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, Anna Kamaeva was included in the Group of Special Tasks - a top-secret structure that was directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Beria and was actually a parallel intelligence department of state security intelligence.

The group of special tasks was alternately led by Yakov Serebryansky, Sergei Shpigelglas and Naum Eitingon. To fulfill the tasks of the country's leadership and state security agencies, it created 12 illegal residencies abroad. In 1940, this "intelligence in intelligence" under the leadership of Eitingon carried out, in particular, Operation "Duck" to physically eliminate Leon Trotsky.

It should be noted that all the leaders of the Special Assignments Group had a tragic fate.

So, in 1938, Serebryansky was arrested and sentenced to death. Only with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, at the request of the head of the 4th department of the NKVD, Pavel Sudoplatov, was he released from death row and reinstated in his former position. In August 1953, after the execution of Beria, Serebryansky was again arrested and died during interrogation at the prosecutor's office.

In November of the same 1938, the first head of the Special Tasks Group, Spiegelglas, was arrested. He was shot in January 1941.

Eitingon, who led Operation Duck and during the Great Patriotic War was General Sudoplatov's deputy, was already arrested in 1951 as a participant in the "Zionist conspiracy in the MGB." Then he was released, and in 1953 he was arrested again, this time in the case of Beria. He was released from prison only in 1964 and got a job as a senior editor of one of the Moscow publishing houses...

However, let us return to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In the autumn of 1941, the situation at the front began to acquire a critical character. In November, Guderian's tanks came close to Moscow. The evacuation of government offices to Kuibyshev began. A state of siege was introduced in the capital. The invaders were already preparing to enter the city. To raise the spirits of the German troops, they were handing out invitations to participate in the triumphal parade on Red Square, which the Fuhrer of the Third Reich himself was supposed to accept.

But the Soviet people were not going to give up. It was the pampered French who declared Paris an open city immediately at approx.

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zhenie German tank-mechanized columns. The leaders of the state ordered to prepare a sabotage underground in order to continue the fight even in Moscow captured by the enemy.

The Chekists began to prepare and implement a sabotage plan in case the city was taken by the Nazi troops. Where can Hitler and other Nazi bosses arrange celebrations on the occasion of the fall of the Soviet capital? Either in the Kremlin or at the Bolshoi Theatre.

So, they reasoned in the department of Beria, it is necessary to prepare the explosions of these objects. At the same time, the NKVD proceeded from the fact that Hitler and other leaders of the Third Reich, before realizing the threat to "raze Moscow to the ground", would certainly take a personal part in the planned ceremonial events.

The employees of the Special Tasks Group were to wage a secret war already on their own land. Anna Kamaeva found herself in the very center of these operational preparations. The practical combat training of the Chekists was led by Yakov Serebryansky. In conditions of absolute secrecy, sabotage groups were created. Some of the intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers went underground directly in Moscow. State security officers mined little-known adits and deep underground tunnels in the central part of the city, using several wagons of explosives for this. Mines were laid both in the Kremlin and under the Bolshoi Theatre. One push of a button by an NKVD miner was enough to turn these Moscow sights into heaps of ruins in a matter of seconds.

Anna Kamaeva, on the personal instructions of Lavrenty Beria, was assigned a key role - to carry out an attempt on ... Hitler himself.

Various options for completing the task were worked out, but all of them unequivocally showed that the scout had no chance of surviving. Of course, when giving such a task, the head of the NKVD sent the girl to certain death, but he was sure: Kamaev would fulfill the order.

Fortunately, this plan remained on paper. Moscow withstood the onslaught of the Wehrmacht. The Western Front under the command of Army General Zhukov managed to stop and then push back the Nazi invaders several hundred kilometers from the capital.

In the battle for Moscow, Anna Kamaeva again found herself in the thick of things. She was thrown into the rear of the German troops in her native Moscow region to carry out sabotage operations - already through the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, which was headed by the famous Pavel Sudoplatov. In order to intensify the partisan struggle behind the front line, the leadership of the NKVD then created, within the framework of the 4th Directorate, a Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON), on the basis of which reconnaissance and sabotage groups were formed.

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Anna was a radio operator of one of these groups, operating behind enemy lines.

As noted in the report of the OMSBON commander, Colonel Gridnev, Kamaeva was directly involved in conducting special large-scale sabotage actions against the Nazi troops on the near approaches to Moscow.

In January 1942, Anna Kamaeva was invited to the headquarters of the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov to receive an award. In the waiting room she met her future husband Mikhail Filonenko. He was here to receive an order from the hands of the commander for leading a reconnaissance and sabotage detachment, which made an unprecedented raid on the rear of the enemy in the Moscow region. We think that readers will be interested to know some of the details of this raid.

From the military diary of senior lieutenant of state security M.I. Filonenko, commander of the Moscow reconnaissance and sabotage detachment, whose raid in the Moscow region lasted 44 days: "Day one - December 3, 1941. Wednesday. The temperature is minus 25-30 degrees. Snowstorm, north wind. In the morning I built a detachment: fifty Chekist soldiers. More than half of them have not seen the Nazis yet. We reminded with Commissioner Anatoly Ermolaev that the raid is difficult and dangerous, there is an opportunity to refuse. Nobody got out of order.

"If anyone is embarrassed by his comrades," I said, "then after individual conversations there will be a complete line-up. Those who are not confident in themselves may not become in the ranks.

An hour later, all fifty lined up. I also tried to dissuade eighteen-year-old nurse Tamara Malygina, who volunteered for the detachment. However, here are all volunteers. Tamara is an excellent sportswoman-skier;

pistol. But it's not a woman's business in a snowy forest thicket to arrange an overnight stay, to be in the cold and hunger. Tamara said firmly:

- I'm resilient. You don't have to blush for me.

Three cars came and we drove to Ostankino. Here they received and fitted skis for everyone. At twelve o'clock we left for Aprelevka, from there to Rogachevo.

Late in the evening, the detachment passed the battle formations of the tank division of Colonel Rotmistrov, crossed the front line and disappeared into the snowy forests.

They walked all night. In the morning a heavy snowfall began, our tracks were covered with a blizzard.

Day two - December 4th. Minus 25. Overcast, overcast, snowstorm. In the morning, when the fires were extinguished, Fyodor Safonov came running with two of his scouts:

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- There is a German convoy of ten carts. Fritz are wrapped from head to toe. I don't think there will be much resistance.

I made a decision: to give a sudden fleeting fight. Sergeant Safonov with a capture group was ordered to take one or two officers prisoner, and destroy the rest.

The Nazis did not even have time to raise their weapons, as twelve of them died on the spot, two officers were taken prisoner. The detachment on trophy carts went deep into the forest.

14 Nazis were killed, including 4 officers and 3 non-commissioned officers. 18 machine guns, 3 rifles, 4 pistols, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, 16 pocket watches, 10,000 rubles, five boxes of ammunition, ten boxes of grenades, and a lot of food were captured. We don't have any losses. There were no wounded or frostbite either.

We spent the night in the forest. They raked meter-long snow to the ground, broke coniferous branches, laid them on the ground, covered them with a raincoat. Five or ten people lay down, pressed against each other, covered themselves with a second raincoat, then again with branches and snow. About thirty minutes later it became warm in such a snowy "hut". But every hour the attendants woke people up and turned them over on the other side so that they would not freeze. The guards changed every hour, two at each post. The approaches to the place of lodging for the night were mined.

Day three - December 5th. Minus 22, at night - 28-30 degrees below zero. Overcast, blizzard, moderate wind. With the commissar and Komsomol organizer of the detachment, they congratulated everyone on the day of the Soviet Constitution, wished them a successful raid and the fastest expulsion of the Nazis from our land.

At the settlement of Akhmatovo, Safonov, together with Mikhail Zadkov and Ivan Grachev, went on a search. On the outskirts of the village, a wagon with a non-commissioned officer was seized without noise. The prisoner gave good information: their company is on vacation, half of the personnel are frostbitten and sick. Indicated in which houses they were placed.

The detachment came out suddenly to Akhmatovo from three sides. They removed the sentries, cut the communication wires, threw grenades at the houses where the Nazis were located. The entire garrison was destroyed. They hoisted a red flag over the school, scattered leaflets: "The retribution of the Nazis will overtake everywhere, and they have only a few days left to be near Moscow. Death to the German occupiers!" They collected documents, weapons from the enemy and left as quickly as they appeared.

Nazis killed - 68. Of these, 10 officers. They seized 70 assault rifles and pistols, several thousand rounds of ammunition, food and uniforms. We don't have any losses.

Day four - December 6th. Minus 23 during the day, at night - 28 degrees. Cloudy, quiet, snowfall. We were awakened by a powerful cannonade. Heavy guns, mortars, and then

dozens of red-star planes took off and began to bomb the enemy.

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Apparently, our counteroffensive has begun. The Nazis are fleeing in a panic, in their shirts, some fall into the snow and freeze, and no one knows how the song says, "where is the grave my..."

All day long we monitored the retreating troops and the regrouping of manpower and equipment. Echelons were moving along the railroad under the protection of armored trains - fresh forces were brought in to fix the gap in the defense.

At 22:30, the bridge and the railway were mined. At 23:00, the bridge under the enemy echelon with soldiers and equipment exploded. Along with the bridge, about a hundred fascists died, 10 tanks, 21 guns, 3 tanks with gasoline flew into the river. The sentries at the bridge were filmed by Fedya Safonov with a capture group. The pyrotechnics of Fedya Kuvshinov mined the bridge and the approaches to it. Brave guys!

Almost all night we skied deep into the forest. And only in the morning, thirty kilometers from the place of sabotage, they made a big halt.

Day five - December 7th. Minus 18, at night - 22 degrees. Quiet, light snowfall. Huge white caps of snow have formed on pines and fir trees, many trees resemble fairy-tale knights. Today I gave rest to the whole detachment. We found food supplies from the fascist convoy hidden in the forest, warmed up the stew on the fire. According to the plan, we must reconnoiter the city of Vereya, if possible, paralyze the movement of troops across the Protva River - blow up the bridge and let the local population know that the Soviet government is a solid thing: it is able to defeat the fascist hordes.

Day six - December 8th. Minus 15-18, snowfall, blizzard in the afternoon, strong wind. Three scouts got frostbite on the tips of their noses. This is the first frostbite. At the halt, under the supervision of Tamara Malygina, the "trinity" rubbed their cheeks and noses with snow, Tamara smeared them with ointment, once again instructed everyone in detail how to protect themselves from frostbite.

Vereya is full of fascists. The movement is incomprehensible: some columns go into the city, others out of it. I call Sergeant Major Safonov, I give the task to the capture group: to get a "language", preferably an officer. No more than two hours passed before Fedya brought in two bound Nazi officers. One with a knight's cross is an oberst, that is, a colonel.

The prisoners said that in Vereya there were the remnants of a defeated infantry division, which in three days of fighting lost more than eighty percent of its composition and all equipment: instead of a defeated division, fresh units arrive, trying to hold back the Russian offensive.

"Your accursed winter has ruined all plans!" But spring will come, and we will freely occupy Moscow, we will reach the Urals, "the colonel declared with arrogance.

I ordered Safonov to shoot the Nazis. The entire squad was alerted. It is urgent to cover up the traces: these "prominent" fascists will immediately begin to search.

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More than three hours were on the road. Walking through the forest is very difficult: waist-deep snow, skis keep falling off your feet, bindings are torn - they are semi-rigid. You have to use bandages, belts, ribbons.

Settled down for the night. They mined the approaches, lit a fire.

They developed a plan to disable the railway line. We urgently need to help our units beat the Nazis in the tail and mane. Beat mercilessly, cruelly, with hatred, so that

remembered for life and punished their children ...

Day seven - December 9th. Minus 24-27, snowstorm, north wind. A group of scouts went to the village of Afanasyevo. Barking dogs and screams could be heard in the village. Safonov with his people imperceptibly approached the last house, called the owner. The Nazis arrived a week ago: angry, beaten, frostbitten. Day and night they drink, walk, rape women, kill men, hang captured partisans.

How many Germans are in the village? Safonov asked.

- Yes, about three platoons. Tanks and reinforcements are waiting, - answered the peasant Mikhail Savelyev. "And the officers are in that house with the shutters, where the light is on. At night they close the shutters - they are afraid of the partisans ~ and they put two more sentries at the house. They are very cowardly! They were told that in one garrison the partisans had killed everyone.

Two drunken and bandaged Nazis came out of the gate of a neighboring house, went to Savelyev's hut. The scouts in the passage disarmed and tied them up. It turned out: a non-commissioned officer and a corporal. An hour later, the "tongues" were delivered to the detachment. They confirmed everything that Savelyev said.

They didn't hesitate. The detachment was divided into five groups: three of ten people raid the village from three sides at once. The first group is headed by senior lieutenant Kazankov, the second group is led by the commissar of the detachment Ermolaev, and the third group is headed by foreman Kuvshinov. The covering group is commanded by Sergeant Zadkov, who is told to follow the course of the battle and cover the detachment when it retreats towards Shustikov. The scouts, of course, go ahead of everyone, and I'm with them.

It was decided to start the operation at 23.40 and finish at 0.25. Password - "Moscow", review - "Bayonet". Numerical pass - 17. To be in camouflage coats for everyone is the main difference between "friends and foes."

Silently approached the village. The scouts first of all blew up the house where the officers were, having previously removed the guards. The explosion was the signal to attack.

Something unimaginable arose in the village. Residents quickly figured out what was happening: they jumped out of their houses with pitchforks, axes and finished off the Nazis. The garrison was completely destroyed. The villagers asked to join our detachment. But we could not take them, but advised how to organize a partisan detachment.

Nazis were killed - 52, of which 5 officers. More than a hundred weapons were distributed to the population. There are no losses. Frostbitten - two.

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Day eight - December 10. Minus 27-30, at night up to 45, the wind is weak, the forest is frosty. The night went to Shustikovo. Very frosty. We posted guards, decided to rest and warm ourselves in an empty gatehouse. After lunch and rest we made the transition to Borisovo. They walked slowly. Guards ahead and to the sides. We met peasants hiding from the Nazis. They said that the Nazis and policemen were atrocious in Borisov.

Day nine - December 11th. Minus 26-29, snowfall, quiet. All day we moved in the direction of Dorohovo - Mozhaisk. Germans everywhere. There are so many of them that all the roads are clogged. Hundreds, thousands of dead, frozen.

Day ten - December 12. Minus 28. On the road we met three wagons of the Nazis, they were carrying food and ammunition. Three fascists and one policeman were destroyed. Ammunition was blown up, food was hidden in the forest.

Day eleven - December 13th. Minus 23-25, light snowfall. We made the transition to Borodino. We met a passenger car accompanied by submachine gunners. Two successfully thrown anti-tank grenades - and there was no one to shoot at. They took documents and weapons.

In the car where the fascist colonel was, in addition to documents, they took a briefcase with gold and silver items looted in our country.

We quickly changed the route and headed to Khrabrovo.

Day twelve - December 14th. Minus 18-20, heavy snowfall. We made the transition to Gubino. We met a column of fascist tanks. They were at the gas station. They did not join the battle, they withdrew in the direction of Yurlovo.

Day thirteen - December 15th. Minus 17, snowstorm, wind. Arrived in Vyselovo. The Germans brought many wounded and frostbite to the village. They did not beat them, they were already disabled.

We went to Afanasyevo. We destroyed the enemy communication line - more than 3 km. They made an ambush, began to wait for the German signalmen. Those arrived with guards: 6 submachine gunners. Destroyed 8 fascists. They took documents and weapons. We went to Vera.

Day fourteen - December 16. Minus 15, strong wind. A kilometer from Vereya, three policemen and a fourth aside from them were chasing an unknown man without outerwear. They shot at him, but he kept running into the forest. Three policemen and the fourth, who turned out to be the headman, were seized. It turned out that they were pursuing a partisan sentenced to death.

The fascist henchmen were destroyed right there, on the spot, and the partisan was given German clothes and sent to the forest. He really asked to join our detachment, but it is strictly forbidden to take unknown people.

Day fifteen - December 17th. Minus 25-30, snowfall, moderate wind, blizzard. We went to Simbukhovo. Chopped up 300 meters of the enemy's cable connection.

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Day sixteen - December 18. Minus 24-27, weak wind, blizzard. Arrived in Nazarevo. At night, they blew up an ammunition depot and burned down a petrol depot. We walked all night to Tashirovo.

Day seventeen - December 19. Minus 26-29, northeast wind, snowstorm. We drive through the forest. A snowstorm, even a small one, helps us out a lot.

We met a German convoy of 50 wagons. He was accompanied by three tanks and three armored personnel carriers. They did not enter the battle - it was not possible.

Day eighteen - December 20. Minus 30-33, moderate wind, blizzard. They froze hard. In the Dorokhovo-Shalikino region, they tried to commit a railway sabotage. It did not work: they killed three Nazis, but reinforcements arrived in time. They went into the forest, mined the road behind them, and waited for persecution. The Nazis very soon tried to catch up with us, but they were blown up by mines and stopped the pursuit.

On the way to Petrishchevo, Fedya Safonov, with his capture group, obtained "tongue", an officer of the headquarters of an infantry division. We learned from him that our troops had liberated Volokolamsk and that the most selective Nazi armies near Moscow had been completely defeated. He kept repeating: "Hitler Kaput! Hitler kaput!"

In Petrishchevo, they learned about the execution on November 29, 1941 of the partisan "Tanya". We took an oath to avenge mercilessly for our young intelligence officer, for the blood of many thousands of innocent Soviet people. Everyone was eager to fight ...

Day nineteen - December 21st. Minus 27-30, snowfall, blizzard. In the morning everyone was chilled to the bone, but my heart was joyful: today is the birthday of Comrade Stalin. Misha Zadkov says:

- We should drink to the health of the Supreme ...

I had to allow two hundred grams of schnapps for heating and as a sign of respect for my leader. They didn't go into battle.

Day Twentieth - December 22. Minus 25-27. On the way to Kolodkino-Petrishchevo, we met a fascist convoy in the forest. They attacked suddenly. 7 Nazis were killed, 2 were taken prisoner. We got ten carts with food, ammunition, warm clothes and shoes.

Day twenty-one - December 23. Minus 18-21, snowstorm, wind. We made the transition to Borisovo. We made a reconnaissance of the area. They didn't go into battle. Day twenty-two - December 24th. Minus 20-23, at night up to 25.

On the way to Vereya, we met a convoy of vehicles with barrels of gasoline, they were going to refuel tanks and armored personnel carriers. All eight tankers were burned, and the fascists burned down too. We have no losses.

Fedor Safonov, Mikhail Zadkov, Ivan Grachev, Viktor Pravdin, Alexander Sosulkin, Pavel Markin, Bogdan Dubensky, Lev Bakhmetiev and others distinguished themselves in battle. Beautiful fireworks staged in the forest!..

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Day twenty-three - December 25th. Minus 21-24, the wind is weak. They conducted a reconnaissance of the area in the Afanasevo area. They dug up hidden food, recaptured from the Nazis two weeks ago. They didn't go into battle.

Day twenty-four - December 26. Minus 20-23, snowfall, weak wind, blizzard. They didn't go into battle.

Day twenty-five - December 27. Minus 21-24. We made the transition to Shustikovo. Three fascists were killed on the road.

Day twenty-six - December 28. Minus 22-24, snowstorm. They didn't go into battle.

Day twenty-seven - December 29. Minus 21-23, strong wind. They burned two armored personnel carriers in the forest. With them, eleven fascists offered resistance. Were destroyed. There are no losses.

Day twenty-eight - December 30. Minus 20-24, light snowfall, light wind. The Germans decided on New Year's Eve to bathe and take a steam bath. And we decided to give them heat. The bathhouse was blown up, and the naked Germans who jumped out were shot.

Day twenty-ninth - December 31st. Minus 15-17, heavy snowfall, quiet. The commissar and I gathered all the personnel and, after breakfast, summed up the results for the entire "our" year of 1941. What were we, as volunteers, communists and Komsomol members, able to do, how did we bring the day of Victory over the enemy closer? Everyone counted. And we contributed to the defeat of the fascist invaders. But there are still difficult and dangerous kilometers ahead.

Day 30 - January 1, 1942. Minus 23-25, heavy snowfall in the afternoon. For a month now, we have been raiding the rear of the Nazis. In the morning, together with Commissar Anatoly Ermolaev, we congratulated all the personnel on the New Year, on new happiness. They wished to beat the Nazis even harder, to be healthy and return to the mainland with victory!

There are still no losses in the detachment. Although half of the skis were broken, the detachment's maneuverability became lower. Several people got frostbite on their toes and hands... We are taking measures to protect them from frost.

As before, we do not go to settlements for the night - we spend all nights in the snow "beds".

Day thirty-one - January 2. Minus 21-24, at night up to 28. The whole day we were in the area of Kolodkino and Kryukovo. They monitored the enemy troops and their movement. In the evening they took one "language". He reported that reinforcements had arrived in winter clothes and that the command had given the order to go on the defensive. We moved to Tashirovo.

Day thirty-two - January 3rd. Minus 22, snowfall, westerly wind, weak. There are many fascists in Tashirovo. It is dangerous to approach. Sent intelligence. An hour later, foreman Safonov reported that the Germans had set up a CIP and were checking everyone who enters and leaves the village.

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him. We took a course again in Kryukovo. Two scouts got frostbite on their toes, they had to be rubbed with snow and bandaged. People are very tired. Loads are terrible. Cold.

Day thirty-three - January 4th. Minus 18-20, strong wind. Near Kryukovo we hid provisions in December after the defeat of the enemy convoy, killed several horses and covered them with snow - this was our NZ. The products that they carried with them are running out. They found NZ and made a feast with a mountain: horse meat, stew, lard, even schnapps for heating was preserved.

Day thirty-four - January 5th. Minus 16-23, strong snowstorm. We arrived again at Vereya, reconnoitered the approaches, captured two drunken fascists. They showed that an SS regiment arrived in Vereya to fight the partisans: the commander of the Center group, Field Marshal von Bock, called in another punitive battalion of White Finns from near Leningrad to more effectively fight the partisans.

Day thirty-five - January 6th. Minus 20-23, light snowfall. We met on the road on the way to Afanasevo two German wagons with cargo. The Nazis resisted. Five soldiers and an officer were killed. Let's go to Vyshgorod.

Day thirty-six - January 7th. Minus 23-25, snowstorm. No military action was taken. We found stocks of clothing, ammunition, explosives - something that required replenishment.

Day thirty-seven - January 8th. Minus 25-27, snowstorm. They destroyed the enemy's telephone communication line, destroyed two wagons. In the ensuing firefight, five soldiers and two officers were killed. We don't have any losses.

Day thirty-eight - January 9th. Minus 26-29, snowfall. Six German soldiers and an officer who were patrolling on the road were shot dead from an ambush.

Day thirty-nine - January 10. Minus 22-25, snowstorm. Conducted reconnaissance. Replenished ammunition and food. We approached Borisovo.

Fortieth Day - January 11th. Minus 22-24, snowstorm, strong wind. They attacked an enemy convoy of 100 carts. Fire from machine guns and rifles killed 45 fascists. They set fire to two vans with ammunition. We don't have any losses.

For the first time in the entire raid, some fascists managed to escape. We must expect persecution.

Day forty one - January 12. Minus 21-24, snow, blizzard. They cut out two spans of cable communication, and in another place destroyed the communication line for 600 meters. They killed three German soldiers and an officer. Several sections of the road were mined.

It's getting harder and harder to work. After the sabotage, they went into the forest. The approaches to the camp were mined, and dinner began. At this time, there was an explosion - our mines exploded.

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Safonov and the guys found two corpses of the Nazis, the rest fled.

So, we are being followed. But while the Nazis are afraid to go deeper into the forest.

In the evening we went to Akhmatovo. The transition is difficult. Eighty percent of the composition has broken skis. Tomorrow we return to the mainland. No losses yet.

Day forty-two - January 13th. Minus 23-25, snowstorm. We got up early ~ prepared to cross the front line. I built a detachment, briefly set the task - to break out of the rear of the enemy. At this time, an observer came running: the Germans were walking through the forest on skis.

I give the command: "To battle!". We decided to let them in at 50-60 meters and hit them with aimed salvo fire. We saw the punishers: a detachment of White Finns and several Germans. More than a dozen of them were blown up immediately by mines placed the day before. More than three dozen more were killed with volley fire. The rest fled.

Having hastily collected documents and weapons, we hastily began to retreat. We had not gone even two kilometers, when the punitive detachments of the Nazis again began to overtake us. Fight again. Destroyed several dozen enemies. But it was clear: we had to leave the cover and retreat, otherwise the whole detachment would perish, and all the information we had obtained would be lost.

Detachment commissar Anatoly Ermolaev, foreman Fyodor Safonov, Fyodor Kuvshinov, senior lieutenant Andrey Kazankov voluntarily decided to cover the detachment. We said goodbye at the village of Akhmatovo. I gave them all the cartridges for machine guns, machine guns, grenades. He left only two grenades and one magazine each with cartridges for a machine gun and a pistol.

Everyone understood: to cover us means to go to certain death. The forces of the punishers exceeded ours by dozens of times. Trained white Finns on skis felt at home in the forest. Our scouts are exhausted without skis. Not a little rest could give us the situation, after which we could again successfully beat the enemy.

We retreated, and behind us we could hear short bursts of machine guns, machine-gun rattle, grenade explosions. I was wounded in the shoulder, my consciousness was dizzy from loss of blood, but I had to gather my last strength, make a dash and withdraw the detachment. Punishers rushed to the handful of our remaining comrades.

Day forty-three - January 14th. Minus 21-23, snowfall, blizzard, strong wind. We walked all day and almost all night. Worn out on the board. Food was over, ammunition - one grenade, 10-12 rounds each. I landed in a large hole in the forest, it was covered with snow. I wouldn't have gotten out on my own - I didn't have the strength. Well, Misha Zadkov noticed. He unfastened the belt of the machine gun, threw one end to me, and they, together with Va

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Grachev dragged me out with it. I would lie in a snowy grave in the truest sense of the word.

At night, fires were noticed in the forest. We looked at the map: this territory was occupied by the Nazis. They sent a group of three people to find out what kind of people they were. It turned out that our units had already taken up defense here.

Day forty-four - January 15, 1942. Minus 20-23. At three o'clock in the morning we were allowed to approach the fires of our troops, and then sent to the headquarters of the division, army and front.

Many senior military leaders at the front headquarters did not believe that such a raid was possible. But we had material evidence: they brought a bag full of tokens taken from dead Nazis, a bag of officer and soldier documents, a bag of Soviet and German money, about 300 metal and gold watches, pocket and other watches, a bag of gold and silver items taken from the Nazi invaders. Only then did they believe us.

Our losses: four brave scouts were killed and four were wounded in the last battle. The commissar of the detachment Anatoly Ermolaev, the head of the intelligence unit communist Andrey Kazankov, the deputy commander of the detachment for military intelligence, the Komsomol foreman Fyodor Safonov, the commander of the pyrotechnics platoon, the communist foreman Fyodor Kuvshinov, died the death of the brave.

It must be said that all the dead listed in the report of M. Filonenko were subsequently buried with full military honors in Moscow, next to the Heroes of the Soviet Union V.V. Talalikhin and L.V. Dovator.

The raid of the "Moskva" detachment turned out to be the most effective in comparison with the raids of other reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of the OMSBON, carried out in the winter of 1941/42. The commander of the detachment, Senior Lieutenant of State Security Mikhail Filonenko, received from the hands of General of the Army G.K. Zhukov Order of the Red Banner.

When Mikhail, flushed with pride and embarrassment, left the office of Georgy Zhukov, he caught the curious glance of Anna, who was sitting in the waiting room on a large leather sofa. Having examined the buttonholes on her tunic, Mikhail thought: "How pretty!

And we work in the same People's Commissariat. I need to get to know her better." Then he did not even imagine that he saw his future wife in front of him.

Even while studying at school, and then at the institute, teachers predicted to Mikhail Filonenko that he would find his true calling in the field of exact sciences. And well-known chess players had no doubt that he would become a world-famous grandmaster.

However, fate decreed otherwise: after the institute, he went to the foreign intelligence of the state security agencies. During the war, Mikhail, like Anna, served in the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, which,
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As we have already noted, it was engaged in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines.

In the waiting room of General Zhukov, Mikhail Filonenko had his first meeting with Anna Kamaeva. But their paths immediately diverged for many months. Anna continued to serve as a radio operator in one of the partisan detachments operating in the Moscow region, and Mikhail was appointed commissar in a partisan detachment that fought deep behind enemy lines.

Mikhail fought in Ukraine. In Nazi-occupied Kyiv, he led a reconnaissance and sabotage group of the Olympus special residence of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD. Thanks to the information obtained by Mikhail about the situation on the right bank of the Dnieper, the command of the Red Army managed to find the optimal areas for forcing the river by our units in November 1943. Mikhail was well known in the partisan detachments of Kovpak, Fedorov and Medvedev. While performing a sabotage operation in Poland, Mikhail was seriously wounded. The doctors managed to save the life of a brave intelligence officer, but he became an invalid of the second group. The intelligence officer left the military hospital with a cane, which he never parted with all his life.

He met Anna again only after the war. In the meantime, she fought in a partisan detachment. When the immediate threat of the capture of Moscow passed, Anna was recalled to the capital and began to work again in the central office of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD. From July to December 1942, the girl studied at the Sverdlovsk school of the NKVD, and then was sent to foreign language courses at the Higher School of the NKVD of the USSR in Moscow. Here she improved her knowledge of Spanish, studied Portuguese and Czech. The intelligence leadership planned to use her for illegal work abroad.

In October 1944, Anna was sent to an illegal residency in Mexico, where, together with other Soviet intelligence agents, she was preparing to conduct a daring operation to release from prison Ramon Mercader, who participated in the liquidation of Leon Trotsky and was sentenced by a Mexican court to 20 years in prison. Together with fellow illegal residents, she developed a plan to attack the prison. However, the operation was canceled at the last moment. In 1946 Anna returned to Moscow.

... And Ramon Mercader was released from a Mexican prison in 1960 and became a Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, Anna and Mikhail got married. Soon their son Pavlik was born. But the Filonenko couple no longer had a calm family life ...

The leadership decided to send them to study at the Higher Intelligence School (or, as it was also called, School No. 101), preparing

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shui cadres for foreign intelligence. For three years, intense preparation of future illegal immigrants for work in Latin America continued. And then, from October 1948 to August 1951, they made regular trips to various countries in the region under the guise of foreign citizens. At the same time, their young son Pavlik also studied Czech and Spanish. According to the decision of the leadership of illegal intelligence, he had to go abroad with his parents in order to provide confirmation of one of the points of the legend-biography specially developed for them. In the practice of Soviet illegal intelligence officers, this was one of the first cases of such use of children.

The "run-in" of illegal intelligence officers before they were sent on a long-term business trip took place in difficult conditions. Before being transferred to Latin America, they first had to, posing as "refugees from Czechoslovakia", legalize themselves in Shanghai, where many Europeans settled after the war. The Soviet-Chinese border in November 1951, the Filonenko spouses, together with their four-year-old son, had to cross illegally, through a "window" specially prepared for them, at night, in a blizzard, waist-deep in snow. At that time Anna was pregnant again. However, they got to Harbin, where the first and most dangerous stage of their legalization took place, quite safely. Here their daughter was born. According to the legend, the "refugees from Czechoslovakia" were zealous Catholics, therefore, in accordance with the traditions of Europe, the newborn was christened in the local Catholic cathedral.

The journey to Latin America took several years. From Harbin, the couple moved to the largest port and industrial center of China - Shanghai. A vast European colony, numbering up to a million people, settled here for a long time. Europeans lived in separate quarters called settlements. These quarters enjoyed extraterritoriality and were governed by foreign consuls - British, French, Portuguese and American. With the victory of the people's revolution in China, all the privileges of foreigners in that country were annulled. The outflow of Europeans from mainland China began. The Filonenko family also left China with them. January 1955 was on the calendar.

..On the eve of their departure from Moscow on an intermediate business trip, which was supposed to test the strength of their legend, the reliability of documents, the Filonenko spouses were received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. At that time, he simultaneously headed the Information Committee, which united military and political intelligence under its roof.

V.M. Molotov slowly paced around the office, looking over the huge political map of the world. "We, the Soviet leadership, attach the utmost importance to your forthcoming

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mission," the minister said, admonishing the scouts. He added that penetration into the highest governmental and military echelons of power in a number of leading Latin American countries should

become a springboard for the organization of large-scale intelligence and operational work of illegal immigrants in the United States.

Such parting words of the minister, of course, were not accidental. After the end of World War II, the paths of the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition radically diverged. The United States, which in 1945 used an atomic bomb against the already defeated Japan, began to consider itself the masters of the world and openly prepared a nuclear war against the USSR. The course towards military confrontation with the USSR was openly proclaimed in the famous speech of the retired British Prime Minister W. Churchill, which he delivered in the American town of Fulton on March 5, 1946. The West fenced itself off from the USSR and other countries of people's democracy with the Iron Curtain, imposed restrictions on the free movement of diplomats from the East, the exchange of scientists, athletes, and trade union delegations.

In addition, as a result of the betrayal of the agent-group leader of the Soviet intelligence station in the United States, Elizabeth Bentley, work in this country in the post-war period was complicated. In 1948, the Soviet consulates and other official representations of the USSR in Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York were closed. In September 1950, the United States passed the Homeland Security Act (McCarren-Wood Act), which increased the prison sentence for peacetime espionage to ten years. A "witch hunt" began - repressions against those Americans who sympathized with the USSR and left-wing political movements. Under the McCarren-Wood Act, ten million American government officials and employees of private firms were tested for loyalty. Senator McCarthy's notorious Commission of Inquiry into Un-American Activities was set up in the US Congress, which killed more than 100,000 people.

Anti-Soviet hysteria intensified even more after an atomic bomb test was carried out in the Soviet Union on August 29, 1949. The US authorities were so frightened by the coming end of their monopoly on this deadly weapon that they announced this event only two weeks later, after inspiring a special request from journalists. As a result of the investigation, the US FBI came to the conclusion that the American atomic secrets were given to the Soviet Union by the English pacifist scientist Klaus Fuchs. He was handed over to the British authorities and sentenced to 14 years in prison.

As a result of the betrayal of Elizabeth Bentley, the Soviet spy network in the United States was destroyed and had to be recreated. To solve this problem, at the end of 1948, an intelligence officer arrived in the United States.

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legal William Fisher, who later became known as Rudolf Abel. Filonenko's illegal immigrants were instructed to work in parallel with him in Latin America.

Having previously made several trips from Shanghai to a number of Latin American countries in order to consolidate the legend-biography and check documents, in January 1955 the scouts left for Brazil, where Mikhail Ivanovich, posing as a businessman, was to engage in commercial activities. On the shoulders of Anna Fedorovna lay the care of performing operational and technical tasks: ensuring the safety of secret documents, "insurance" of her husband when he goes to meetings in the city. At first, everything seemed to be going well, but Mikhail's first attempt to become a businessman failed. The commercial firm he had created went bankrupt due to inexperience in this kind of business.

However, for Brazil at that time, this was not something unusual: the years of a prosperous economic situation gave way to years of protracted depression. Every day, several dozen large and small companies went bankrupt in the country. "There was a time when there was nothing to live on, hands fell, it seemed that it was better to give up everything," Anna Fedorovna later recalled. "In order not to fall into despair, we gathered our will into a fist and continued to work, although our hearts were heavy and sad." But even the first sad experience of entrepreneurship brought

favor scouts. Mikhail managed to successfully play on the stock exchange several times. The money earned was more than enough to open a new firm and start commercial activity from scratch. Gradually, Mikhail's business began to bring tangible dividends, and commercial affairs went uphill.

A year later, Mikhail has already gained a reputation as a serious and successful businessman, who was received in the most influential houses of Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Chile. He often traveled across the continent, making connections among high-ranking officials, representatives of the military and aristocratic elite of Latin America, and in business circles.

When their legalization in the New World was over, the Filonenkos began to carry out intelligence assignments of the Center. The main task of the intelligence officers was to identify the real US plans for our country, especially the military-political ones. It was easier to get such information in Latin America than in the United States itself: Washington shared its plans with partners from the Western Hemisphere, referring to their possible use in a future war against the USSR.

Now let's go back ten years. On September 4, 1945, when the Second World War was still going on in the Far East, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States drew up a memorandum for President H. True

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Maine, in which, in the proposed war against the USSR, twenty targets were planned for inflicting atomic strikes on them. This plan was not implemented, because at that time the United States was not yet ready for a large-scale war against our country.

In 1946, a new plan was developed, which received the code name "Pincher". In 1947, it was replaced by the revised "Broiler" plan. And in 1948, a whole series of war plans against the USSR was born at once: Grabber, Eraser, Doublestar, Loughmin, Intermezzo, Fleetwood, Sizzle.

The next year, 1949, was marked by the adoption of new plans for the total destruction of our country: Dropshot and Offtackle. This is how Washington reacted to the appearance of atomic weapons in the USSR. The plans for a US nuclear attack on the USSR and the countries of people's democracy were given meaningless names on purpose in order to "mislead the enemy." And every plan, every development of the scenario of a world catastrophe only increased the number of targets for nuclear bombing. Now we can say with full confidence that the world was saved from a nuclear catastrophe only because the USSR, not yet recovering from the terrible destruction of the war, was able to mobilize all its forces and create its own atomic weapons, and in the 1970s - to achieve nuclear parity with the US.

Plans for nuclear attacks on the USSR were obtained by Moscow thanks to the connections of illegal intelligence agents among the Latin American aristocracy.

An important place in the activities of the Filonenko spouses was also occupied by the study of the policy of the United States and its Western allies in the international arena. On the eve of each session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, documents containing detailed information about the position of the main Western countries were placed on the table of the Soviet delegation. And the Soviet leadership several times made coups at meetings of the General Assembly thanks to the information that illegal intelligence officers obtained.

Filonenko prepared several agents for a long-term settlement in the USA and, with the help of the Center, provided them with reliable documentary cover. Anna Fedorovna was a reliable friend and assistant to her husband. During the frequent complications of the situation in the country, where military coups were not uncommon, she showed restraint and self-control. This was facilitated by the strong position of illegal immigrants on the continent. Mikhail Ivanovich managed to infiltrate the entourage of Brazilian President Juscelino Kubizek de Oliveira, to tie

acquaintance with many ministers of the government of the country, whom he often invited to dinner at his villa.

Mikhail even made friends with the Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner, who flooded his country with former Nazis. Being a former officer of the German Wehrmacht and a connoisseur of arrows

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The owner of Paraguay once saw in a shooting club how accurately an elegant businessman shoots from rifles and pistols, and he was indescribably delighted. In the future, he repeatedly invited Mikhail to hunt crocodiles together. In conversations with the scout, "Uncle Alfredo" was extremely frank. Such an "honor" was awarded only to the elite.

Years passed. As a result of well-established intelligence work, up-to-date political information was regularly received from illegal immigrants. The situation around the scouts was calm. Soon another child was born in the family - the son of Vanechka.

Meanwhile, the work became more and more difficult. In 1957 in New

At the same time, an illegal Soviet intelligence officer, William Fisher, was arrested, who identified himself during the arrest as Rudolf Abel, in parallel with whom the Filonenko spouses worked. In order to avoid deciphering them and preserving the agent network they created, which had access to the United States, the Center decided to change the conditions for communication with illegal intelligence officers. Any contacts with them through hiding places and contacts were stopped. Communication with the Center was now maintained only by radio.

The scouts were given the latest short-wave high-speed radio station, which "shot" the message into the air in a compressed "packet" in a few seconds. Anna Fedorovna had to remember her military specialty as a radio operator.

In those days, satellite communications did not yet exist. Therefore, in the composition of the Soviet whaling flotilla, fishing in the waters of the Antarctic, under the guise of a whaling ship there was a special ship. Its powerful communication center was used as an amplifier and repeater for radio signals coming from illegal immigrants. These were the years of the Cold War, and the information transmitted by intelligence officers was of an alarming nature.

There were dramatic moments in the life of illegal intelligence officers. Once Mikhail Ivanovich went on a business trip across the continent. Soon the radio announced that the plane on which he was supposed to fly had crashed. One can imagine the state of Anna Fedorovna when the meaning of this message reached her: an illegal widow with three young children in her arms in a foreign country! Fortunately, Mikhail Ivanovich was late for the ill-fated flight: before the plane took off, he had an important meeting with his source of information and was delayed.

Constant stressful situations, of which the scouts had a lot, affected the health of Mikhail Filonenko. In early 1960, he suffered a massive heart attack and could no longer work with the same workload. In July of the same year, the Center decided to recall the illegal spouses to their homeland. They went home with a whole suitcase of money. These were party dues, which they carefully set aside for

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border to hand over to the party cash desk upon returning to Moscow. The network of agents created by their efforts was transferred to communicate with another employee of illegal intelligence and continued to operate for many more years.

The journey home took a long time. Spouses with children moved from one country to another in order to hide their true route from the counterintelligence of the enemy. Finally they reached Europe, and from there they crossed the Soviet border by train. They could not hide their tears of joy and sang: "Wide is my native land..." And the children listened in amazement to the unfamiliar Russian speech. After all, two of them were born in a foreign land and had never heard a language other than Portuguese, Czech or Spanish. At this point, they probably thought their parents were crazy. Then the eldest son Pavel shouted: "I understand everything! After all, you are Russian spies! Apparently, he remembered how, in the not so distant 1951, he crossed the Chinese border with his parents, wandering waist-deep in snow. Subsequently, the children took a long time to get used to the new home, the Russian language, and even to their real surname.

After treatment and rest, the scouts returned to duty. Their merits were marked by high awards of the Motherland. Colonel Mikhail Ivanovich Filonenko became deputy head of a department in the Directorate of Illegal Intelligence. Anna Fedorovna, a major of the state security, also worked in the same department. By today's standards, they were still young, barely past forty years old.

Over the years of work in intelligence, Anna Filonenko was awarded the Order of the Red Star, two medals "For Military Merit", many other awards, as well as badges "Honored Worker of the NKVD" and "Honorary Officer of State Security". The military period of her life was also marked by several orders and medals.

In 1963, the Filonenkos retired.

In the early 70s, director Tatyana Lioznova began filming the famous television series Seventeen Moments of Spring. For its filming, experienced consultants were required. The leadership of the then KGB allocated Anna and Mikhail to help her. Sometimes Tatyana Lioznova, fascinated by the stories of illegal immigrants, stayed at their house well after midnight. She was interested in the experiences of spies, the psychology of the Western man in the street, and the smallest details of everyday life. Therefore, many episodes of this wonderful film were prompted by the Filonenko spouses. For example, the plot with the birth of a child. True, Anna, unlike the radio operator Kat, while giving birth to a daughter in Harbin, still did not shout in Russian. The director introduced this episode to enhance the dramaturgy of the plot.

Vyacheslav Tikhonov, who played the role of Colonel Stirlitz in the television series, also made friends with illegal immigrants. The Artist Who Created the Persuader

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ny image of the Soviet intelligence officer, borrowed a lot from Mikhail Ivanovich.

A veil of secrecy shrouded the illegal spies of the Filonenko spouses until the very end of their lives. Mikhail Ivanovich died in 1982. But Anna Fedorovna, who became the prototype of the radio operator Kat, survived her husband by sixteen years and died on June 18, 1998.

But the feat of the Filonenko family will not be forgotten. As long as there is Russia, its intelligence service will also live. New generations of secret service officers are coming, and the example of the legendary illegals becomes a guiding star for them. The rich experience of Soviet intelligence officers will serve them for a very long time.

for a long time.

After the death of the Filonenko spouses, the Foreign Intelligence Service declassified their names. Publications appeared in the Russian press revealing some episodes of their combat biography. However, the time has not yet come to talk about many specific cases of these foreign intelligence officers.

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In the land of blooming chrysanthemums

Her path to Japan ran through a third country, where the scout lived for many months. There, according to legend, she was the daughter of a wealthy Uighur who allegedly emigrated from Russia with his family even before the revolution. The birth certificate issued by a local mullah indicated in Arabic script that she was born in Chinese Turkestan. After "acclimatization", she flew to a neighboring country, where her fiancé was waiting for her. Four months later they registered a marriage. The newlyweds gradually moved closer to Japan, where they had to work during the Cold War. In the country of blooming chrysanthemums, Bir and Khalef (such were the operational pseudonyms of illegal intelligence agents) spent almost fourteen years.

She was preparing to become an actress. The Turkmen girl Bibiiran (Irina) Alimova, who was born in June 1920 in the city of Mary, was a second-year student at the workers' faculty in Ashgabat, when she was unexpectedly offered to act in films. And not just to act in mass scenes, but to become a professional film actress.

Irina's father, Karim Alimov, fought on the fronts of the Civil War. After graduation, he settled in his native city of Mary, in an adobe hut left over from his parents. Soon he started a family, he had three children. Karim-aga became a watchmaker and at the same time was engaged in the manufacture of jewelry. The fame of his skill went far beyond Mary, and in 1928, guests from the Persian consulate came to the house of a modest watchmaker whose family was barely making ends meet. They promised Karim a good job and offered to move to Tehran. However, he refused. Later, Karim and his family moved to Ashgabat, where Irina went to school. The beautiful girl willingly participated in amateur performances and from her school years she thought about devoting herself to the stage.

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But she did not go to the theater institute. After graduating from school, she entered the workers' faculty at the agricultural institute: Irina suddenly decided to become a veterinary surgeon. It was here that the employees of the Turkmenfilm studio drew attention to her and invited her to star in the film Umbar. This film was released a few years before the war. Irina played the role of Umbar's beloved in it. Fame came to her: the young actress was recognized on the street, numerous admirers wrote letters to her.

After her film debut, Irina Alimova was sent to study acting in Leningrad, in the group of the famous director G. Kozintsev. Later, Irina Karimovna recalled: "In Leningrad, I met many famous Soviet artists: Tamara Makarova, Yanina Zheimo, Zoya Fedorova, Yakov Sverdlin, Pyotr Aleinikov and prominent directors: Kheifits, Zarhi, Trauberg, Romm, Gerasimov. They praised and approved of me, saying that I had good prospects to become a real actress."

In 1939, Alimova completed her studies and was assigned to Tashkent, to the Uzbekfilm film studio, where she was promised the main role in a new Uzbek film. The young Soviet government carefully took care of the creation of national personnel in the Central Asian republics, including in the field of art. Before Irina, who was only nineteen years old, a brilliant prospect of a film actress opened up. However, fate decreed otherwise.

While preparations were underway for a new role in the cinema, the Great Patriotic War broke out. Irina, like thousands of other young people, went to the draft board with a request to send her to the front. This request was granted. True, Irina was sent not to the front, but to military censorship. So in the fall of 1941, she became an employee of the state security agencies. Irina served in military censorship throughout the war. Together with the active army, she marched along the military roads of Ukraine and Poland, where she met Victory in Krakow. Then she served in Czechoslovakia and Austria. After demobilization, she returned home to Ashgabat, where her aged parents were waiting for her. However, Alimova did not have to continue her pre-war career as a film actress. The family was in poverty, and Irina decided to temporarily work in the local counterintelligence, in the surveillance unit. Here she gained invaluable experience in secret surveillance of

objects, detecting surveillance and avoiding it, which was useful to her later when working abroad as an illegal intelligence officer.

At the beginning of 1947, Irina was suddenly summoned to Moscow, to the Lubyanka. In Ashgabat, she was warned not to say a word to anyone about this challenge. On the way to the gray building known throughout Moscow on Dzerzhinsky Square, Irina reflected on the reasons for such an unusual

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call. At the pass office on Kuznetsky Most, she was met by an employee of the department in which the future illegal intelligence officer was to work.

Handing her a pass, he escorted Irina to a spacious office. The owner of the office, Aleksandr Korotkov, himself a former illegal intelligence agent, offered her an easy chair and, after a conversation on general topics, said:

- How do you look at going to work in foreign intelligence? I mean that you have to conduct intelligence abroad from illegal positions, under a false name and as a foreigner. We understand that this is not a woman's business. It is difficult, dangerous, and the fulfillment of the tasks of the Center is sometimes associated with a considerable risk to life. You know what the international situation is like now: the Americans are openly threatening the Soviet Union, which suffered great losses in the Great Patriotic War, with a new war, this time an atomic one. We need to know the plans of the United States and need personnel for illegal work in order to be aware of the plans of a potential adversary. According to your data, you are suitable for work in illegal intelligence. However, you can refuse our offer: this matter is purely voluntary, and we will not claim against you. Think it over carefully, you have time.

She agreed without hesitation.

"I agree," Irina said after a few seconds of reflection.

Irina was well aware that such proposals are not made just like that. Apparently, "above" they studied her case well, made the appropriate inquiries. This was both disturbing (what did they dig up there?), and at the same time filled with pride. She was silent for a few seconds and, unexpectedly for everyone, suddenly asked:

- I heard that when our scouts return home, they are destroyed. This is true?

Alexander Korotkov and curator Irina Karimovna looked at each other.

— What kind of nonsense? Who told you such nonsense? You have to imagine...

Then, addressing an employee of his department, either approvingly or condemningly, he said:

Look how brave...

The Colonel did not palter, calling such statements nonsense. In the post-war period, repressions against foreign intelligence officers, who successfully fulfilled their duty during the war years, ceased. There were also no mass purges of state security organs, from which they suffered so much in the pre-war period. However, such statements were not encouraged in intelligence and could cause a lot of trouble for their authors.

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Fortunately, for Irina this conversation had no negative consequences.

Many years later, when Irina Karimovna's business trip abroad had already ended, she recalled with great warmth her first head of the Illegal Intelligence Department

Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov.

"He was a very determined man," the scout said. — In the pre-war years, Alexander Mikhailovich worked in Nazi Germany. He was directly related to the anti-fascist organization known as the Red Chapel.

To foreigners, he introduced himself as Alexander Erdberg. When the war began, Korotkov, at the risk of his life, left the Soviet embassy, already blocked by the SS, in order to hand over the radio station and communication conditions to the German anti-fascists for a "special period". He went from an electrician in the OGPU to one of the chiefs of foreign intelligence, became a general. For many years, Alexander Mikhailovich headed the illegal intelligence department, because he was a master of his craft. As a professional, he was unparalleled," emphasized Irina Karimovna.

He led the scouts, most of whom went through the war, were wounded, received government awards. In other words, adults who are quite experienced both professionally and purely in everyday life. Therefore, the demand from them was different than from the youth who came to intelligence after graduation. In cases of serious misses in the service, omissions, not to mention serious misconduct, he could make decisions both tough and tough. True, none of his subordinates took offense at him, because no one could remember that the general had imposed a penalty or even simply verbally reprimanded him for absolutely no reason.

What.

Despite the high official position he occupied, Alexander Mikhailovich did not avoid communication with ordinary intelligence officers. He could play volleyball with them, knock with dominoes, invite them to visit him ... And there was nothing ostentatious in this: any bureaucratic swagger was organically alien to him. It was for these qualities that he enjoyed unquestioned authority in the team. His sudden death was a great sorrow for

lecture".

However, let us return to the years of study of Irina Karimovna at the intelligence school. After a conversation with the head of the illegal intelligence department, painstaking preparation began for her to work abroad: learning foreign languages with personal teachers, getting used to the image of an emigrant, working out a biography legend. Suffice it to say that during the years of study Irina Karimovna mastered Turkish, Uyghur, Farsi, English and German.

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All these languages, especially Turkish, were very useful to her in her future illegal work.

The choice of Irina Alimova as an illegal intelligence agent was, of course, not accidental. A big role in this was played ... her profession as an actress.

A small digression on this matter.

The famous American intelligence officer and counterintelligence officer Charles Rossel, giving a course of lectures back in 1924 in New York to US Army reserve officers - intelligence officers, already at that time emphasized: "A good intelligence agent must be an excellent actor. How you play your part will determine not only the success of your cause, but also the lives of many comrades. You must not only own your feelings, but also facial expressions. Never let your tongue say one thing and your eyes another. Be vigilant, do not forget about your role.

These instructions of the specialist are relevant to this day. It is well known that any intelligence officer, especially an illegal one, has to play many roles in life. Irina's training as an illegal intelligence agent lasted several years. The personal teachers assigned to her, native speakers of the languages she was to master, "trained" the future scout for ten to twelve hours a day.

At first, she actively studied German, as she was being prepared for work in Austria. For an in-depth study of the language, the future intelligence officer was sent to the German Democratic Republic. According to the legend, she, a Turkish woman, often traveled to Leipzig, where she allegedly searched for her relatives. To confirm this legend, she also studied Turkish and Persian. However, Irina's legend soon changed again. She began to prepare for work in Japan. The training system has also changed.

Irina had to master not just, let's say, English, but precisely that dialect of it, which is spoken by the inhabitants of "her homeland". But Irina studied not only languages. She needed to get used to the role, learn how people communicate in the country from which she allegedly came from, what and how they eat, how they behave at the table, what the representatives of her circle dress in, what relationships exist in different social strata. In preparation, its legend was taken into account. In accordance with it, Irina came from a family of Uighurs who emigrated from Russia to Chinese Turkestan before the revolution. The family permanently resided in Kashgar. Therefore, she needed to get used to the role of the daughter of Uyghur emigrants. Only after the legend of Irina was fully worked out, it was decided to send her to Japan.

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This decision was not spontaneous. Circumstances developed in such a way that by 1953 in this large Asian country there was no residency of our foreign intelligence, and the Soviet leadership needed reliable information about the processes taking place in it, about Japan's relations with other countries. However, the absence of diplomatic relations with Japan did not allow the creation of a "legal" residency there. The fact is that on July 26, 1945, the Big Three conference in Potsdam published a special declaration on Japan, which contained a demand for Tokyo's unconditional surrender. The document stated that "the power and influence of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan, forcing them to follow the path of world conquest, should be forever eliminated, and "irresponsible militarism" should be eliminated. The declaration confirmed that "the conditions of the Cairo Declaration on the limitation of Japanese sovereignty over the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and over those smaller ones "which we shall indicate" must be fulfilled.

The declaration noted that in order to achieve these goals, it is necessary to occupy Japan, but "the occupying Allied forces will be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these goals are achieved and as soon as a peacefully minded responsible government is established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. ". It should be noted that these goals were achieved by the Allies as early as the 1950s, but the American occupation of Japan continues to this day.

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union, true to the commitments made at the Potsdam Conference, declared war on militaristic Japan. On August 9, the Soviet Army began military operations in Manchuria against the million-strong Kwantung Army. Five days later, on August 14, this army capitulated. On September 2, 1945, aboard the USS Missouri, the Japanese delegation signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. The Soviet side at the signing of the act was represented by Lieutenant General Derevyanko.

At a conference in San Francisco, the parameters of the post-war structure of Japan were determined. This country was occupied by American troops under the command of General MacArthur. According to the agreement reached in December 1945 in London, the Allied Council and the Far East Commission were to monitor Japan's compliance with the terms of surrender. However, the actual power in the country belonged to the commander of the American occupation corps, General MacArthur. Soviet foreign intelligence worked in Japan under the cover of the Soviet part of the Allied Council and the Far Eastern Commission, but in 1950, in connection with the war in Korea, the activities of the Soviet part

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these organizations ceased and intelligence lost its legal cover. The Center decided to work in Japan from an illegal position.

Shamil Abdullazyanovich Khamzin was to become one of these illegal intelligence agents.

From the operational information on Sh.A. Khamzina: "I was born in 1915 in Arkhangelsk, in a Tatar family. In 1923 the family moved to Kazan, where Khamzin went to high school. After leaving school, he entered the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute named after V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin) at the Faculty of Instrumentation. Theme of the thesis: "Control of torpedo boats from an aircraft by radio". Just before the start of World War II, he received a diploma in electrical engineering. He worked at a military plant in Moscow, where he was accepted into the party. In 1946, Khamzin was offered to go to work in the NKGB, in one of the foreign intelligence units. Graduated from a special intelligence school. He is fluent in Uighur, Turkish, Arabic, English and Romanian, not counting his native Tatar and Russian."

A professional intelligence officer, a Tatar by nationality, Khalef (this was the operational pseudonym of Shamil Khamzin) could easily impersonate an Arab. In addition, he was fluent in Arabic. That is why, immediately after appropriate training, he began to actively work from illegal positions in the Middle East. However, the Center soon decided to gradually withdraw the intelligence officer to Japan, where he was to organize and lead the work of the illegal residency.

In 1952, Khalef disguised himself as the Uighur Enver Sadyk arrived in the Chinese province of Tianjin. He quickly entered the local Muslim community, became one of its leaders and even an assistant to the mullah. In the future, Irina Alimova was supposed to join Khalef in China, who was to impersonate his bride. In Japan, they needed to settle down as a respectable immigrant couple.

..The road to the country of blooming chrysanthemums began for Irina in 1953 with a trip to Europe. During that trip, no reconnaissance missions were assigned to her: Irina had only to check the reliability of her new documents, to get used to the appearance of a foreigner. In the autumn of the same year, having successfully completed the tasks assigned to her, Irina returned to Moscow. She was given a short leave to visit relatives who lived in Ashgabat.

And at the very beginning of 1955, a young intelligence officer, who was assigned the operational pseudonym Bir, left for her main business trip.

The journey to Japan was not easy. First, it was necessary to enter a third country, where they had to live for several months under the name Gyu

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Only after making sure that her stay there did not attract the attention of local special services, Bir should have changed her documents and, under the appropriate legend, went to the east of China, ostensibly to meet her fiancé, also "the son of emigrants from Russia," who, while living there, ran a small business in neighboring Mongolia and then decided to emigrate from the country. Beer went to him in order to marry.

Arriving in Turkey, Bir stayed there for several months to get comfortable. After it became clear that the situation around her remained normal, Bir flew by plane to the Chinese city of Urumqi, where local Muslims lived compactly.

Here Bir finalized her legend, according to which she was the daughter of a wealthy Uyghur merchant, about to marry a native of her hometown, a Uyghur named Enver Sadiq, to whom she was allegedly engaged earlier.

Convinced that the legend “works” and the situation around her remains calm, Bir, in accordance with the plan developed at the Center, went by train to her fiancé, whom she knew only from a photograph. Their meeting was to take place at the station of the Chinese port city of Tianjin, which was the “sea gate” of the Chinese capital Beijing. Beer's future husband came to the station for several days in a row to meet her, but in vain. On the day of the intelligence officer's arrival, he also arrived at the station, but was told at the information desk that there would be no train from Beijing, and he left. In fact, the Beijing train was very late, and the scouts could not meet.

At two o'clock in the morning, Beer found herself alone on the platform of the railway station of an unfamiliar city. Convinced that no one was meeting her, the scout decided to go to the hotel, but then she felt the policeman's gaze on her. Nearby in the square was a rickshaw with a wagon, waiting for passengers. Irina called him with a gesture of her hand. The policeman also moved towards her. When the law enforcement officer approached her, Bir said in Uighur:

“Something is dark in here. It would not hurt to improve the lighting of the area.

Hearing the familiar speech, the policeman, who also happened to be a Uyghur, smiled at Bir and saluted her. And she handed the things to the rickshaw and casually said:

— To the central hotel.

In the hotel, she managed to get a private room without any problems, if you can call it a room, the doors of which did not have constipation. Bir, without undressing, sat on the bed and patiently waited for the dawn. Noisy voices, shouts, singing could be heard from neighboring rooms: apparently, the tipsy company was celebrating some event.

At five in the morning, a man dressed in underwear entered the room. He silently went to the stove in the corner of the room.

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and started melting it down. Having done his job, he silently left. Beer didn't say a word. Later, she learned that her behavior was correct: it was the stoker of the hotel, taking turns lighting the stoves in the rooms, and any conversations with him would be inappropriate.

The next day, Beer met her fiancé in a back-up in the city, near a department store. Four months later they got married. Each of the newlyweds left their last name, although for those around them they were Enver and Khatycha Sadyk.

It should be emphasized that already at the first meeting, Bir and Khalef liked each other. Looking ahead, we note that for the entire long period of their stay in Japan, they, who created a married couple at the will of the Center, lived together and happily. Their family life continued even after their retirement.

Now the scouts faced the most difficult stage of fulfilling the task of the Center - the spouses of illegal immigrants had to go to Japan, where they were to work. However, after the war, Japan was under the de facto occupation of the United States, and it was extremely difficult for foreigners to obtain permanent residence permits there.

The newly-married couple proved to be cordial and hospitable hosts. Their big house in the Dutch settlement of Tianjin was always full of Muslim emigrants (let's not forget that Khalef was once an assistant to the mullah). This hospitality and charity created an excellent reputation for the married couple. Here, fortunately, one of their good friends, who owned a plot of land in Japan the size of three acres, offered, and then sold her plot to the Sadyk spouses. This circumstance greatly simplified their move to Japan. The scouts were also helped by letters of recommendation they had stored up in advance from a number of Japanese public figures, with whom they managed to

get to know each other, as well as letters from religious organizations. The deal to acquire a plot of land in Japan went through, and the couple left for Hong Kong.

Here they turned to the American Red Cross mission with a request to help them move to Japan, where they have landed property. The mission staff, after making inquiries, gave recommendations to the spouses, who, in turn, under their patronage, applied to the Consulate General of Japan and presented letters of recommendation and documents for the land plot. This gave them the right to obtain a temporary residence permit, which had to be renewed every year.

Settling in Hong Kong, then a British colony, Bir and Khalef rented a two-story house and opened a haberdashery shop in it. At first, the business of the "merchants" did not go very well: lack of experience affected. Beer, however, took up embroidery and set up the production of collars, which at that time were in fashion and were in demand. For an institution

useful knowledge

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comm, a married couple of illegal aliens regularly visited the local American club. Beer also signed up for a women's club.

A year and a half later, the intelligence officers, using the connections that had appeared, received, as Uyghur refugees from China, citizenship of Taiwan and passports with which they could travel around the world.

Everything worked out pretty well. However, Beer and Khalef soon noticed that they were under close scrutiny from British counterintelligence. Its agents appeared at various times of the day near the house of illegal immigrants, entered the house under far-fetched pretexts when the spouses were absent, and questioned the servants about their lifestyle, habits, and acquaintances. This seriously alarmed the intelligence officers, who were lost in conjecture about the increased attention to them from the local special services. Fortunately, the solution quickly became clear. It turned out that one of the emigrants from Russia, a man with a dark past, took a dislike to them and began to openly say in the club that they were not the people they claimed to be. Upon learning of this, Beer went to the Taiwanese embassy and asked to protect their family from the insults of the White Guard emigrant. This step brought results: surveillance of them noticeably weakened, and soon stopped altogether.

In the autumn of 1954, Beer and Khalef left Hong Kong for Japan under the guise of food vendors. They followed through the Japanese port of Kobe, located on the west coast of the country. When crossing the border, the scouts used Taiwanese passports.

Until 1945, Taiwan was a Japanese colony. As a result of the unconditional surrender of the Japanese military in September 1945, the colonial status of this island was canceled. However, thousands of people remained outside Japan, who had Japanese and Taiwanese passports and intended to return to the "Yamato country". A more liberal entry regime was established for them compared to citizens of other countries. Bir and Khalef took advantage of this.

Before leaving for the country of their intelligence activities, the illegals met with a representative of the Center, who gave them the last instructions and instructions. He said:

"We lost contact with all agents in Japan. Information on the problems of this country has not been received by Moscow for several years now. For a while, you will be the only sources of information there. There are high hopes for you.

Arriving in Japan, the Sadyk couple settled for some time in the port city of Kobe. They sold for a decent amount a piece of land that belonged to them and bought a small two-story house with the proceeds. They occupied the first floor themselves, and rented the second floor to two Americans.

Having passed the "acclimatization period", Khalef and Bir moved to Tokyo, where they became partners in one of the export-import

firms. They bought a two-story house and opened their own shop on the ground floor. The firm and the store were a reliable cover for the spouses in their intelligence activities.

The illegals were assigned the following main intelligence tasks: to collect information on the rearmament of Japan, to observe the process of formation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the development of bilateral relations with the United States in the military field. In one of the Center's codes, they were specified as follows:

"The following issues should be the subject of special interest in the near future:

1. Relations between Japan and the USA: how close they are, in what direction they will develop in the future.
2. Japanese policy towards the USSR.
3. How strong are the tendencies of the militarization of the economy and the reconstruction of the army: its structure, funding, weapons, possible plans for joint exercises and military operations with the United States.

Soon the scouts began to carry out the tasks of the Center.

Considering that Moscow was primarily interested in the US plans to remilitarize Japan and draw it into military blocs, they focused their attention on this problem. Thus, Beer reported to the Center that in Japan, under the guise of creating self-defense forces, an intensive increase in the army began:

"Under the guise of creating new police units in Japan, an intensive increase in the army began. Plans for the militarization of Japan are kept in deep secrecy, because this is a serious violation of Tokyo's obligations to demilitarize the country during the international conference in San Francisco. In the coming years, it is planned in this way to double the size of the Japanese army. The government of the country signed secret contracts for the development of the military industry. The local press is prohibited from publishing any information on this issue."

Such reports were of exceptional importance, since at that time very little was known to Moscow about the militarization of Japan.

Beer primarily performed the duties of a radio operator-coder of an illegal residency. However, this rather voluminous work did not free her from the need to periodically solve specific reconnaissance tasks of the Center. At the same time, Bir was actively studying promising candidates for recruitment, kept in touch with agents - sources of information, processed intelligence information received by the residency, and prepared operational letters to the Center.

In 1955 she radioed to the Center:

"It became known that a new type of submarine equipped with the latest equipment was launched in secrecy."

The intelligence officers were able to obtain this information thanks to their acquaintance with an American soldier of Turkish origin. At the same time, the "trading company" of the Sadyk spouses became a "second home" for Turkish military personnel who arrived in Japan on vacation.

During the Korean War, a contingent of Turkish troops was stationed on the Korean Peninsula under the UN flag. After the signing of the armistice agreement in Korea in 1953, these

military personnel joined the UN peacekeeping contingent. Bir and Halef were fluent in Turkish, so it is not surprising that the Turkish military showed interest in them.

By inviting Turkish officers to visit them, the illegal intelligence officers received information from them that Moscow was interested in. To establish useful contacts and obtain important information about the actions of US troops in South Korea, Beer also used a public women's club, in which the wives of foreign diplomats and officers gathered over a cup of tea.

In most cases, the scouts rechecked the oral information received in this way visually. One day they were returning home at night in a heavy downpour along a rural road that passed through a mountainous area. Suddenly, around the corner, they saw that the road was washed out. Khalef tried to slow down, but it was too late. The car did not obey the brakes and slowly slid down the slope.

- Jump! Halef ordered.

"First, jump yourself, you are more needed," Bir objected.

- Jump! Halef shouted with all his might, trying to cope with the naughty steering wheel.

Beer opened the car door and, placing both feet on the threshold, pushed off sharply. Following her, her husband managed to jump out of the car that had lost control. Fortunately, the illegal scouts escaped with minor bruises, and the car was kept by a tree growing just below.

The couple spent the night in the nearest village, and in the morning of the next day the car was pulled out of the ravine by a tractor they called. Leaving the car for repair at a nearby workshop, the couple rented another car and drove it to Tokyo. The task of the Center was completed on time and without serious losses.

There were other similar cases in their intelligence practice. Once a car driven by Khalef collided with an oncoming car. Khalef suffered a leg injury and was unable to walk. And that evening, he was to lay a container with materials intended for the Center in a hiding place.

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Bir volunteered to stand in for her husband on this reconnaissance mission.

— And how will you go alone, late at night, to a remote urban area, where even during the day it is difficult to make sense of the labyrinth of streets? - he asked.

"There is no other way out: we can't disrupt the operation," she objected calmly. "Nothing, I'll figure it out somehow, everything will be fine."

Bir successfully completed the task. She reached the desired area around midnight. Homeless people were sleeping near the public transport stop, climbing into cardboard boxes, and she had to walk to the hiding place, stepping over their protruding legs. Passers-by at night tried to avoid this troubled quarter. It was this that gave a chance that the laying of the cache would remain invisible and would not attract the attention of strangers.

Soon another important telegram, signed by the short pseudonym of the intelligence officer, leaves for the Center:

"A well-informed source reports plans for the creation by the Americans of a new closed military-political grouping, which could include Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, New Zealand and Australia.

Negotiations may take place in Seoul or Bangkok. The creation of such a grouping will be a serious destabilizing factor in Southeast Asia.”

It was information, as they say, ahead of the curve. The subsequent development of events fully confirmed the information of the scouts. At the founding conference, which was held on June 14-16, 1966 in Seoul (South Korea) and in which the foreign ministers of the countries listed in the telegram took part, a new military-political grouping closely associated with the United States was created - the Asia-Pacific council (AZPAK).

Bir and Khalef had many successful intelligence operations to their credit. Suffice it to say that their operational file consists of twenty-two volumes with a total volume of over seven thousand pages! It contains intelligence reports received by the Lubyanka during more than thirteen years of their illegal work in Japan.

From the documents of Bir and Khalef's correspondence with the Center, it follows that one of the major achievements of the intelligence officers was their acquisition of aerial photographs of US military bases in Japan, locations of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and their military airfields. All this information, given to illegals by a reliable source, received the highest appraisal from the Center, because at that time Moscow did not have a clear idea about Tokyo's military programs and the degree of their threat to the Soviet Union.

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There were other cases when intelligence officers received extremely important documentary information, numbering more than a dozen pages. Documents were urgently photographed and handed over in undeveloped film to the Center's courier. Beer later recalled how her husband fell ill, and she had to meet with a contact late at night in the area of the imperial park. It was dark, it was scary to go there, besides, I had to get to the meeting on foot.

On the way to the meeting place, Beer had only one question: what to do with the material if something unforeseen happens? For example, the police will stop and check the documents. However, everything went well: Bir did not find herself being followed, the messenger arrived at the meeting place at exactly the appointed time. He took the documents and thanked the scouts for successfully completed task.

During the entire stay in Japan, Bir and Khalef were on vacation in their homeland only once. This journey to Moscow took a long time. In order to throw off the enemy intelligence services, the scouts went to Europe as tourists, visited the sights of France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland... Since the people of Japan are world leaders in tourism and love to travel around the world, such a trip - illegal immigrants did not attract the attention of special services. They arrived in the Soviet Union secretly, through a neutral country. And they flew from Moscow to their native Ashgabat quite legally, with Soviet documents.

It seemed to the scouts that the vacation flew by like one day. They reached Japan again through Western Europe. Then they told acquaintances and friends for a long time about the beauties of Venice, the cathedrals of Rome, the sights of the “capital of the world” Paris...

The daily hard work began again. Even at home, left alone, they could not relax and remember Moscow. And at home, illegal intelligence officers spoke only Uyghur.

“Once we went to the cinema to see a Soviet film,” Irina Karimovna later recalled. “It was only in the middle of the film that I noticed that, while perfectly understanding the Russian language, I still conscientiously read the captions in Japanese and perceive it from these captions.”

Although there was no surveillance of the scouts, they were constantly on the alert. Once on a trip to Japan, they stayed at a hotel and decided to do a little experiment. They put the telephone on the sofa and, as if by accident, covered it with a pillow. Some time later in

There was a polite knock on the door of the room, a young man came in, introduced himself as a telephone operator, and, apologizing, said that he wanted to check how the telephone set worked.

Hard work took a toll on Bir's health. And now, after a long stay in the country of flowering chrysanthemums, the scouts

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The Germans received a long-awaited telegram from the Center, which announced that they could soon return to their homeland.

The way of the spouses to Moscow again lay through Europe. Bir and Khalef left quietly, with one suitcase. For acquaintances, it was an ordinary business trip related to the affairs of their trading house. In the hot summer of 1966, they were met by a representative of illegal intelligence at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport, who congratulated the spouses on the successful completion of a business trip.

Major Alimova retired in 1967. Her husband, Khamzin Shamil Abdullazyanovich, repeatedly went on business trips abroad to carry out special tasks of the Center, including re-establishing contact with valuable sources in countries with a difficult operational situation. From him, the Center received the most important information about the creation of "first-strike weapons" in NATO countries. He also received information about secret work on the creation of atomic weapons in those countries that did not have them. In total, Sh.A. Khamzin spent more than twenty years in illegal work in various countries. In 1980 he retired with the rank of colonel. In 1991 he died.

For the successful completion of special tasks, Major Alimova was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 2nd degree and the Red Star, the medal "For Military Merit". Her husband, Colonel Khamzin, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Banner of Labor, as well as the Medal for Military Merit.

During one of the conversations with General V.G. Pavlov, who at one time was her immediate supervisor at the Center, Irina Karimovna emphasized:

"All my life I played a very difficult role, only without dubbing and prompters. It was impossible to make a mistake - a huge country stood behind us, which should not have suffered because of our failures.

Khalef and I devoted ourselves to our work as scouts with abandon. As for difficulties and nervous tension, there were many. But after all, in any other profession there are more than enough of them, their own difficulties.

And now I can say with confidence that if I had to live again, I would again choose the old path.

Having retired, Irina Karimovna does not stop her active social work. She meets with young scouts, journalists, writers. Recently, Irina Alimova, an illegal intelligence agent, became the subject of a television documentary film "Voices from the Silence," in which she shared her memories of working in Japan.

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Russian intelligence at the turn of the century

(material published in the 6th newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" on December 21, 1993)

In today's society, there are quite a few organizations that collect information. This is done by journalists, commercial structures, political

parties, scientific institutions, etc. Intelligence differs from all of them in that it works only for the leadership of its country and obtains secret information of foreign origin.

In the post-confrontation world, intelligence, in our deep conviction, should be a tool for ensuring stability. It makes it possible to eliminate the unpredictability of the political course of certain countries. Helps the leaders of his country to develop an optimal course that takes into account the legitimate interests of other states. If intelligence comes to the conclusion that this or that leader is unpredictable, then this is also an important result of its activity, since it obliges the political leadership of its country to act on the basis of the worst-case scenario.

Intelligence should be the first to catch signs of the maturing of conflict and crisis situations. Often, it can also serve as a confidential channel for conflict resolution. Finally, intelligence provides, by its special means, unofficial control over the observance of treaties, makes sure that the partners, by their intentional or unintentional actions, do not harm her country, so that they cannot acquire some new quality unnoticed by others, achieve a technological breakthrough that disrupts the balance of power and thereby destabilizes the situation.

Perhaps the most serious, although less noticeable to the general public, changes in the activities of Russian intelligence in recent years have occurred in its doctrinal guidelines. First of all, we are talking about the category of the enemy as an object of reconnaissance activities.

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Historically, foreign intelligence in the Soviet era has always been one of the instruments of ideological struggle in the international arena. In the first post-revolutionary years, its opponents, of course, were foreign anti-Soviet formations, the basis of which was white emigration. Later, the anti-Stalinist opposition of the social democratic and Trotskyist persuasion was added to them.

The establishment of a fascist regime in Germany and the growth of Japan's aggressive aspirations in the Far East created a new and very real threat to the very existence of our state. Hence, it is quite natural that in the 1930s, the Soviet foreign intelligence had a new powerful enemy in the face of Nazi Germany, as well as those who supported it or could support it in the future.

The victory of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II, unfortunately, meant the end of the coalition itself. Now it is hardly worth going into an analysis of the root causes of the Cold War - whether it was the West's fear of the spread of communism in Western Europe or the war-ravaged Soviet Union's fear of a new, nuclear threat, but for intelligence agencies on both sides of the Iron Curtain, this meant the emergence of formidable new opponents.

Now the situation has changed. In the conditions of today's realities, we abandoned the previous approach, when intelligence activities were built on the basis of the existing "gallery" of opponents. Now we must take our national-state interests as a starting point.

In the open society to which we aspire, it is no longer possible to single out any countries or groups of countries as their opponents. But if someone sets as their goal the violation of the state sovereignty of our country or infringes on the principles of the world order enshrined in international law, which we adhere to, then they, naturally, can become our opponents. As for ordinary intelligence activities, it is important to remain professional and not get carried away with propaganda. We reserve the right to conduct reconnaissance and obtain secret information, as others are doing it in the most active way in relation to Russia.

The changes that have taken place in the world in recent years have changed not only some of the doctrinal provisions of individual intelligence services, but also the intelligence services themselves, as well as the relationship between them.

It does not at all follow from this that all the connections and relations that existed between the intelligence services until recently have suddenly lost their force. Where they were based on truly common interests, they survived. Getting rid of these relations from an unjustified ideological burden only benefited them. In addition, the process of establishing new contacts

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between intelligence services, the search for common ground and ways of interaction.

In our opinion, the improvement of the international legal framework, the enhancement of the role of international organizations that unite most countries of the world on a non-bloc basis, create good prerequisites for strengthening and expanding the interaction of intelligence services. It is unlikely that intelligence will go to the establishment of an international organization of the Interpol type, but the desire of the special services to jointly fight the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, the drug business, the illegal movement of capital and organized crime undoubtedly deserves approval and support. . In all these areas, Russian intelligence is already cooperating with a number of special services, including the intelligence agencies of NATO countries. This interaction and cooperation, we hope, will develop in the future.

We proceed from the fact that intelligence in its classical form will exist for a very long time. The new situation will inevitably pose new challenges for her. Some of them will require new methods and means. The "rules of the game" that now guide the intelligence services of civilized states will be improved. But the main mission of intelligence - obtaining secret information in the interests of one's state - will be preserved. In this regard, it seems illogical to us that some Western states appeal to Russia to stop conducting intelligence. Such a refusal is possible only on a mutual, and even better - on a global basis. Hypothetically, it would look like this: the whole world without intelligence. But at this stage of historical development, this is an unattainable goal. Regardless of the growth in the degree of trust, intelligence is now needed.

Until 1991, our foreign intelligence service was part of the KGB system, which created the preconditions for its use not for its intended purpose. In the fall of 1991, the Foreign Intelligence Service was separated into an independent organization, which is focused exclusively on work in the external sphere.

In July 1992, for the first time in the history of our country, the Law of the Russian Federation "On Foreign Intelligence" was adopted, which formulated the principles of conducting intelligence activities, outlined the range of means and methods used, determined the place of the Foreign Intelligence Service in the system of state bodies and the procedure for its relationships with other organizations and institutions of the Russian state and society.

What are the tasks of foreign intelligence? If we formulate the main idea in one phrase, then we can say that intelligence is designed to help ensure the national security of the country, its national-state interests. Such a questioning

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sa reflects the actual long-term strategy. Another thing is that Russia's national interests have so far been outlined only in the most general form.

As a result of positive changes in the world, the threat of a world nuclear missile war and a large-scale military conflict has decreased today, however, the potential military danger has not been completely eliminated. There is, moreover, the possibility of creating new types of weapons. It is also impossible not to take into account the possibility of mastering weapons of mass destruction by those regimes that are pursuing an expansionist course or have

territorial claims against other states. It is impossible not to notice local conflicts along the perimeter of the CIS, in which Russia may be drawn into.

Under these conditions, today the task of obtaining information that contributes to maintaining the defense capability of Russia, ensuring its economic security, as well as information about such achievements in the field of the latest technology and technology that can be of vital importance for our country remains relevant today.

The competence of intelligence does not include the development of directions for foreign or domestic policy, the adoption of independent decisions regarding what corresponds and what does not correspond to the national interests of the state. Intelligence serves the legal, constitutional structures of the state - both executive and legislative authorities.

Foreign intelligence is an integral element of the overall system for ensuring the national security of Russia, along with law enforcement agencies. At the same time, the law on intelligence clearly defines the scope of powers of foreign intelligence agencies, beyond which it has no right to act. Intelligence, in particular, is not a law enforcement agency and does not have the powers of such agencies. The supreme authorities of Russia entrusted intelligence with the functions of countering international terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, control over the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but only in terms of intelligence support for this work. Foreign intelligence does not have any authority to legally or criminally prosecute citizens.

Without going into a detailed enumeration of specific means and methods used by intelligence, we can say that they are basically similar to those used in their activities by all special services of modern states. I would only like to emphasize that in Russia the intelligence service is prohibited from using inhumane methods and carrying out actions that harm the rights and freedoms of the individual.

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It is very important for us, as intelligence officers, to clearly work out the question of how intelligence activities are managed and controlled. We are convinced that control over intelligence activities by the legislative and executive authorities is essential. The control exercised, of course, without prejudice to the security of intelligence activities, is designed to guarantee the use of intelligence to ensure precisely the national interests of the country, to exclude all kinds of abuses on the part of individual officials, to give full legality to our actions. A properly set control system also creates a feedback between the intelligence and the executive power, gives us the opportunity to better navigate in relation to the needs for intelligence products, and representatives of the highest authorities to get a more complete and correct idea of the nature of intelligence activities and their needs. .

The Law "On Foreign Intelligence" clearly defines the competence of state bodies in matters of intelligence management.

The law provides that the president of Russia determines the strategy of intelligence work, exercises control and coordination of the activities of the intelligence agencies of Russia. Its prerogative is also the appointment of heads of foreign intelligence agencies.

The practice of subordinating foreign intelligence directly to the president has fully justified itself in recent years.

Only with this option can an objective report to the president of the most important and reliable information be guaranteed, since when intelligence enters other structures or is subordinate to any coordinating bodies, attempts will inevitably be made to "correct" intelligence information. This is evidenced by both our own and world

experience.

It goes without saying that the objectivity of intelligence information messages, as well as its successful activity in general, is ensured both by reliable sources and by constant business contacts with other state structures, primarily with the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Defense and its Main Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

To a certain extent, the relationship of intelligence with the media and the public can also be attributed to the issues of control.

The development of democratic processes in Russia objectively contributed to greater openness and transparency in the activities of all state institutions of the country, including its foreign intelligence. A special service has been created in the structure of the Foreign Intelligence Service - the Bureau for Public Relations and the Mass Media,

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designated to inform the public about intelligence activities.

As for publications on intelligence, in our country there is no censorship for any kind of publications. However, if the mass media use materials that lead to the disclosure of information constituting a state secret or recognized as secret, then this entails the liability of the publisher established by law. In order to avoid such situations, it is possible for the publisher to send intelligence materials prepared by him for an expert opinion to the Foreign Intelligence Service

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Intelligence in the modern world

(from the speech of the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service E.M. Primakov on October 14, 1992 at the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University)

First, a few words about the "modern world". A whole period in history, which is usually called the Cold War, has ended. The confrontational model of interstate relations has disappeared, or rather, is disappearing. I would like to emphasize the static nature of this model. The main opponents and main allies in it were determined on the basis of ideological considerations. The configuration of the camp of the main enemy and the states surrounding it did not change. As a rule, the configuration of the Allied camp, in which the states were enrolled for ideological reasons and on which the former Soviet Union counted in its policy, did not change either. Such a bipolar system has ceased to exist - and this is good.

But let's look at this new world from the point of view of national interests. First, it would be clearly premature to say that all threats to the security of Russia and to the security of other states have disappeared. On the other hand, after this static system has collapsed, the national interests of all states come to the fore. In the old over-ideologized model, they were often sacrificed either for helping their permanent allies or for fighting their permanent adversaries. Now, the national interest comes to the fore.

About threats. What threats and dangers exist in the modified world? I would like to dwell on this in some detail, because without such an understanding it is difficult to imagine what intelligence should be doing in modern conditions.

At the global level, the threat is not as contrasting as it used to be. It has become vague, and the possibility of a global clash with the use of thermonuclear weapons (say, between Russia and some other country, and even more so between Russia and the United States) has approached practically zero. But at the same time, a paradoxical situation arose: after

As we moved away from the bipolar world, control over the development of regional situations has weakened. Take, for example, Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, the division of Czechoslovakia, the emergence of new borders. And let's not close our eyes, these borders are not guaranteed by the world community now. Reality came into conflict with the Helsinki Accords. Ethnic conflicts emerged. It's the same in the third world.

When everything was viewed through the prism of a collision between two supergiants, it was possible to contain and localize some conflicts. In any case, there has been a desire to provide some kind of conflict management so that they do not go global and do not spur a global clash. Now, when there is no such barrier, conflict situations are developing quite rapidly, which is dangerous. Their development is reinforced by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to intelligence data, 30 states can be classified as threshold or sub-threshold in terms of nuclear weapons. There is a set of criteria by which these states can be determined. Moreover, many such states are in the sphere of conflict situations.

Additional threats to Russia arise as a result of the development of destabilizing processes in the so-called near abroad. For example, the events in Tajikistan. After all, they are not limited to the struggle of clans, although the struggle of clans is the main content of events, as it seems to me, but it is also pressure from Afghanistan, and pressure in different directions. This is pressure from other states. Moreover, there is pressure on the Afghan-Tajik border, which is currently the Russian border, because we have no other border that fences off Central Asia from Russia.

If the previously mentioned pressure is "successful" even after the border is broken, then in general there is a threat of a greater development of fundamentalist moments, extremist-fundamentalist tendencies, currents in the near abroad, in the underbelly of Russia.

Problems with the Russian-speaking population, whose number in different countries is almost 26 million people. It's good that everything is fine in Ukraine and Belarus so far. But in other countries, there is already a real threat to the Russian-speaking population. In addition, if we talk about the near abroad, it is quite clear that the impulses that come from there, penetrating the territory of Russia, create separatist sentiments and threaten the territorial integrity of the Russian state. All this suggests that the world has not become safe. The world has not become a world without threats.

At the same time, in the modern world, power security techniques are receding into the background, although they retain their function.

monstrous value, and in critical situations - the possibility of their application. But, I repeat, forceful methods are weakening as a factor in maintaining security and, in general, are not so fashionable now. And under these conditions, intelligence becomes even more important than before, which helps to find out the intentions of this or that state, helps to protect the interests of Russia.

In what field? For example, it is important for the political leadership of Russia to know at what stage other countries are developing critical technologies that can lead to a breakthrough in one area or another, lead to the creation of destabilizing weapons systems. This is not only we want to know, but also other states. The intelligence of many countries of the world is engaged in this issue.

A large area is the political intentions of this or that state, the possibility of infringement of Russia's interests by someone else. The latter consists in stabilizing the situation in our near abroad and in other regions of the world. That is, we do not have destructive interests. We now need good international conditions that will help overcome the extraordinary difficulties in the domestic political, economic and social fields. Therefore, everything is now aimed at creating these stable conditions. And if something counteracts the creation of stability, then this, of course, is tracked by intelligence and reported to the political leadership. Intelligence is obliged to bring the political leadership up to date even in the event of the creation of some kind of coalitions between groups of countries.

Intelligence helps to protect the interests of Russia in the economic field, where the intelligence services of various states work. We are talking, for example, about checking the real positions of this or that state that has signed an economic agreement, on checking how the important points of these agreements are being implemented, on checking partners for our state organizations. To be honest, now we are faced with a situation where firms have appeared that have practically nothing for their souls, but pretend to be real partners, trying to win something for themselves unilaterally.

It must be said that intelligence employs people who are not only engaged in the extraction of relevant information, but also analyze it, are able to draw conclusions from it, conduct situational analyzes in which they express different points of view, often diametrically opposed. There is absolute freedom in expressing this or that point of view. Then everything is summed up, crystallized into certain intelligence approaches to certain problems, certain phenomena, processes in the modern world.

About intelligence personnel. In operational work, people, in general, are all with higher education, many with academic degrees. We are very

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maybe the recently passed Intelligence Act. For the first time in history, a law was adopted that provided a legal basis for intelligence activities and protected the rights of intelligence officers.

We are often under attack from certain foreign circles, and our press sometimes speaks unfairly about us. Of course, we had dark pages in the past, but there were perhaps fewer of them in intelligence than in other organizations. Not being a law enforcement agency in itself, intelligence was part of a law enforcement agency almost until October last year. Now everything is in place. Intelligence detached from the KGB. Foreign intelligence exists as an independent organization, which is called upon to facilitate the adoption of foreign policy decisions at a high level, providing relevant information for this.

I said that we are sometimes criticized for nothing. For example, it has become customary to reproach intelligence with espionage, as if we invented this ancient profession and are engaged in it alone. But intelligence exists in all countries that are more or less on their feet, acquiring some weight in the world plan. Intelligence is an essential part of the state mechanism. I do not know of any, and after a year as head of this service, I can say with all certainty, the states of the world, pursuing a more or less significant policy in the international arena, which does not conduct intelligence work to help implement this policy.

We have often been judged and continue to be judged by the past. This is not true, although even in the past, not everything can be shown in dark colors in intelligence. The writing of our past is not dominated by these dark colors. Intelligence suffered greatly during the repressions - we practically swept away all the residencies abroad, and in the central apparatus the vast majority of people were repressed and stopped working in intelligence. So, in percentage terms, perhaps there was not a single other organization, not a single part of the state mechanism, which would have suffered during the totalitarian manifestations of previous years in such a way as

intelligence service. At the same time, we are now working, of course, in a completely different way. Covert operations aimed at achieving political goals are excluded.

Russian intelligence is now establishing links with some special services of other countries. They, in fact, existed before, but on the basis of purely ideological solidarity or joint participation in certain actions. Now we are establishing contacts with the special services of some Western countries, with our former adversary. Moreover, together we are looking for fields of coinciding interests and are conducting joint developments in these fields.

What are these fields? Well, for example, the general interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, tracking the process

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owls, which can lead to an increase in the club of nuclear states. This is the fight against international terrorism. We fight against international terrorism without any discounts, without any attempts to divide international terrorists into our own or not ours. The fight against drug trafficking. The fight against organized crime.

In Russia, unfortunately, organized crime and corruption in the apparatus have reached a fairly large scale. This is not a local phenomenon, there is a certain merging of our mafia structures with structures of a similar kind abroad. Our task, together with our partners, is to trace these links and transfer relevant information to law enforcement agencies, which are called upon to directly carry out this fight.

Another field of convergence of interests. This is tracking those situations that lead to crises in the same third world. An existing conflict can turn into a crisis situation. Careful familiarization with all the circumstances, with all the reasons that push this conflict, push it to the level of a crisis clash, often armed, is necessary in order to take preventive measures to prevent the development of the conflict.

It must be said that in a number of cases states protect different interests - in the economic field, for example, in other areas. In such cases, we agree and undertake obligations, even unilaterally, that we do not work with uncivilized methods. Anything is meant here: both psychotropic drugs and daring recruiting approaches. We agree on the rejection of such methods. Intelligence in the new conditions must act differently, in a civilized manner.

Intelligence is not only the extraction of information, its analytical processing, bringing it to those structures that make decisions. There is another stage in the activities of intelligence that I would like to talk about and that you must know about in order to understand what intelligence does. These are policy assistance measures. For some, this is associated with disinformation, bluffing, launching all kinds of balls, probing, which often lead to paradoxical conclusions about certain actions carried out by the state. This is far from true. Assistance measures are those measures that are carried out to ensure that the policy of Russia, of our state, proceeds better and more effectively.

I'll give you an example. If it becomes known that some country is hardening its position and wants to prevent the G7 from now providing large-scale economic support for the reforms being carried out in Russia, then intelligence methods can and should

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obviously, to bring to public opinion, to the leadership of the countries included in this "seven", the desire of one of the participants and one of the countries to shift the economic burden onto the shoulders

others and take advantage of the situation in order to arouse support for their position on the territorial issue.

Personnel training. We have an appropriate educational institution that prepares personnel from those graduates of educational institutions whom we take on. We need training because we need to provide additional knowledge, additional language training.

Distinguishes intelligence from everything that was in the past, and the system of publicity. Everything used to be behind closed doors.

I confess that I do not understand those who belittle the importance of patriotic feeling. It cannot be opposed to democracy in any way. With all the democratic development, patriotism remains, love for one's state, for one's people. There remains the need to protect the interests of one's state, one's people. And these interests do not necessarily conflict with the interests of other states.

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The spectrum of threats directed against Russia is not reduced

(interview with the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Trubnikov to New Military Review,

No. 26, July 17, 1998)

— Vyacheslav Ivanovich, what do you see as the main threats to the national and state security of Russia?

— The end of the Cold War and Russia's entry into the path of large-scale political and economic transformations, the establishment of cooperation relations with leading Western countries, international financial and economic organizations led to a fundamental change in the situation in the world. An important consequence of the cessation of the long-term military-political confrontation between the two systems was a sharp decrease in the danger of a nuclear war.

At the same time, the spectrum of threats to the new Russian state, although it has undergone serious quantitative and qualitative changes, is, unfortunately, not in the direction of reduction. I mean, first of all, external threats to the security of our country, which in one way or another have or may have an impact on the internal political and economic situation in Russia. Timely detection of such external threats is one of the main tasks of the Foreign Intelligence Service. As is known, the SVR does not deal with internal processes in the country.

It would not be entirely correct to divide threats into large and small, extremely dangerous and not very dangerous, real or supposed. They are as diverse as the world around us, constantly changing: some of them disappear, others increase or new ones appear. This process is permanent and requires constant attention, monitoring and adequate response. The serious socio-economic difficulties the country is experiencing objectively contribute to the expansion of the range of threats.

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If you try to make a conditional gradation of external threats, then I would put in one of the first places attempts to deprive Russia of the status of a great power, push it to a secondary role in world affairs, create a unipolar world under the auspices of the United States and its NATO allies. This striving for all-encompassing dominance clearly conflicts with the objective trend towards a multipolar world order.

The ongoing political and military confrontation between individual countries, the incompleteness of the process of state building in a number of new subjects of international relations, the desire to expand the spheres of influence of regional and global centers of power are accompanied by an aggravation of conflicts, including on the territory of the CIS and in other regions adjacent to our borders. . Many of them affect or may affect the security interests of the Russian Federation.

One can clearly see the desire of the North Atlantic Alliance to become the main instrument for ensuring security not only on the European continent, but also beyond its borders, thus replacing the UN, the OSCE and other international organizations. At the same time, the process of political transformation of NATO does not correspond to modern realities. In this context, the expansion of the bloc's area of responsibility to the countries of Eastern Europe and the encouragement of the aspirations of the Baltic states to join NATO pose a serious threat to Russia's security. The approach of the military infrastructure to the borders of our country, which is still considered as the main potential adversary, directly affects the interests of its national security, requires the adoption of adequate measures to counter the emerging threat.

We cannot but be concerned about NATO's actions aimed at expanding its presence in a number of countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, declaring certain territories, including those covering the CIS countries, as zones of its responsibility.

In our complex, constantly changing world, the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is becoming increasingly important. I fully share the opinion of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the emergence of new nuclear states threatens peace and stability no less than the confrontation between the two powers during the Cold War. It is especially dangerous when weapons of mass destruction appear in countries that are in a state of permanent conflict with each other, or fall into the hands of extremist regimes, and even more so terrorist organizations. No less dangerous is the proliferation of fissile materials, nuclear technologies and means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction carried out outside the framework of

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relevant international structures and generally recognized international legal instruments.

It is well known what priority Russia attaches to the strengthening of all-round cooperation within the framework of the CIS and the creation of a common economic and defense space. However, this line is faced with active opposition from a number of foreign states that are not interested and are clearly afraid of the transformation of the Commonwealth into an effective and powerful organization that contributes to the economic growth of its member countries. In this regard, the real threat to the interests of Russia and the Commonwealth as a whole is the overt and covert encouragement by certain external forces of centrifugal tendencies in the CIS using economic, national, religious and other factors.

Recently, the task of identifying, timely warning and organizing counteraction to attempts from outside to violate the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation has become very urgent. There are numerous facts that testify to the desire of a number of foreign countries to establish direct ties with the regions, bypassing the federal Center, encouraging separatist and nationalist sentiments, including using the religious factor, extremist ideas and movements. One of the main goals of such efforts is to create conditions for the coming to power in the regions of forces capable of withdrawing these territories from the constitutional and legal field of the Russian Federation.

The potential danger is fraught with obvious and, if I may say so, "postponed" for the time being, territorial claims against Russia by a number of neighboring countries.

During the transitional period, serious threats appeared to the economic foundations of our state, due to the well-known transparency of borders and the country's openness to cooperation with the outside world. We are talking about attempts by a number of foreign states to prevent Russia's equal entry into world economic relations, to oust our country from its traditional markets, and to stimulate negative processes in its economy. Threats of an economic nature can also include the penetration into the country of unscrupulous contractors and capital of criminal and dubious origin, the supply of substandard goods, and the illegal export of foreign currency abroad.

Serious attention should be paid to the attempts of foreign countries to use the current economic difficulties of Russia to gain access to the advanced achievements and developments of our scientists in the field of science and technology, to borrow our intellectual potential, including through the technical backwardness of our country. immediate threat

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Russia's security and interests can also be represented by scientific research carried out abroad in the field of creating fundamentally new types and systems of weapons.

Recently, the task of ensuring the environmental safety of the country has become more and more urgent. It is connected primarily with the intentions and attempts to locate hazardous industrial production in Russia, bury poisonous and radioactive waste from abroad on its territory, and other actions potentially dangerous for us in the environmental sphere.

In the age of rapid development of information technologies, a new threat has arisen, called "information war". This concept includes establishing control over the information resources of other states, deterring the development of information technologies in the countries of a potential adversary, the possibility of disrupting or completely disabling information networks and communication systems, creating information weapons and systems to ensure the security of one's own information structure and information flows.

International terrorism, illegal production and trafficking of narcotic drugs, organized crime in all its manifestations, and arms smuggling have become a transnational threat.

I focused on the main, in our opinion, risks and threats to the national and state security of Russia, which arise from the current situation in the country and the world. As mentioned above, they are constantly changing. The task of the Foreign Intelligence Service, along with other government departments, is to timely identify emerging dangers, monitor their development trends, analyze and promptly inform the country's leadership for political decision-making.

- What are the objective and subjective problems, in your opinion, that impede the work of the Foreign Intelligence Service and what are the ways to resolve them?

— The objective difficulties faced by the Foreign Intelligence Service are due to serious problems characteristic of the current state of Russian society as a whole. Nevertheless, the Service functions stably, solves the tasks set by the country's leadership, and meets its mission. For this we have everything you need. We try to use the allocated material resources economically and with maximum efficiency. Of course, we would like to live better, but the existing realities must be taken into account. We are not accustomed to complaining and find mostly positive solutions to emerging problems in cooperation with other departments and with the support of the country's leadership.

The staff of the Service is distinguished by professionalism, devotion to their work and to the Motherland. The reinforcements arriving for reconnaissance are on the whole well prepared and quickly find their place in the general ranks. They leave us mainly for material reasons. The vast majority of employees value and are proud of their work in intelligence. We have good opportunities for self-improvement, sports and recreation.

- How do you assess the progress of the reorganization of law enforcement agencies, and in particular the Foreign Intelligence Service?

— The Foreign Intelligence Service went through a very difficult period of reorganization in late 1991 - early 1992, associated with the separation of intelligence from the structure of the former KGB of the USSR and giving it the status of an independent federal executive body. So in many respects for us it is already a passed stage. We believe that the separation of foreign intelligence from the system of law enforcement agencies was the right step. Having become an independent agency, the SVR carried out the necessary organizational changes. The tasks and structure of intelligence were optimized, which were brought into line with the changed situation in the world and around Russia. This allowed the Service not only to maintain, but also to strengthen its potential for the effective solution of the new tasks that confronted it.

The process of improving the organizational structure of the Service is basically completed. At the same time, we remain highly prepared to maneuver with the available forces and means, to mobilize them in priority areas of intelligence activities.

It seems that the Foreign Intelligence Service has found its organic place in the political system of the state, confirmed by concrete deeds its responsible role in ensuring the security of the country. The demand for its information is growing, which is positively assessed by the Russian leadership and interested departments.

At present, a solid legal base has been laid down for the activities of foreign intelligence. Along with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Law "On Foreign Intelligence" adopted in 1992 became fundamental for the work of the Foreign Intelligence Service, which was then supplemented and revised at the end of 1995 into a new federal law under the same name. According to this law, the Foreign Intelligence Service is an integral part of the country's security forces and, as such, is called upon to protect the security of the individual, society and the state from external threats.

The SVR closely cooperates with other special services of Russia, and in solving intelligence tasks to ensure the security of the Russian Federation, it performs coordinating functions.

Secret intelligence war

(Interview with S.N. Lebedev to the newspaper Trud-7, December 20, 20012.)

The director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Colonel-General Sergei Nikolaevich Lebedev, does not give any interviews. On the eve of his professional holiday, the Day of the National Foreign Intelligence Establishment, he made an exception for the Trud newspaper.

- The President of Russia signed the decree on your appointment on May 20, 2000. At that time, you, Lieutenant General, were the representative of the Foreign Intelligence Service in the United States. Did you expect such an increase?

- To be honest, I did not expect the appointment to the post of director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Later I learned that Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov proposed my candidacy, whom I replaced in this post.

— How true were some statements or, if you like, rumors that you were acquainted with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and even worked with him in the GDR for some time?

- I get asked this question all the time. Yes, we worked simultaneously in the German region, but we did not meet there in person. This is not a conspiracy game, it was.

- How are your relations with the head of state today? How often do you see the president?

— I regularly communicate with the president, often participate in meetings of the security forces, in other meetings held by Vladimir Vladimirovich.

- What do you report, inform the president? In what form do you make your reports?

- There are various types of reports. These are oral reports during meetings, and written reports, and one-on-one communication.

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I have the opportunity, if necessary, to turn to the President at any time.

- How much does it help that the president once worked in the Foreign Intelligence Service?

— Naturally, the president's understanding of the problems of intelligence, knowledge of the specifics of its activities make it easier for me to communicate with him.

— Your predecessors as head of foreign intelligence – Leonid Shebarshin, Yevgeny Primakov, and Vyacheslav Trubnikov – were excellent specialists, let's say, in the southeastern region. You worked in Germany, in the USA - the specifics are different. Has your appointment affected the priorities of today's foreign intelligence? Has anything drastically changed with your arrival in these little more than a year and a half?

- The tasks of foreign intelligence are to reliably protect the state from external threats and do not depend on the "specialization" of its leaders. By the time I was appointed director, intelligence was already a well-established mechanism, and there was no need to change anything. Therefore, no major changes have occurred, the priorities have remained the same. But nuances are introduced every day, depending on the development of the situation in the world. Here, let's say, the topic of missile defense has come to the fore - naturally, we should pay more attention to this problem. Or today the fight against international terrorism is extremely important. And we are looking for additional opportunities in this area, although we have dealt with both before.

Let me get back to your personality. I guess you are fluent in English and German...

— My first foreign language is German, the second is English.

- Could you, if necessary, pass in Germany for your own?

— I worked in all parts of Germany from 1975 to 1995. When I came to reconnaissance, I, a lieutenant, immediately identified the German direction. But what would pass for a German - I'm not sure, it still gives out an accent. It could hold out for a short time, but then they would still recognize it.

- What about English? - English is weaker, there is not enough practice. Although sometimes he conducted conversations himself, when he had to talk without an interpreter.

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- Once it slipped in the press that you, a native Russian, born on April 9, 1948 in the city of Jizzakh, also speak Uzbek. And then, while studying in Chernihiv, they also mastered Ukrainian. This is true?

— When I lived in Jizzakh, I spoke Uzbek, but 36 years have passed since then, and much has been forgotten. Then, having lived for ten years in Ukraine, he also acquired the skills of the Ukrainian language.

Let me turn to more difficult questions. No intelligence service comments on the activities of its agents, their successes and achievements. But there are also failures. Ames, Hanssen, Trofimoff - after all, they were arrested in the States for a reason. Apparently, most often, traitors brought people who collaborated with the SVR. How is foreign intelligence fighting this evil? There is an impression of some kind of impunity. He left, he betrayed, and he certainly showed himself in the memoir genre...

- The SVR is involved in a secret war. In any confrontation, there are victories, defeats, and betrayals. Unfortunately, betrayal is as old as the world, it comes from Judas. But that's the strength of the individual, that she knows how to suppress the low, unworthy in herself. And I note that in the intelligence of people who betrayed, betrayed the Motherland, there are only a few. I treat them the way one can treat them, with the deepest contempt.

Investigations are underway on them, criminal cases are initiated. If there is an opportunity to hold accountable, then this is done. If they are abroad, the sentences are passed in absentia. Our service has long abandoned special events such as "a person got hit by a car" or "got pricked with an umbrella." Nevertheless, we monitor the activities of the renegades, including, as you put it, their "epistolary works".

— Sergey Nikolaevich, did you ever cross paths with Major General Kalugin, who testified against Trofimoff at a recent trial?

- I saw him there from afar at some events and receptions.

— There is a relatively new version that Kalugin's wife fell seriously ill, and the Americans put pressure on him: either you go to court to testify, or you roll out.

— I doubt this version. I think that Kalugin has long been ripe for betrayal, and there was no need to put pressure on him.

- Many employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service claimed in the press that Kalugin was recruited by the Americans at a young age. - Can't be ruled out. But enough about Judas.

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Let's talk about those whom you believe and trust then. Is there a big competition for your Intelligence Academy?

— Our selection is purely individual, lengthy, painstaking. They come to us with desire, and strong guys from prestigious universities. They say that in the early 90s, some applicants began to write the word "dollar" in exams with a capital letter, and Motherland - with a small one. Yes, you do not record on a tape recorder, this is an anecdote of those years. Seriously, the good guys are coming. By the way, knowing in advance that they doom themselves to not the most prosperous material position.

- But you can pay your employees - they almost always have two higher educations, with several languages - a decent salary.

We pay for knowledge of languages. But what is important here is not the allowance, but the base salary. And if our employees are well provided for abroad, then in Moscow I fight tirelessly for a salary increase. Russian intelligence deserves more.

Is there something in intelligence that in our purely practical time is called self-sufficiency? Or maybe bring some profit?

"Intelligence information by itself is invaluable. It helps to make informed government decisions in various areas of real life today. And what are the values to measure the value of intelligence that helped to resolve the most complicated interstate conflict or prevent human casualties? But there is also a material equivalent. For example, scientific, technical, economic information brings an effect that is measured by numbers with many zeros.

- Relatively recently, "Trud" spoke in some detail about two married couples of illegal intelligence officers - the Vartanyans and the Mukaseys. Thank you for providing this opportunity. Gevorg Andreyevich Vartanyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Are there any Heroes of Russia among the current employees?

- Every year, many scouts receive high awards. Consequently, intelligence exists and solves its tasks. And we have Heroes of Russia, working and acting, but whom we have not named yet.

- Do I understand correctly that your last position before being appointed director - the representative of the Foreign Intelligence Service in the United States - was part of the cooperation between the special services of the two countries that was already planned then?

- I maintained contacts with the American intelligence services - with the CIA, with the FBI and these leaders, experts. Met more than once

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multiple times with the head of the CIA, George Tennen, and with Louis Free, now the former director of the FBI. We talked in a formal setting, although we also met at receptions, for example, on Christmas occasions, and on other pleasant occasions. American colleagues are highly qualified professionals.

- An unexpectedly flattering assessment ... - I strive to be objective. As far as I know, they also have a very high opinion of the professional qualities of our intelligence officers.

— But how then to explain that neither the CIA nor the FBI could prevent what happened on September 11?

— In this case, I would like to refrain from evaluating the activities of the CIA and the FBI. Much should be learned from their bitter experience.

— And what matters did you talk about with your American colleagues?

— Exchanged information on an equal footing. It seems to us that, among other things, this helped to prevent some possible terrorist attacks.

- Can't you be more specific? Well, at least one example.

- We informed our partners about possible threats to human lives ... We received similar information from them. More specifically, believe me, I can not.

How is cooperation going today?

- These days, the priority is the closest cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. But the details are so serious that I have no right to disclose them. Painstaking work is being carried out, and we are closely exchanging (not only with colleagues from the United States, but also with the special services of countries in Europe, Asia,

Africa) information important for ensuring the security of our states. There are a number of threats in the world that can only be prevented by working together.

— Partnerships and cooperation are, of course, wonderful. But President Bush still brings surprises. Did the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty come as a surprise to you?

- Neither for me, nor for all the experts who deal with this issue, there could not be a surprise here. We, for example, knew that the announcement of the withdrawal is a matter of days.

- You are probably one of the most knowledgeable people in our country. They say knowledge multiplies sorrow.

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Are you quoting Ecclesiastes to me? Greater awareness in intelligence comes with greater responsibility, and the burden of responsibility has never been light.

— Well, if we return to international cooperation, is there any interaction with the special services of Muslim states?

— These partnership contacts exist. Terrorism also worries Muslim countries, some of them are taking rather harsh measures against terrorist groups. In Algeria and Egypt, for example, rather radical steps were taken. But after all, in many states, not only Muslim ones, even until recently Chechen extremists were treated quite loyally. A certain turn took place after 11 September. The exchange of information between the countries of the world community is now taking place at a different, higher quality level. If earlier this exchange was periodic, spontaneous, then today it has assumed, as we say, a permanent character. These days the world has grown wiser, it has understood that the main threat comes not from some one or two states, but from a phenomenon. For example, international terrorism. And that is why today everyone is forced to fight it. But what worries me? Will the operation in Afghanistan be completed, bin Laden will be found, and then everyone will again disperse "to their apartments"? Will we continue to assume that terrorists, like cockroaches, each has his own? In these coming years, we will understand if humanity has become smarter after all this drama. Or is there only enough memory for a few seasons? But after all, the network of international terrorism has spread, many organizations, movements, groups continue to operate. The ideological and financial sources of the phenomenon are not in Afghanistan, they are still preserved in other countries. International terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking - these are the ones we are fighting in Chechnya. Among the bandits fighting there are terrorists from all over the world. Up to the Slavic mercenaries.

— How do you feel about finally talking a little about the personal? I remember that your predecessors as director always lived in a service apartment, more precisely, a cottage, about two hundred meters from the place of work. And you? Also settled here, outside the city?

- Yes, in a country house next to the Service. It's very convenient for me. You could say I live at work.

- Have your houses been privatized yet? This, I think, is done in many organizations.

- What are you talking about? It didn't even cross our minds. The man worked, left, another replacement moved in.

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- Is your family with you?

"My wife and I have been together for 32 years. Vera Mikhailovna is a chemical engineer. We have two adult sons, both of whom have received higher education and are now working in the economic field. Grandson Vitalik

for three and a half years now. We have a strong friendship with him.

Does he know who you are? - Not yet. But one day, when he saw me for the first time in a photograph in a military uniform, he was surprised: "Grandfather Seryozha, it turns out, is a policeman!"

- And how is your working day? Suddenly, yes, free time falls out - what are you looking at? You are a fit, athletic-looking person...

- Not enough time for sports. Before, when I lived in Uzbekistan, every summer I climbed the mountain ranges of the Tien Shan, and earned the first category in tourism. At the institute he took up classical wrestling, but continued to go to the mountains. There he received the first category in shooting. Now, when there is an outlet, I try to tinker in the country, chop firewood, talk with my grandson. There is a birch tree, a Christmas tree and fruit trees planted by me on the site. My wife is the chief agronomist, designer, but I am basically a rough workforce. I try to help my wife as much as possible: work in the country is an endless land.

- Where are you going - to the ballet, to the stadium? And who are you rooting for? Dynamo has always been preferred in your department.

- I am a board member of the Dynamo Council. But, forgive me sportsmen, I have time to cheer only for the national teams of Russia. There is no time for clubs, there is a lot of work to do. It's hard for me to get somewhere. Unless occasionally to the theater or to a concert.

- Many of your colleagues in the profession, who have worked abroad for many years, are "spoiled" by their love for foreign drinks. Not in the sense that they drink too much, but in a different way: they prefer whiskey or fine French wines during the holidays. How about this case for you? What glass, for example, will you raise today, on the day of a professional holiday - the Day of an employee of the Foreign Intelligence Service?

I love dry red wines. I like varieties of Cabernet, not only French, but also Bulgarian, Moldavian, Romanian. And on a holiday, I will probably raise a glass of Cabernet Sauvignon. For the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, for its employees and for our colleagues from other state security agencies. For their health, well-being and success. And of course, for Russia, which we served, we serve and will continue to serve.

Interviewed by Nikolai Dolgoplov

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Intelligence Awards

Along with state awards in any professional community, departmental awards, which are the highest sign of professional distinction, invariably enjoy well-deserved honor.

Not deprived of departmental awards, testifying to their special professional merits, and Russian foreign intelligence officers.

Since the foreign intelligence of our country was created and operated for a long time as part of the state security agencies, their highest departmental insignia were at the same time honorary awards for the "fighters of the invisible front".

Let us recall in a few words the initial organizational forms of the state security bodies, which included foreign intelligence:

— On December 20 (according to the new style), 1917, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VChK) under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR was created

- On December 20, 1920, Dzerzhinsky signed order No. 169 on the creation of the Foreign Department (foreign intelligence) of the Cheka.

— On February 6, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR abolished the Cheka and formed the State Political Directorate (GPU) under the NKVD of the RSFSR

— In connection with the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (December 30, 1922), by a resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on November 2, 1923, the United State Political Directorate (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was created

From the first day of its existence, the activities of the state security agencies have been fully supported by the country's leadership. The employees of the Cheka, who were especially distinguished at that time, represented

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were going to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner. It was established on September 16, 1918 and was the first official award of the RSFSR. At the same time, it was practiced to award an honorary revolutionary military weapon - a Mauser or a saber - with the image of the badge of the order. But the owners of such awards among the Chekists were few.

The leadership of the Cheka understood that in order to encourage employees for the successful conduct of specific operations and the performance of other special tasks, a system of departmental awards was required. At the initial stage, it included the awarding of prizes, certificates and thanks from the Presidium of the Cheka. Then the most deserving Chekists were given military weapons, gold or silver watches and cigarette cases with the corresponding inscriptions: "For the ruthless fight against the counter-revolution", "For selfless Chekist work", "For the successful execution of an operational assignment". The institute of departmental awards of the state security bodies gradually developed and improved. However, the highest award was not required. And it was introduced soon after.

Representatives of the first generation of scouts on especially solemn occasions proudly wore the badge "Honorary Chekist" on their chests.

This sign was established on July 12, 1923 by order of the Collegium of the GPU No. 304 as an addition to the title "Honorary Chekist" introduced in December 1922 on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the state security agencies (VChK-GPU).

The description of the sign stated:

"The honorary jubilee badge of the VChK-GPU is an oval hoop made of matte silver with the inscription "VChK - 1917 - 1922 - GPU". A hammer and sickle are placed on a hoop crossed with a sword. The emblem is bordered by the Roman numeral "five", covered with red enamel. On the back of the badge its serial number is engraved.

The badge was awarded to particularly distinguished employees of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence, as well as servicemen of the border service on behalf of the Collegium of the GPU-OGPU until December 1932. It was the highest departmental award of the state security agencies. Almost 800 people became holders of the sign before the introduction of the new one.

The regulation on the sign, approved on July 19, 1923 by order of the Collegium of the GPU No. 307, noted that it was given "the value of the award of the most worthy employees of the Cheka-GPU, who deserved to be especially noted for their work in the bodies of the Cheka-GPU." The order of awarding provided for work experience in the bodies of at least three years. Along with the badge, the recipient was given a certificate in the form of an identity card with a photo and bound in leather.

The place for wearing the sign was determined by special order No. 123 of June 18, 1926, which, in particular, stated:

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"1. Employees and servicemen of the OGPU shall be given the right to wear a badge of honor on uniform both in the ranks and outside it, in addition to the badges allowed by the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR this year. No. 140, the following badges:

a) Badge of honor, established in memory of the fifth anniversary of the existence of the VChK-GPU.

6) The sign of the Dynamo sports society.

2. The honorary badge of the OGPU is worn on the left side of the chest in the place established by clause 24. of the Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR No. 140 for wearing the Order of the Red Banner. In the presence of the Order of the Red Banner, the OGPU badge of honor should be worn to the left of it.

The badge of the Dynamo sports society should be worn above the flap of the left breast pocket.

3. Notify the relevant heads of garrisons about the establishment of the wearing of the indicated badges ... "

Badge "Honorary Chekist" No. 1 was awarded to F.E. Dzerzhinsky. Among the employees of the Foreign Department (foreign intelligence) of the GPU, one of the first to receive this honorary sign was S.G. Mogilevsky, A.P. Fedorov, G.S. Syroezhkin and S.V. Puzitsky.

In December 1927, the state security organs of the USSR celebrated their 10th anniversary. By this time, only a year had passed since the death of their permanent leader F.E. Dzerzhinsky. In memory of the fearless "knight of the revolution", the Collegium of the then United State Political Administration established a commemorative badge with the profile of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, framed in a laurel wreath, against the background of the Red Banner with the numbers "1917" and "1927" in its upper left and right corners. The banner lay on an oval, in turn, edged on both sides with wheat ears topped with a five-pointed star. In the lower part of the token there were two crossed swords, above which hung a ribbon with the abbreviation "O.G.P.U.".

This commemorative token was awarded to both regular and civilian employees of the OGPU. Cases were noted of awarding it to the widows of those who died at the post of Chekists, including foreign intelligence officers. So, V.R. On behalf of the Collegium, Menzhinsky handed over the anniversary badge "X years of the OGPU" to M.I. Popova - the widow of a foreign intelligence officer L. Kh. Popov, who died while performing an assignment from the OGPU. At the same time, as noted above, the staff members of the OGPU (including those who worked in the Foreign Department) continued to be awarded the "Honorary Chekist" badge.

On November 9, 1929, by its order No. 245, the Collegium of the OGPU approved the "Statute of the rights and obligations of the Chevalier of the Badge of Honor of the Cheka-OGPU .. It, in particular, emphasized:

"1. The Cavalier of the Badge of Honor of the Cheka-OGPU is awarded the title of Honorary Worker of the Cheka of the OGPU.

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The honorary title of Chekist requires vigilance, determination and courage.

An honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU, wherever he is, is always obliged to maintain live communication with the organs of the OGPU and provide them with all kinds of assistance and assistance.

2. The title of Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU is retained even when moving from the bodies of the OGPU to another, party, Soviet and professional public work.

3. An honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU (upon presentation of a letter) has the right to unimpeded entry to all bodies of the OGPU.

4. For an honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU upon dismissal from service, with the transition to state support - the pension is increased by 10%.

5. In the field of public and welfare and sanitary services for the personnel of the OGPU bodies, the Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU of the current composition and who is on special records, and their families, are given the priority right:

a) for free treatment,

6) in receiving resort and sanitary assistance,

c) in the state of members of the cooperatives of the bodies of the OGPU,

d) in a state by members of the PSO "Dynamo",

e) in the state of members of the clubs of the bodies of the OGPU,

f) the pre-emptive right to be sent to the Rabfak, to universities and other educational institutions,

g) placement of their children in children's institutions and schools of the OGPU bodies,

h) preservation of living space in houses under the jurisdiction of the OGPU.

b. An honorary worker of the VChK-OGPU of the current composition, when traveling along railway and waterways, both on business and on vacation, is granted the right to travel in a soft place (by letters).

7. An honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU, out of service in the OGPU bodies, retains the right to wear uniforms with insignia previously assigned in service, received at the state expense from the relevant OGPU body on time and at the rate of allowance determined by the current orders of the OGPU.

8. An honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU is exempt from requiring a permit (certificate) for the right to acquire, carry and store weapons. A certificate of the Board of the OGPU on the Badge of Honor serves as a certificate for these rights.

9. For the restoration of health, an honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU (even if not working in the bodies of the OGPU) is given the right to receive a non-refundable cash allowance once a year.

10. Honorary worker of the Cheka-OGPU, who is on a special register of the OGPU:

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a) enjoys the right to receive extraordinary housing and additional space,

6) cannot be evicted by administrative procedure from houses subordinated to and attached to institutions and organizations.

11. The deprivation of the title of Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU and, accordingly, the badge can take place only by a special resolution of the Collegium of the OGPU.

On November 23, 1932, Order No. 1087 was issued by the OGPU, which stated: "In commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the VChK-OGPU, establish an honorary badge of the VChK-OGPU, to which to assign

the significance of the highest award of the OGPU Collegium ... The badge of honor of the 5th anniversary of the VChK-GPU, as the highest award of the Collegium, remains with the workers who were awarded it, and is not replaced by a new badge. The new award compositionally repeated the badge "Honorary Chekist", only the Roman numeral "five" in the center of the badge was replaced by the Roman numeral "fifteen". The wording in the award letter, which was presented along with the badge: "For the merciless struggle against the counter-revolution", has not changed either.

Like the previous honorary badge "5 years of the VChK-GPU", the new badge was awarded for "outstanding services", but at the same time, the service record of the recipient in the state security bodies had to be at least ten years.

Among the first honorary badges "15 years of the Cheka-OGPU" were awarded: the head of foreign intelligence A.Kh. Artuzov, an illegal intelligence agent B.Ya. Bazarov, prominent scouts P.Ya. Zubov and M.A. Allahverdiv, as well as many other representatives of the cohort of the first generation of Soviet foreign intelligence officers.

On July 10, 1934, the OGPU was renamed the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) and incorporated into the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR.

On November 6, 1940, instead of the title "Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU", the title "Honored Worker of the NKVD" was introduced.

For the successful completion of responsible intelligence missions and many years of impeccable service, foreign intelligence officers also began to be awarded the badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD".

The Regulations on the badge approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR stated:

"1. The badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD" is established to reward the personnel of the bodies and troops of the NKVD of the USSR for merits in the leadership or direct performance of work to protect the state security of the USSR.

2. Awarding with the badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD" is made by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Simultaneously with the badge, a diploma is issued.

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3. Those awarded with the sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD" serve as an example of exemplary performance of their duties. They must be selflessly devoted to the party of Lenin Stalin, vigilant and merciless in the fight against the enemies of the Soviet state.

4. Those awarded with the badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD" have a priority right to receive housing in the houses of the NKVD.

5. The awarded may be deprived of the sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD" for misdeeds discrediting the title of Chekist by order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR."

The description of the new departmental award read:

"The sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD" has an elliptical shape of steel color with a ribbed surface. In the center of the ellipse, against the background of red enamel depicting the rays of the rising sun, there are a sword, a sickle and a hammer, bordered by a red enamel ribbon with the inscription "NKVD" in the center. The hammer and sickle and the hilt of the sword are gilded. The badge is made of silver.

Among the intelligence officers, the first holders of this highest departmental award, in particular, were: Lieutenant General Fitin, head of Soviet foreign intelligence on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War; his deputy, Lieutenant General Sudoplatov, who simultaneously headed the 4th Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB during the war years and led the partisan and

reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines; illegal intelligence agent I.A. Akhmerov, active scouts of the Republic of Ingushetia. Inoyatovi Z.I. Voskresenskaya-Rybkina, illegal intelligence officer A.F. Kamaeva-Filonenko.

On March 13, 1954, the state security bodies were separated from the internal affairs bodies into a separate department - the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Foreign intelligence became part of the KGB as the First Chief Directorate. The formation of an independent State Security Committee required, over time, the establishment of a special Chekist award, which was at one time the badge of the "Honorary Chekist". Therefore, on December 6, 1957, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the VChK-KGTB bodies, the badge "Honorary State Security Officer" was established by order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to reward especially distinguished employees. At the same time, it should be noted that if the main element of all previous signs was the sword ("smashing sword of the dictatorship of the proletariat", "punishing sword of the revolution"), the second important element appeared for the first time on the new sign - the shield (as a new attribute, a symbol of state security organs). aimed at protecting the Motherland).

Rewarding for specific achievements in work with the badge "Honorary State Security Officer" was a special distinction for the intelligence officers of the 1950-1980s. The description of the sign said:

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"The sign "Honorary State Security Officer" is a slightly convex figured shield, crossed vertically by a sword. In the center of the shield is a gilded five-pointed star with a hammer and sickle, framed by a red enameled ribbon with the inscription "Honorary State Security Officer". The badge is made of oxidized tombac."

The Regulations on the badge "Honorary State Security Officer" provided for the following benefits for those awarded: extraordinary receipt of living space in the houses of the KGB, and after dismissal, the right to use departmental clinics and the right to wear military uniforms.

This badge, which continued to be called "Honorary Chekist" in the professional slang of state security officers, in different years became such wonderful illegal intelligence officers as V.G. Fisher (Rudolf Abel), A.M. Korotkov, Africa de Las Heras, Hero of the Soviet Union G.A. Vartanyan, Galina and Mikhail Fedorov, a member of the famous "Cambridge Five" intelligence officers Kim Philby, awarded in 1996 the title of Heroes of the Russian Federation L.R. Kvasnikov, A.A. Yatskov, V.B. Barkovsky and A.S. Feklisov, as well as many other foreign intelligence officers.

On July 14, 1990, on the eve of the 70th anniversary of foreign intelligence, the badge "For Service in Intelligence" was established to reward the most distinguished employees of the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

It is a shield and a sword (which have become traditional elements of state security agencies) made of oxidized copper-nickel alloy (melchior) with a stylized five-pointed relief star made of non-oxidized cupronickel placed on them.

On the plane of the star there is a round plate made of brass alloy with a relief edging and raised inscriptions around the circumference "For service in intelligence" and PGU (since August 1993 - SVR). In the center of the overlay there is a convex image of the globe, partially covered with blue enamel, bordered by olive and oak branches of golden color. In the upper part of the overlay there is an asterisk covered with red enamel. On the reverse side is the serial number of the sign.

Sign height - 48 mm, width - 35 mm.

With the separation of foreign intelligence in October 1991 into an independent department, the badge "For Service in Intelligence" became the highest departmental award - recognition and certificate

professional merits of an employee of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

Together with the badge "For service in intelligence", the recipient is given a certificate and is paid a one-time monetary reward.

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The badge for No. 1 was awarded to the distinguished intelligence officer George Blake.

In connection with the 70th anniversary of foreign intelligence, its employees who served in intelligence for at least fifteen years were also awarded the anniversary badge "70 years of INO PSU". In 1995, in connection with the 75th anniversary of foreign intelligence, the jubilee badge "75 years of INO-PGU-SVR" was established.

On November 14, 1995, the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service signed an order establishing a departmental medal "For Distinction in Military Service" of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd degrees to reward foreign intelligence officers for impeccable service in terms of seniority. This medal replaced the abolished in 1992 departmental medal "For Impeccable Service" I, 2nd, 3rd degrees.

In order to encourage the military personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation for their professional merits and many years of conscientious work, on May 28, 1997, the President of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 530 "On the establishment of the honorary title "Honored Officer of the Foreign Intelligence Agencies of the Russian Federation"". The same Decree approved the Regulations on the honorary title "Honored Officer of the Foreign Intelligence Bodies of the Russian Federation" and the description of the badge for the honorary title.

It should be noted that simultaneously with the introduction of the honorary title for employees of foreign intelligence agencies, the Decree of the President of Russia also established the honorary titles "Honored Border Guard of the Russian Federation" and "Honored Officer of the Security Bodies of the Russian Federation".

The Regulations on the honorary title "Honored Officer of the Foreign Intelligence Bodies of the Russian Federation" state:

"The honorary title "Honoured Foreign Intelligence Officer of the Russian Federation" is awarded to servicemen of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation for merits in protecting the country's security from external threats and who have been in military service for 15 years or more in calendar terms."

Awarded with this honorary title, a badge is awarded.

"The badge made of silver 40 mm high and 30 mm wide has the shape of an oval wreath. The wreath is formed by laurel and oak branches. The ends of the branches crossed at the bottom are tied with a bow.

On the top of the wreath is the State Emblem of the Russian Federation.

On the front side, in the central part, a cartouche with an inscription - the name of the honorary title of the Russian Federation - is superimposed on the wreath.

The form of the badge is the same for all honorary titles of the Russian Federation.

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On the reverse side there is a pin for attaching the badge to clothing.

Thus, the honorary title "Honored Officer of the Foreign Intelligence Bodies of the Russian Federation", being a state award, has become at the same time the highest form of professional

a real difference for the employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

In June 1999, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Decree "On conferring the honorary title "Honored Officer of the Foreign Intelligence Bodies of the Russian Federation"" to the first four most distinguished members of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

In order to strengthen the cooperation of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia with creative organizations and cultural figures of the country, as well as to stimulate the creation of highly artistic works of literature, art and culture about Russian foreign intelligence, on January 5, 2000, by order of the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Prizes of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia for the best works were established in the field of literature and art about Russian foreign intelligence.

Since 2000, the annual prizes have been awarded to the authors of the three best works in literature, theatre, cinema, music, fine arts, dramaturgy, television or journalism dedicated to Russian foreign intelligence and intelligence officers.

The award-winning author is awarded the badge "Award of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia", a Laureate Diploma and a one-time monetary reward.

On December 20, 2000, on the day of the 80th anniversary of INO-PSU-SVR, the prizes were awarded to the first laureates. They were: Teodor Gladkov, writer - for a documentary story about N.I. Kuznetsov "From the scene of the assassination attempt disappeared ..."; Vadim Kirpichenko, veteran of the Foreign Intelligence Service, for the book of memoirs "Intelligence: Faces and Personalities" and Yevgeny Potievsky, film director, for creating a series of documentary television films about the history of Russian foreign intelligence.

In 2000, in connection with the 80th anniversary of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the jubilee badge "80 years of INO-PGU-SVR" was established.

The jubilee badge "80 years of INO-PGU-SVR" was awarded to military personnel of the Foreign Intelligence Service who had been in military service in the PGU KGB-SVR for at least 15 calendar years and had specific results and distinctions in operational and service activities, as well as Russian foreign intelligence veterans who were in the reserve (retired) and on a permanent basis made a specific contribution to the activities of the Foreign Intelligence Service units.

The sign is a triangular shield made of oxidized cupronickel elongated towards the bottom. Along the shield there is a sword with a golden-coloured tompak handle protruding above it and the tip of the sword descending under the shield. The blade of the sword is made of oxidized cupronickel.

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On the plane of the shield with the sword there is an overlay made of tombac - a golden wreath: on the right - from oak, and on the left - from laurel leaves. At the bottom of the wreath are the numbers "80" covered with red enamel. Above them is a fantasy fluttering ribbon with red enamel. On the ribbon there is a relief inscription in golden color: "INO-SVR-PTU". The inscription is crushed along the break of the tape. The middle part with the abbreviation "SVR" is protruding and slightly raised.

Above the ribbon on the wreath is a relief five-pointed stylized star made of non-oxidized cupronickel. On the plane of the star there is a round tombac overlay with a convex golden inscription on the tinted surface of the circumference: "Fatherland Valor Honor".

In the center of the blue enamel overlay there is a convex contour image of the system of geographic coordinates of the globe.

The height of the sign is 48 mm, the width is 35 mm.

The badge was accompanied by a certificate.

In order to improve the system of departmental awards and incentives, in April 2002, by order of the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the medal of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation "For Merit" was established.

The medal, which is a departmental award of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, is awarded to:

- employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service who have made a significant contribution to the organization, implementation and maintenance of intelligence activities;

- persons who have made a great personal contribution to the strengthening and development of interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia;

- persons providing significant assistance to the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia in ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation.

The medal of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia "For Merit" is made of cupronickel and has the shape of a regular circle with a diameter of 32 mm.

On the obverse side of the medal there is a relief image of the emblem of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service: in the center of the five-pointed star formed by strals, there is a medallion with a schematic representation of the globe; parallels and meridians are depicted along the field of blue enamel; the globe is framed by a convex inscription "Fatherland Valor Honor"; the field of the inscription is separated from the slings by a welt, the lower ends of the star are covered with a ribbon with enamel in the colors of the state flag of the Russian Federation; below, under the ends of the branch star: on the right - laurel, on the left - oak.

On the reverse side of the medal around the circumference is the inscription "Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation", in the center ~ "For Merit".

All inscriptions and images on the medal are convex. The edges of the medal are bordered on both sides.

The medal is fastened with an eyelet and a ring to a pentagonal block covered with a silk moiré ribbon with stripes: yellow - 1.5 mm, blue - 9 mm, yellow - 1.5 mm, red - 4 mm, white - 4 mm and red - 4 mm. Tape width 24 mm.

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In March 2004, by order of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, a departmental award of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation was established - the medal "Veteran of the Service".

The medal is awarded to servicemen of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service who have irreproachably served for 25 or more years in calendar terms, of which, as a rule, at least 10 years in the PGU of the KGB-SVR of Russia.

The medal of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia "Veteran of Service" is made of tompak, silver plated (dark silver), has the shape of a regular circle with a diameter of 32 mm.

On the front side of the medal, in the center, against the background of a convex image of a shield and a sword, there is a five-pointed stylized star of light silver color with a size between opposite peaks of 25 mm. In the center of the star is a convex image of the globe, partially covered with blue enamel. At the bottom of the medal around the circumference is a silver inscription: "Veteran of Service".

On the reverse side of the medal there is an image of crossed laurel branches along the circumference. From top to bottom, relative to the center, there is a convex light silver inscription "Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation".

The front side of the medal is oxidized. The reverse side of the medal is matte. The medal is bordered.

The medal is connected with an eyelet and a ring to a pentagonal block covered with a cornflower blue silk moire ribbon 24 mm wide with four orange and three black alternating stripes along the right edge of the ribbon, then a gray stripe and two yellow stripes along the left edge, alternating with cornflower blue stripe. The width of orange, yellow and black stripes is 1 mm, gray - 5 mm.

The departmental medal of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia "For Interaction", established in November 2004, is intended to reward persons who have provided significant assistance to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation in the performance of its assigned tasks.

It is a classic ten-pointed order star, composed of two stars of the coat of arms of the SVR of Russia, the upper one is white metal, the lower one is yellow metal, which is shifted along the axis by 36 degrees.

The size of the star is 38 mm between the tips of the rays diagonally. In the center of the sign on a schematic representation of parallels and meridians along a convex plane of a blue background are golden continents, outside the grid of meridians along a dark red circle is a golden inscription of the motto: "Fatherland Valor Honor".

In the lower part between the letters there are ~ three separating stars of yellow metal. In the upper part, the medal is attached to a standard pentagonal block with the help of an eyelet and an adapter ring. The width of the moire silk ribbon is 24 mm. The left side is traditional

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for the award system of the SVR of Russia: yellow-cornflower blue-yellow, respectively: 1 mm, 10 mm, 1 mm. Right side: white-cornflower blue-yellow-red-yellow-cornflower blue-white in the ratio 1, 2, 1, 4, 1, 2, 1 mm.

On the reverse side of the medal, along the matte plane of the lower star, there is an inscription in a circle: "For interaction", at the bottom, horizontally in two lines, the inscription "Russian Foreign Intelligence Service".

In order to encourage employees of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation for specific results in operational and service activities, in 2005 the medal of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia "For Distinction" was established.

At the heart of its composition, the medal has a five-pointed white metal coat of arms star of the SVR, rusticated along the rays in the form of "drop silver". In the center is a convex yellow metal image of the continents with the surface of the seas and oceans filled with blue enamel, through which schematic parallels and meridians are applied in blue enamel. The globe is bordered by a dark red ribbon outlined on both sides with a yellow inscription of the motto: "Fatherland Valor Honor" with three stars separating the letters in the lower part of the ribbon. On the lower rays of the star there is a figuratively lined ribbon in the colors of the tricolor. The star reclines on a golden laurel wreath of glory.

The upper ray of the star is attached to a standard pentagonal block with a silk moiré ribbon 24 mm wide by means of an eyelet and an adapter ring. The left side of the ribbon is traditional for the award system of the SVR of Russia (yellow-cornflower blue-yellow, respectively: 1 mm, 10 mm, 1 mm). The right part is red-blue-red, 4 mm wide each.

On the reverse side, on a matte plane, the inscriptions: "SVR of Russia", below - "For Distinction" and even below - No.

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The diameter of the circumscribed circle of the medal is 38 mm.

In 2005, in connection with the 85th anniversary of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the jubilee badge "85 years of INO-PGU-SVR" was established. It is designed to reward distinguished servicemen of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service who are in military service in the KGB-SVR of Russia.

not less than 15 years in calendar terms, and civilian personnel of the Foreign Intelligence Service with at least 15 years of work experience in the KGB-SVR of Russia.

The jubilee badge "85 years of INO-PGU-SVR" is a triangular shield elongated towards the bottom. Along the shield there is a sword with a protruding hilt and the point of the sword descending under the shield. The shield and sword are made of oxidized nickel silver.

On the plane of the shield there is a brass overlay - a golden wreath: on the right - from oak, and on the left - from laurel leaves. At the bottom of the wreath are the numbers "85" covered with red enamel. Above them is a fantastically fluttering ribbon of blue enamel with embossed golden

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the inscription: "INO-SVR-PGU". The inscription is crushed along the break of the tape. The middle part with the abbreviation "SVR" is protruding and slightly overestimated.

Above the ribbon along the wreath is a relief five-pointed stylized star made of non-oxidized nickel silver. On the plane of the star there is a round tombac overlay with a convex golden inscription on the tinted surface of the circumference: "Fatherland Valor Honor".

In the center of the overlay on blue enamel is a golden image of the continents of the globe.

Fastening - on the screw. Sign height - 48 mm, width - 35 mm.

Throughout the history of the existence of our state, its foreign intelligence officers have waged a tense struggle on an invisible front. This struggle also had its heroes, which the public will learn about only after many years. But a modest sign of professional distinction on a civilian suit of a veteran can testify better than any words to the considerable contribution that this person made to ensuring the security of the Fatherland.

Afterword

The sixth volume completes the publication of the essays "History of Russian Foreign Intelligence". From volume to volume, from essay to essay, the reader has the opportunity to trace the main milestones in the formation and development of Russian foreign intelligence: from its first steps at the time of the birth of Russian statehood to the present day; get acquainted — within the limits allowed by the requirements of secrecy — with the tasks it solves, the main directions of its activity, and some striking operations. The team of authors set as its main goal to show that at all stages of the life and activities of foreign intelligence, its service to the Fatherland, concern for the external security of its Motherland, increasing its glory and wealth run like a red thread.

The creation of a domestic foreign intelligence service, the changes in its structure and activities that took place in the process of its development and were reflected in the six-volume edition, were not accidental. They were determined by the specific political and operational situation in the country and abroad, and other objective factors. The Foreign Department (INO) of the Cheka was created on December 20, 1920 due to the urgent need to protect the young Russian state from the intrigues of numerous external enemies that encroached on its independence and territorial integrity.

Already at the initial stage of their activities, INO employees managed to achieve impressive results. They were able to infiltrate the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of a number of foreign states, emigrant centers, open and put under control their channels of communication with the counterrevolutionary underground in the USSR. Such operations as "Syndicate", "Syndicate-2" and "Trust" are widely known, as a result of which the subversive activities against the USSR of some foreign centers and their leaders were neutralized. These operations, by their design and implementation, have become a

material. They formed the basis of numerous memoirs, fiction books and films.

In the 1930s, when the National Socialists came to power in Germany, and the threat from militaristic Japan increased in the Far East, the main object of intelligence attention was the preparation of these countries for war against the USSR. The Soviet leadership decided to expand the range of tasks assigned to foreign intelligence, to strengthen its personnel. And we have every reason to be proud of the results of the work of our predecessors. The striking operations of that period include the creation of operational positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Communications and the apparatus of the National Socialist Party of Germany, the receipt of secret materials from Japanese institutions in China, Korea, and European countries. In 1934-1936, valuable sources were acquired in England, among them the famous "Cambridge Five". All this made it possible to gain access to very important information from the leading circles of these states.

Intelligence has constantly increased its contribution to the strengthening of the country's defense capability, the development of its economy, science and technology. In the prewar years, valuable materials were obtained on aircraft and engine building, radio communications, military optics, the production of synthetic gasoline, chemical protection equipment, as well as on new types of warships, submarines, and artillery systems.

To meet the growing needs of intelligence in professionally trained personnel, the School of Special Purpose was established in 1938. By the middle of 1941, more than 120 employees left its walls, who were sent to the most difficult areas of reconnaissance work.

The Great Patriotic War demanded a huge effort from foreign intelligence. The government was regularly informed of undercover information about the state of the German army and its planned military operations. Intelligence warned in time about the preparation of the Wehrmacht for a summer offensive on the Eastern Front in order to break through to Stalingrad, a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge and many other military plans of the German command.

Through intelligence capabilities in various states, valuable information was obtained in a timely manner about the military-political plans of the countries of the fascist bloc, behind-the-scenes maneuvers of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition related to the opening of a second front and the post-war structure of Europe. Intelligence uncovered the preparations that had begun abroad for the creation of atomic weapons, and even during the war years began to obtain the necessary information on this problem.

It is impossible not to mention the direct participation of intelligence in the combat operations of the Great Patriotic War. So, already at the end of June 1941, the preparation and deployment of reconnaissance and sabotage groups behind enemy lines began. In total, during the war, it was prepared

but more than 2200 such groups. For exploits in the fight against the enemy, nine security officers-intelligence officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, many employees were awarded military orders and medals.

In general, foreign intelligence made a great contribution to achieving a turning point in the course of the war and securing victory.

In the post-war years, in the conditions of a tough confrontation between the former allies and the unfolding Cold War, the role of intelligence and the information it obtained continued to grow. During this period, the restructuring of intelligence agencies was repeatedly carried out in order to increase the efficiency of their activities and search for optimal forms of management. In 1954, the First Main Directorate of the KGB was created, important documents were adopted that specified the tasks of intelligence in relation to the new situation. Three main areas of its activity were identified - political intelligence, scientific and technical intelligence and foreign

counterintelligence, appropriate organizational measures were taken. In subsequent years, the activity of foreign intelligence acquired a virtually global character.

The processes that began in our country in the second half of the 1980s, the change in priorities in foreign policy, left their mark on the entire operational activity of intelligence, put forward new tasks for it. With the liquidation of the State Security Committee, the First Main Directorate was transformed into the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. A legal basis was placed under the activities of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which determines its place in the country's security system and establishes direct subordination to the President of the Russian Federation.

Taking into account new priorities and real opportunities, the Service has focused its efforts on those regions of the world where Russian interests are present to the greatest extent. Today, the objects of its intelligence aspirations are individual states and their alliances, the political course of which constitutes a real or potential threat to Russia and its security; foreign special services working against our country and its foreign intelligence; international terrorist and other criminal organizations.

In accordance with the status, the main goal of the activities of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is to ensure the national interests and security of the country by carrying out intelligence activities abroad and within the territory of the Russian Federation. It conducts intelligence activities in the political, economic, scientific, technical, environmental spheres, as well as in the areas of information security, the security of Russian foreign agencies and Russian citizens sent abroad who hold secrets.

These tasks are solved by the Service in cooperation with other state bodies. A feature of intelligence activities is always

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there were and still are the use of specific forces, means and methods, the possibility of their quick and effective use in a complex, constantly changing environment.

For 80 years foreign intelligence has traveled a long and difficult path. There have been major successes and bitter failures. We have accumulated rich, sometimes unique, experience in conducting intelligence work. This experience can rightfully be considered a national treasure that needs to be carefully preserved and creatively developed. It provides an opportunity to learn both from our mistakes and from the mistakes of our opponents, to draw useful lessons from intelligence operations of the past and present. The value of this experience in the training and education of young intelligence officers is invaluable.

The six-volume edition "History of Russian Foreign Intelligence" contributes to ensuring the continuity of generations of intelligence officers and the use of the accumulated experience of past years, fidelity to the traditions of serving one's Fatherland.

Today, the Service lives a busy, full-blooded life. In organizing its activities, it takes into account the radically changed international situation. New political and geographical realities emerged. Crisis phenomena and conflicts approached the borders of Russia and even affected its territory. The existing system of international relations is being transformed. There is a change of priorities in the policy of most states and they are looking for new ways to ensure their interests, which are far from always favorable for Russia. The problem of maintaining its territorial integrity arose.

The unipolar world has not led to the end of confrontations in the international arena. The spectrum of threats to the security of the Russian Federation remains diverse.

Today, the Foreign Intelligence Service is busy solving both traditional and new intelligence tasks. Of great relevance, in particular, in the activities of the Service has acquired

assistance in the development of relations with the CIS countries, integration processes within the Commonwealth.

Difficult tasks stand in the economic direction. They are caused by attempts from the outside to prevent our country from equal participation in world economic relations, the desire to use financial and economic levers to impose approaches that are beneficial to the West in solving internal political and social problems.

Foreign intelligence contributes to the recovery of the economy not only by obtaining reliable information about real and potential threats to economic security, but also by concrete assistance by means of intelligence in strengthening Russia's positions in world markets, in developing mutually beneficial cooperation, and eliminating discriminatory barriers.

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Meeting the requirements of life, foreign intelligence is actively working on operational and informational support of the international negotiation process with the participation of Russia on economic and monetary and financial issues, protecting the national economy from capital of criminal and dubious origin.

Foreign intelligence continues to build up efforts to promote the country's technical progress and strengthen its defense, industrial, scientific and technical potentials.

In the fight against international terrorism, organized crime, and the drug business, intelligence contributes to the unification of the efforts of various countries to neutralize these transnational threats. The service takes an active part in ensuring the necessary conditions for the completion of the antiterrorist operation in the North Caucasus, countering attempts to discredit Russia in connection with the events around Chechnya.

At present, the SVR increasingly has to work in extreme situations. Taking into account the experience of the Kosovo, Middle East and other crises, intelligence is improving the mechanism for making organizational and managerial decisions to ensure the actions of the Center and foreign agencies according to a single plan and plan, clear coordination of interaction at all levels, including with federal agencies.

Acting in different directions, intelligence does not forget about the opportunities provided by the channel of interaction with the special services of foreign states. It is effectively used on a mutually beneficial basis to solve specific operational and informational tasks.

Intelligence activities are highly valued by the country's leadership, as the President of the Russian Federation has repeatedly said.

The main wealth of intelligence is the people who work in it. Our success depends most closely on the business and personal qualities of those who work in it today or will come tomorrow. The service needs employees with good professional training, broad erudition, and high moral qualities. They are subject to such important requirements as fidelity to duty and devotion to the Motherland, honesty, decency, diligence, responsibility for the task assigned, psychological stability, the ability to navigate difficult situations and make non-standard decisions. The selection and education of cadres meeting these requirements is a matter of constant concern for intelligence.

The entire long history of domestic foreign intelligence is most closely connected with the fate of the country. At all stages of its history, it remained a reliable and effective tool for solving vital tasks for the state, faithfully served the people and always strived to fully meet its purpose. It will continue to be so.

APPLICATION

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FEDERAL LAW ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE Adopted by the State Duma on December 8, 1995

This Federal Law defines the status, principles of organization and functioning of the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation, the procedure for control and supervision of its activities.

Chapter I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation

Foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation as a set of bodies specially created by the state - foreign intelligence bodies of the Russian Federation - is an integral part of the security forces of the Russian Federation and is designed to protect the security of the individual, society and the state from external threats using the methods and means specified by this Federal Law.

Article 2. Intelligence activities

Intelligence activities are carried out by the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation through:

1) obtaining and processing information about real and potential opportunities, actions, plans and intentions of foreign states, organizations and persons affecting the vital interests of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as intelligence information);

2) assistance in the implementation of measures taken by the state in the interests of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation.

The need to carry out intelligence activities is determined within the limits of their powers by the President of the Russian Federation and the Federal Assembly, based on the impossibility or inexpediency of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation in other ways.

Article 3. Legal Basis for Intelligence Activities

regulations of the Russian Federation, this Federal Law, other federal laws and other regulatory legal acts of federal organizations

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new state authorities concerning foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation.

The foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, within their powers and in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, issue regulatory legal acts regulating their activities.

Article 4. Principles of intelligence activities

Intelligence activities are carried out on the basis of the following principles:

1) separation of powers of federal executive bodies that are part of the security forces of the Russian Federation;

2) legality;

3) respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen;

4) accountability to the President of the Russian Federation and the Federal Assembly;

5) combinations of overt and covert methods and means.

Article 5. Purposes of intelligence activities

The objectives of intelligence activities are:

- 1) providing the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly and the Government of the Russian Federation with the intelligence information they need to make decisions in the political, economic, defense, scientific, technical and environmental fields;
- 2) providing conditions conducive to the successful implementation of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of security;
- 3) assistance to economic development, scientific and technical progress of the country and military technical security of the Russian Federation.

Intelligence activities cannot be carried out to achieve inhumane goals, as well as to achieve goals that are not provided for by this Federal Law.

Article 6

In order to achieve the goals of intelligence activities, the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are granted the following powers:

- 1) establishment on a confidential basis of cooperation relations with persons who voluntarily who consented to this;
- 2) implementation of measures to encrypt the staff and organize its activities using other departmental affiliation for these purposes;
- 3) use for the purpose of secrecy of documents that encrypt the identity of personnel, departmental affiliation of units, organizations, premises and vehicles of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation;
- 4) interaction with federal executive bodies engaged in counterintelligence activities and federal state security bodies of the Russian Federation;

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- 5) conclusion of agreements with federal executive authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations of the Russian Federation, necessary for the implementation of intelligence activities;
- 6) organizing and ensuring, within its competence, the protection of state secrets in institutions of the Russian Federation located outside the territory of the Russian Federation, including determining the procedure for the implementation of physical and engineering protection of these institutions, measures to prevent leakage through technical channels information constituting a state secret;
- 7) ensuring the safety of employees of institutions of the Russian Federation located outside the territory of the Russian Federation, and members of their families in the host state;
- 8) ensuring the security of citizens of the Russian Federation sent outside the territory of the Russian Federation, who, by the nature of their activities, have access to information constituting a state secret, and members of their families who are with them;
- 9) interaction with the intelligence and counterintelligence services of foreign states in the manner prescribed by this Federal Law;

10) creation of special educational institutions, institutions for advanced training, scientific research organizations and archives, issue of special publications;

11) ensuring their own security, that is, protecting their forces, means and information from illegal actions and threats;

12) creation of organizational structures (divisions and organizations) necessary for the functioning of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.

In order to carry out its activities, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation may, under its own licensing and certification, acquire, develop (with the exception of cryptographic means of protection), create, operate information systems, communication systems and data transmission systems, as well as means of protecting information from leakage through technical channels.

Article 7

The foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are financed from the federal budget. Draft cost estimates for the maintenance of foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are considered at closed meetings of the relevant committees (subcommittees) of the chambers of the Federal Assembly and are approved at closed meetings of the State Duma and the Federation Council.

The material and technical support of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation is carried out at the expense of the centralized resources of the Russian Federation, as well as by acquiring the necessary material and technical means from enterprises, institutions and organizations.

The foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation may have service housing stock formed in accordance with the procedure established by the Government of the Russian Federation.

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Article 8. Protection of information about the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation

A person admitted to information about the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation goes through the procedure for issuing access to information constituting a state secret, unless another procedure is provided for by federal laws. This procedure includes the acceptance of a written undertaking not to disclose this information. Violation of this obligation entails liability established by federal law.

Documents from the archives of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, which are of historical and scientific value, declassified in accordance with federal law, are transferred for permanent storage to the State Archival Service of Russia.

Documents of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, containing information about their personnel, about persons providing (rendering) confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, as well as about the methods and means used by these agencies, are stored in the archives of the foreign intelligence agencies. intelligence of the Russian Federation.

Article 9

In order to inform the public about their activities, the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and their employees communicate with public associations, with the media and with citizens of the Russian Federation through the relevant services created for this purpose in the structure of these agencies.

Materials provided to the media about the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation must not contain information constituting a state secret.

Information affecting the personal life, honor and dignity of citizens, which became known to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation in the course of their activities, is not subject to disclosure, with the exception of cases provided for by federal,

by law.

In order to prevent the possible use of the mass media to disclose information about the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation constituting a state secret, the authors of materials prepared for publication on the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation or the editors of the mass media who have received these materials have the right to apply for an expert conclusion to the relevant foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation, which in this case must establish the presence or absence of the specified information in these materials and submit such a conclusion to the author or to the editorial office of the mass media.

The publication by the mass media of materials on the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation containing information constituting a state secret, which led to its disclosure, or the publication of information that does not correspond to reality, which caused moral or material damage to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, their employees, entails a liability under federal law.

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Chapter II

Article 10

Intelligence activities are carried out both by independent and by foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation that are part of the structure of other federal executive bodies.

The creation, reorganization and abolition of an independent body of foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation are carried out in the manner established by the federal law regulating the formation of federal executive bodies.

Decisions on the creation, reorganization and abolition of the foreign intelligence body of the Russian Federation as part of the federal executive body are taken by the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the head of the relevant federal executive body.

Regulations on foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 11

Intelligence activities within the limits of their authority are carried out:

- 1) The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation - in the political, economic, military-strategic, scientific, technical and environmental spheres, as well as in the field of ensuring the security of institutions of the Russian Federation located outside the territory of the Russian Federation and seconded outside the territory of the Russian the Federation of Citizens of the Russian Federation who, by the nature of their activities, have access to information constituting a state secret;

2) foreign intelligence agency of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation - in the military, military-political, military-technical, military-economic and environmental spheres;

3) by the foreign intelligence agency of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the President of the Russian Federation - in the political, economic, military and scientific and technical fields through the use of radio electronic means;

4) by the foreign intelligence agency of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation - in the field of protection of the State Border of the Russian Federation, the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation.

The intelligence activities of the federal security service agencies are carried out in cooperation with the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and in accordance with the Federal Law "On Federal Security Service Bodies in the Russian Federation".

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Article 12

The general leadership of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation is carried out by the President of the Russian Federation.

President of Russian Federation:

- 1) determine the tasks of intelligence activities;
- 2) controls and coordinates the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation;
- 3) takes decisions, within the limits of authority determined by federal laws, on issues related to the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation, including on the advisability of concluding agreements of an interdepartmental nature between the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and intelligence and counterintelligence services; bami of foreign states;
- 4) appoints the heads of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.

Article 13. Methods and means of intelligence activities

In the process of intelligence activities, the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation may use overt and covert methods and means, the special nature of which is determined by the conditions of this activity.

Methods and means of reconnaissance activities should not harm the life and health of people and cause damage to the environment.

The use of methods and means of intelligence activities in relation to citizens of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Russian Federation is not allowed.

The foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, in order to achieve the goals of intelligence activities, have the right to use information systems, video and audio recording, film and photography, the removal of information from technical communication channels, as well as other methods and means that meet the requirements of part two of this article.

The procedure for using covert methods and means of intelligence activities is determined by federal laws and regulatory legal acts of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.

The content of regulatory legal acts on the use of covert methods and means of intelligence activities is a state secret.

Ensuring one's own security is carried out by the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation in accordance with the Federal Law "On Operational-Search Activities".

Article 14 Provision of intelligence information

Intelligence information is provided to the President of the Russian Federation, the chambers of the Federal Assembly, the Government of the Russian Federation and the federal executive and judicial authorities designated by the President of the Russian Federation, enterprises,

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institutions and organizations. Intelligence information may also be provided to federal executive bodies that are part of the security forces of the Russian Federation.

The heads of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation bear personal responsibility to the President of the Russian Federation for the reliability, objectivity of intelligence information and the timeliness of its provision.

Heads and other officials of federal legislative, executive and judicial authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations, members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma, who are provided with intelligence information, bear the responsibility established by federal law for disclosing the information contained in it constituting a state secret or disclosing the sources of said information.

Article 15

The principles and forms of interaction between the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, both among themselves and with the federal executive authorities engaged in counterintelligence activities, and the federal state security agencies of the Russian Federation are determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation and concluded agreements based on it.

Relations between the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and the intelligence and counterintelligence services of foreign states are established on the basis of international treaties of the Russian Federation, including treaties of an interdepartmental nature.

Within the framework of established relationships, official representatives of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are sent to foreign states in the manner determined by the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 16

The federal executive authorities assist the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation in carrying out their intelligence activities, if it is not related to a change in the main areas of activity of the said federal executive authorities. Reimbursement of expenses for rendering such assistance is carried out at the expense of the federal budget.

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The procedure for interaction between the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and the federal executive authorities in matters relating to the provision of assistance to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation in carrying out intelligence activities is determined by the President of the Russian Federation.

The terms of relations between the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and the federal executive authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations of the Russian Federation are established by the relevant agreements.

Chapter Sh

Article 17

Employees of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are servicemen and employees of the cadre and not included in the cadre of military personnel, employees and workers who voluntarily entered military service or work in these bodies, respectively.

An employee of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation may be a citizen of the Russian Federation who, due to his professional qualities, age, education and state of health, is capable of fulfilling the duties assigned to him.

The military personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are subject to the federal laws governing military service, taking into account the features established by this Federal Law and other federal laws, due to the specifics of the functions performed by these military personnel.

Military service in the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation is carried out on conscription and under a contract. Conclusion of contracts with servicemen performing military service on the territory of the Russian Federation is carried out in accordance with the procedure established by the Law of the Russian Federation "On Military Duty and Military Service". The procedure for concluding contracts with students of higher educational institutions of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and with military personnel seconded outside the territory of the Russian Federation, and the content of these contracts are established by departmental regulatory legal acts. In this case, material liability of the parties for non-fulfilment of the terms of the contract may be provided.

The age limit for the military personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation to be in military service is established by the head of an independent foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation or the head of the federal executive body, which includes the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation, in the manner determined by the President Russian Federation,

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but it cannot be less than the age limit established by federal law.

Employees and working bodies of the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation are subject to the rights, obligations and benefits provided for by the labor legislation of the Russian Federation.

Employees of the cadre and military personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation cannot be members of public associations pursuing political goals.

Employees who are not part of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, and workers of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation may not create public

associations pursuing political goals.

Article 18

The personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation include military personnel and employees of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation appointed to the appropriate positions, whose functional duties are directly related to the implementation of intelligence activities. The list of personnel positions is determined by the regulations on the relevant foreign intelligence body of the Russian Federation.

Information about the belonging of specific individuals to the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, including employees dismissed from these bodies, constitutes a state secret and can be made public only with the sanction of the head of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation, and in cases not related to business necessity, and with the mandatory written consent of these persons.

Employees of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, in order to fulfill their functional duties, may, in accordance with the requirements of this Federal Law, without disclosing their affiliation to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, hold positions in federal executive bodies, at enterprises, in institutions and organizations. Officials of the said federal executive bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations shall bear the responsibility established by federal laws for disclosing information about the affiliation of these employees to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.

Employees of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are prohibited from taking tacit participation in the activities of legislative (representative) or judicial authorities, as well as public associations and religious organizations in the Russian Federation in order to influence the nature of their activities.

Employees of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are not entitled, unless it is due to official necessity, to engage in other paid activities in combination, with the exception of teaching, scientific and other creative activities carried out with the consent of the head of the relevant foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation. Federation.

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Article 19

In order to achieve the goals of intelligence activities, the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation may establish, on a gratuitous or reimbursable basis, relations of cooperation with adult capable persons who voluntarily agreed to provide confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation. The procedure for relations with such persons is determined by the regulatory legal acts of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.

The foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are not entitled to seek confidential assistance from members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, deputies of legislative (representative) bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, judges of the courts of the Russian Federation and prosecutors of all levels in the Russian Federation, clergymen and authorized representatives of officially registered in the Russian Federation of Religious Organizations.

Information about persons providing (provided) confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation is a state secret and declassified due to the expiration of the maximum allowable period for classifying information constituting

state secrets are not subject. Access to this information is only available to the head and authorized by him employees of the relevant foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation.

In order to ensure the safety of persons providing (providing) confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, and their family members, measures may be taken to protect them, which do not violate the rights and legitimate interests of other persons.

The procedure for holding such events is determined by the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 20

Employees of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation bear the duties and have the rights provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation for citizens of the Russian Federation, with the exception of restrictions established by federal laws.

Military personnel, employees and workers of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are under the protection of the state. No one, with the exception of bodies and officials directly authorized to do so by federal laws, has the right to interfere in the official activities of employees of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.

The protection of life and health, honor and dignity, as well as the property of employees of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and members of their families from unlawful encroachments and threats in connection with the implementation of intelligence activities is provided by the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation in the manner established by federal laws. horses.

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The status of an employee of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation may not be used for purposes incompatible with his functional duties.

Article 21

An employee of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation is responsible for the committed offense in accordance with federal laws.

Belonging to the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation and being involved in intelligence activities do not release an employee of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation from liability to federal laws.

Article 22

Social protection of employees of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and members of their families is guaranteed by federal laws.

All employees of the staff of these bodies are subject to compulsory state personal insurance at the expense of the federal budget in the amount of their fifteen-year monetary allowance.

Damage caused to the health of a staff member of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation or a member of his family in connection with the performance of intelligence activities shall be compensated in full at the expense of the federal budget. From the same funds, the said persons are paid a one-time allowance in the amount of their annual to seven years of monetary allowance, established on the day the allowance is calculated, depending on the degree of disability.

In the event of the death of a staff member of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation or a member of his family in connection with the implementation of intelligence activities, the state pays the costs of preparing for transportation and transportation of the remains to the burial place specified in the will or indicated by close relatives (in the case of their absence). - actions - by the leadership of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation), as well as the costs of burying the remains of an employee of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation. The family of the deceased is paid a one-time allowance in the amount of his fifteen-year monetary allowance, established on the day the allowance is calculated. In addition, the family of the deceased enjoys benefits in dealing with issues of social welfare in the manner prescribed by federal laws.

The state is obliged to facilitate in every possible way the unconditional release of a staff member of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation and members of his family detained, arrested or convicted outside the territory of the Russian Federation in connection with the implementation of intelligence activities.

In case of full or partial loss of professional suitability by an employee of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation as a result of his decoding or other reasons beyond his control

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For some reason, the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation is obliged to employ the specified employee or create conditions for his professional retraining, including compensation for related expenses.

Property damage inflicted on a staff member of the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation and members of his family in connection with the performance of intelligence activities shall be compensated by the state at the expense of the federal budget in accordance with the civil legislation of the Russian Federation.

In the event that employees of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, who are not part of the staff, are involved in the performance of one-time reconnaissance missions and the consequences ensuing in connection with this are listed in parts three to seven of this article, these employees are subject to the rights benefits and privileges provided for employees of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation.

Article 23

A person who provides (provided) confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation and is not a citizen of the Russian Federation may, at his request, be granted citizenship of the Russian Federation in the manner prescribed by federal laws.

The period of cooperation of a person admitted to the citizenship of the Russian Federation with the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation is included in his seniority. Social protection of such a person is carried out in accordance with parts three through seven of Article 22 of this Federal Law.

Social protection of a person who provides (provided) confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agency of the Russian Federation and is not a citizen of the Russian Federation is carried out in the manner established by the President of the Russian Federation.

Chapter 1U. CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BODIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Article 24

Parliamentary control over the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation is carried out in the manner established by federal laws, as well as by checking by the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation the execution of the cost estimates approved by the State Duma and the Federation Council for the maintenance of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation. For these purposes, a special group is being created in the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation from among its members.

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The specified group has the right to request from the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation documents on the implementation of cost estimates, to hear at its closed meetings the reports of the heads of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation on these issues.

Relations between the chambers of the Federal Assembly and the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are carried out through the relevant committees (subcommittees) created by each from the chambers.

Members of the said committees (subcommittees) and the special group of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, employees of their offices shall have the right to start fulfilling their duties in exercising the functions provided for by this article only after obtaining access to information constituting a state secret, in the manner established by the Law of the Russian Federation "On State Secrets".

Members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma receive information about the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation exclusively through the relevant committees (subcommittees) of the chambers of the Federal Assembly.

The actions of members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma, employees of the apparatus of the chambers of the Federal Assembly should not create a threat of disclosure of information about persons providing (rendered) confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, about the belonging of specific individuals to the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, as well as the methods and means used by these bodies.

Article 25

Supervision over the execution of federal laws by foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and prosecutors authorized by him.

Information about the persons providing (provided) confidential assistance to the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, as well as about the organization, methods and means of carrying out the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, is not included in the subject of prosecutorial supervision.

Chapter V. FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 26

This Federal Law shall enter into force on the day of its official publication.

From the moment this Federal Law comes into force, the following legislative acts of the Russian Federation shall be recognized as invalid:

1) Law of the Russian Federation "On Foreign Intelligence" (Bulletin of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, 1992, No. 32, art. 1869);

2) Decree of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation of July 8, 1992 "On the Enactment of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Foreign Intelligence"" (Vedomosti of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, 1992, No. 32, art. 1870).

Propose to the President of the Russian Federation and instruct the Government of the Russian Federation to bring their regulatory legal acts in line with this Federal

by law.

President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin

Moscow. Kremlin January 10, 1996 No. 5-FZ

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Clarification

O.I. Nazhestkin is also the compiler of the documentary supplement to volumes 3-5

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